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 Primo Capitolo 
 
Chapter 1 - Water, Regulation and Democracy      
 
 
 
This thesis aims to be a cultural thesis, paying tribute to the Culture of Rules 
on the issue of Water,  in a country, and in a  period, where the social meaning of it  
seems to be apparently faded, or missing. 
 
THE QUESTION OF THE CHAPTER 
 
Which cultural conditions do allow for a more sustainable and democratic approach to water and which 
regulatory conditions are noted having been established by societies and economies in order to set a 
democratic ‘ pattern of rules’ that paves the way for a sustainable water policy ? 
 
 
CONTENT OF THIS CHAPTER 
 
This chapter provides an oversight of the regulatory discourse created in the recent decades around the 
highly debated issue of water management and water privatisation, within a context of a globalized society.  
 
In the Premise the global water issue is overseen from a general perspective. The aim is to draw a broad 
picture which may help private and public actors to reflect on the consequences that may affect a country 
with its  political economy in case of distortions of democratic dynamics in the management of its water 
and environmental resources . An overlook on the theory of Sustainability is given. 
 
In the second part, the glance of Environmental History offers a journey through two different cultural 
environments in different historical times and geographic areas, that are the Progressive era in Us and the 
Struggle for Water in Lake District. The attempt is to analyse which Cultural characteristics allowed, in 
both cases, for the raise of water and environmental consciousness and consequent Regulatory reforms in 
both countries. Attention is paid on the Cultural Environment that allowed for the reform, or judgment, 
taking place. It is illustrated the story of how the cultural and political process did start and in which 
cultural conditions favoured the establishment on new rules. The two major stories of reference, are 
respectively:  the story of the Progressive Movements in early XX century US and the story of a Social 
struggle which happened in Britain during the 80s, and the victorious  battle of common people to protect 
their natural heritage against the unrelenting requests of the industry on the environment, in a pattern of 
consumption characterized by and increasing pressure on water resources. The Community fought and 
won.  
 
Aim of this Chapter is helping the  reader in drawing out  from each of  these true stories - each with its 
own regulatory legacy - lessons and hints for his own reflection and action in the present time  as these are 
stories of hope and may well be fancied to be applied to environmental and water policy making of any 
country, in any time. 
 
 
 
The language of the chapter is maintained intentionally bi-linguistic, as a special dedication to readers of 
different cultural pattern. 
 
Premessa,  per il Lettore italiano. 
 
 
Alla luce della caratteristica di potenza indefinita nella pluralità di tematiche che il tema 
dell’acqua può sollevare in sé per la sua infinita poliedricità di sfaccettature e di possibili 
approcci offerti allo studio di specialisti di ogni genere e disciplina -  e, questo proprio per la 
sua caratteristica di elemento pluri-valente, onnipresente e multilegante dei diversi aspetti della 
realtà del vivere umano - partendo dalla sua realtà biologica e fisica, dalla sua afferenza 
contemporanea e mai contrapposta alla sfera naturale come a quella spirituale, oppure 
all’ambito organizzativo e industriale dell’organizzazione di una società tanto quanto agli 
aspetti comunitari e più ricreativi della sua economia , dalla sua pertinenza tanto alla politica 
organizzativa di uno stato quanto alla sua struttura economica, alla sua politica industriale, o a 
quella sociale, l’acqua catalizza e raccoglie  in sé una tale poliedricità di proiezioni, immagini 
ed aspettative che sarebbe oltremodo ingenuo il pretendere di esprimerli tutti in un’unica 
trattazione, affermando o illudendosi di perseguire esaustività sull’argomento. Per questo 
motivo, la scelta del tema della seguente trattazione poggia su un argomento, che, per scelta e 
per sua natura, condensa in sé una tale densità e numero di problematiche caratterizzanti il 
profilo di una società e di una economia moderna - afferenti tra l’ altro ad una pluralità di sotto-
tematiche multi-disciplinari – da dimostrare nel proprio stesso ‘consistere’ quella pluralità di 
mondi cui una entità come l’Acqua può appartenere ( nel senso, inglese, di ‘pertain’ ), che 
vengono messi in luce ove affrontati dallo  
 
1 Frontiera intensa nel senso di Marchis : ‘un territorio di confine culturale tra discipline diverse’ 
 
 2Vilfredo Pareto, ingegnere, economista e sociologo italiano dell’800. Ha teorizzato l’ottimo  paretiano, cioè il 
massimo di efficienza allocativa di una risorsa, date certe condizioni non mutabili al contorno dell’ organizzazione 
della produzione. 
 
scienziato con rigore e con la dovuta ampiezza e poliedricità di sguardo, ove possibile, e con 
la necessaria cura e precisione di approccio tipici dell’applicazione di un metodo scientifico di 
fondo, ancorché riferito ad un ‘ territorio di frontiera1 ‘, al quale la water politcs può dirsi di 
appartenere. 
 
    Di fronte ad una tale pluralità di temi, che affrontano l’acqua partendo da una 
molteplicità di direzioni e sfaccettature, questa Tesi rivolge la propria originaria curiosità sull’ 
indagine dei modi e delle tecniche di Regolazione di quei  fenomeni e dei processi che si sono 
osservati accadere intorno, a causa o in seguito alle decisioni prese dai governi, allorquando 
sono state intraprese svolte storiche di innescare meccanismi di  privatizzazione dell’acqua ( 
cioè del servizio di fornitura idrica ) seguendo quelle logiche che, in base ai dettami della 
moderna economia neoclassica, porterebbero , almeno in teoria, all’inseguimento  di una 
‘efficienza’ ottimale dei sistemi, secondo la il concetto di ottimo paretiano2, ma che , di fatto 
si sono risolti, in molti casi  generando la miseria sociale e perturbazione nelle economie che 
li hanno imprenditorialmente introdotti. Una tematica , questa,  che  sin degli anni giovanili ha 
sempre solleticato in modo serio la mia curiosità di studente, e, benchè fossi così ancora poco 
attrezzata (unequipped) a fronteggiare con competenza un argomento così complesso, sin dagli 
inizi , mediante  tentativi forse ancora un po’ goffi ed impropri - tipici dei giovani esemplari 
di ogni specie, scientifica e naturale - l’ ho abbracciato,  nella misura in cui mi è stato reso 
pervio l’ accesso al conoscere, con giovanile entusiasmo e totale passione cercando di  
comprenderne, per quanto possibile, l’interezza della problematica, nella maniera più ampia 
cui fosse permesso di accedervi ad un semplice studente di dottorato. 
Ne è risultato un lavoro ampio e articolato di ricerca , di cui questa tesi riesce ad essere appena 
ventilata immagine, ma segno concreto, bozza visibile, di forma scritta, che vuole restituire 
propositiva immagine di un possibile approccio scientifico di sintesi ad una problematica tanto 
accesa e oltremodo dibattuta come quella del corretto approccio metodologico ad una risorsa 
tanto preziosa e strategica la cui conoscenza, amministrazione e gestione, e l’apprezzamento 
del cui valore sono meritevoli della pacatezza di una riflessione scientifica il più possibile pura 
dei troppi tecnicisimi linguistici che, sovente, allontanano il lettore ‘non-specialista’ dalla 
comprensione delle cose anziché spianargli la strada verso nuovi e più evoluti orizzonti di 
conoscenza. 
 
Piccola nota Recente della Storia della Regolazione dell’Acqua in Italia (e non solo). 
Tra i molti esempi di casi in cui necessita una regolazione specifica, nella gestione settore 
dell’acqua, è il caso della Privatizzazione dell’acqua. 
La privatizzazione dell’acqua rappresenta in sé un tema che ha catalizzato gli interessi di un 
pubblico molto vasto, per la sua complessità e ampiezza di implicazioni, ed in Italia, come 
ovunque nel resto del mondo, è stato al centro del dibattito politico e scientifico in occasione 
e a causa di alterne vicende, non ultima l’indizione di vari Referendum ad Iniziativa popolare 
che hanno visto le società civili, tra cui quella italiana, mobilitarsi nelle forme di una 
sensibilizzazione trasversale in un ampio ed organizzato movimento civile  su questo tema. 
Questi movimenti ovunque sono occorsi hanno saputo operare dal basso un’azione di 
sensibilizzazione capillare e di sostegno tra tutte le fasce della popolazione civile sollevando 
il dibattito e il confronto sul tema dell’acqua e dei servizi idrici, e risvegliando nei cittadini 
una consapevolezza profonda del valore e dell’importanza della gestione di una risorsa così 
strategica nell’ambito della politica pubblica. 
 
 
Where Regulation is Needed.  The case of Water Privatization  
 
 
“ Privatization, in the water sector involves transferring some or all of the assets 
or operations of public water systems into private hands. There are numerous ways 
to privatize water, such as the transfer of the responsibility to operate a water 
delivery or treatment system, a more complete transfer of system ownership and 
operation responsibilities, or even the sale of publicly owned water rights to 
private companies ”.  
(from Gleick)  
 
 
Since 1990, water privatisation - that means turning over part of the entirety of the assets of 
water management from a public system to a private company  - spread widely worldwide.  
Although for many privatization is seen as necessary step towards the improvement of the 
efficiency in water management systems, as well as a quick way to raise funds for 
infrastructural expansions, for states cronically lacking funds, as many colleagues within the 
water sector  (Gleick, Hall, Johnstone & oth.) the writer shares the belief that privatisation 
requires strong oversight through regulation of the entire process, for public interest to be 
adequately upholden. 
 
Prices, Commerce, Ownerships and Transfers: Water as an ‘Economic good’. 
 
Commodification 
 
” is the process of converting a good or service formerly subject to many 
non-market social rules into one that is primarily subject to market rules 
. “  
                              ( from Gleick & oth ) 
 
 In the last decades, the idea of  water as an ‘ economic good ’ has become a widespread reality, 
transferring into practise the concreteness of what such a definition involves in several places 
around the world.  International development agencies that used to work with governments to 
improve water services started, in the latest decade, to promote privatization efforts (Gleick , 
Hall & oth ). Private companies have been invited to take over the management, operation and, 
sometimes, the ownership of public water systems. A system of prices for customers have been 
set, for a system which used to provide citizens water for free, and sustained through the 
general tax system. The commerce of bottled water developed exponentially.  Even the idea 
of  transfer of fresh water from water rich regions to water scarce regions, or even across 
borders, has become extremely popular and started to be implemented everywhere. 
 
 
Globalization , Privatization and Failure of major objectives for Privatizing. 
  
Globalization 
 “ Globalization is defined as the process of integrating and opening 
markets across national borders. The entire process of globalization is 
highly controversial, raising great concern about national sovereignty, 
corporate responsibility, equity for the world’s poorest people, and the 
protection of the environment. The controversy extends to proposals to 
encourage large-scale trading of freshwater across borders. Indeed, 
among the most controversial water issues today are questions about 
how to implement – indeed,  whether to implement – international water 
trading and sales.” 
        ( from Gleick & oth ) 
 
Inevitably, the trend toward globalization and privatisation of fresh water cannot be stopped, 
and sometimes the presence of a private partner can help communities that are totally lacking 
a basic water and sanitation infrastructures to receive the possibility of access to these basic 
services. This should be done with caution, and following rules that will be described onward 
in the chapter. In the case of a country with a strong regulatory structure, letting private 
companies take responsibility for  some aspects of water provision,  or management, can help.  
Nevertheless there is little doubt that the reckless rush toward private markets has failed to 
address some of the most important issues and concerns about water. 
 
( Per il Lettore italiano.. ) 
 
Il problema del Controllo della Privatizzazione. 
 
Uno studio dei fattori che determinano le condizioni storiche attraverso  cui gli stati 
pervengono a scelte politiche di privatizzazione dei propri beni, o alle condizioni che possono 
condizionarne lo sfociare verso esiti  più o meno favorevoli per il comune cittadino, non può 
esimersi dall’osservazione delle dinamiche economiche, sociali e politiche attraverso cui gli 
stati e le società pervengono ad ottenere il controllo su questi nuovi sistemi i quali, sino a poco 
prima, si trovavano ad essere sotto la più ampia tutela derivante dall’esercizio del diritto di un 
regime di proprietà pubblica. 
Inoltre, il problema di sorvegliare, da parte delle società civili questi complessi processi globali 
che implicano una improvvisa, e talvolta sconsiderata, vendita a privati di servizi pubblici 
essenziali (come l’acqua, il telefono o l’elettricità),  fino a quel momento posseduti e operati 
perseguendo la finalità del bene pubblico,  è stato dimostrato essere un problema in comune a 
tutte  le società dei paesi del  mondo più diversi, in tutte le più recenti decadi.   
In particolare, nello specifico rispetto della tutela degli interessi dei singoli cittadini, e delle 
economie nel loro complesso - tanto nei paesi industrializzati come in quelli in via di sviluppo 
- l’economia odierna presenta in sé, nella propria struttura, una serie di fattori esacerbanti che 
aggravano, per se, gli aspetti di complessità e inafferrabilità che caratterizzano le dinamiche 
di privatizzazione.  Un primo determinante fattore è la natura ad alta intensità di capitale 
(capital-intensive) di questo tipo di industrie, le cui decisioni di investimento vengono ormai 
fortemente influenzate dall’andamento del mercato in un’economia mondiale dove ormai non 
sussistono più limiti e barriere legate alla presenza degli stati che si oppongano al flusso dei 
capitali tra paesi. Questo è molto evidente nelle industrie manifatturiere e in quelle tipiche 
nella filiera alimentare, ad elevato consumo di acqua,  dove le industrie e le corporations già 
routinariamente muovono le loro operazioni attraverso i confini nazionali, spesso spinte dalla 
mera logica di sfuggire il maggior costo economico di produzione che viene loro imposto dalle 
nazioni industrializzate nell’applicazione di legislazioni a più elevati standard ambientali e 
sociali La ricerca del minimo carico regolatorio come criterio in base al quale orientare la 
scelta della localizzazione degli impianti, si registra in verità anche per le corporations 
dell’acqua, dell’energia e delle telecomunicazioni, ‘internazionalizzate ‘ negli anni recenti, 
quando queste decidono di investire il loro capitali in nuovi territori. 
 
Il Regno scatenato dei Capitali d’investimento 
 
 Internazionalizzazione dei servizi idrici (Bakker ha raccontato estensivamente questo 
fenomeno, ed i suoi esiti)  
 
La questione sollevata dalla presenza di un regno ormai ‘scatenato’, senza più alcuna 
restrizione, dato dai flussi di capitali di investimento, in particolare per quanto riguarda i 
servizi di pubblica utilità, è almeno antica quanto l’industria medesima. Di fronte a fenomeni 
di fluidità operativa-finanziaria che attraggono le scelte di investimento su situazioni 
abbastanza efficienti, di per sé, più prossime e facili a creare ulteriori margini di utili, 
rimangono aperte tutte le situazioni difficili, poco attrattive per la politica finanziaria d’ 
impresa, delle quali è costellata la geografia delle utilities nel mondo. Sono migliaia le imprese 
di gestione dell’acqua che versano in condizioni pessime, o per cattiva gestione, o per 
malaffare, o più semplicemente per mancanza di fondi per operare i dovuti ammodernamenti. 
La domanda, di fronte al divario, ad una disparità sempre più marcata tra imprese ‘efficienti’ 
ed imprese ‘colabrodo’ – sulle quali, ovviamente nessun investitore privato si prenderebbe il 
rischio di mettere il proprio denaro – è su come colmarlo. Per il ricercatore generalista, o anche 
per il semplice cittadino, che vorrebbe vedere affrontata con un poco di serietà un argomento 
tanto spinoso e complesso,  la domanda allora può venire riformulata nelle sue due 
componenti: la questione dell’attendibilità ( Reliability ), fidatezza e sicurezza ( Security ) del 
servizio in generale di fornitura idrica (water supply) e la questione della affidabilità ( 
trustability ) da parte di un privato nella fornitura dei servizi medesimi alle frange più povere 
della popolazione, siano queste in zone urbane, peri-urbane o rurali. La prima domanda 
affronta il  come possa una società che voglia dirsi moderna, efficiente e democratica, mettersi 
in condizioni di funzionare efficacemente, mantenendo la sicurezza del proprio 
approvvigionamento idrico, e dello smaltimento dei propri liquami - servizio essenziale per la 
sicurezza sanitaria di un  paese – affidata ad un regime dipendente da meccanismi di mercato, 
e soggetta pertanto a cicli economici e a fenomeni di scarsità del bene, quali capitano in tutti 
i mercati, il che determina che la domanda spesso non incontri l’offerta, e lascia - come è gia 
stato alcune volte registrato accadere -  la domanda di servizio inevasa, nelle zone più povere. 
La seconda questione è relativa alla distribuzione e all’accessibilità del servizio idrico per tutte 
le tipologie di cittadini. Tale servizio per sua natura legato all’esistenza infrastrutture di e dotti 
e di conduzione – per le quali si sono prodotte nella storia ingegni appartenenti alle più diverse 
civiltà (dai… fino ai romani ) – un patrimonio ingegneristico, per ogni società la cui 
costruzione, manutenzione e cura, deve essere oggetto di scelte d’investimento e manutenzione 
deliberate, pianificate e opportunamente controllate. Ma che cosa accade se i soldi per 
effettuare questi investimenti nel settore pubblico non ci sono ? In che modo è possibile 
garantire l’affidabilità del servizio alla fasce più deboli della popolazione o spingere il mercato 
a farsi carico di investimenti nelle zone più povere e rurali ? 
Questi sono i temi che la comunità scientifica da molti anni affronta e, di fronte ai quali risulta 
sempre difficile, se non impossibile, trovare una soluzione, o un’immediata risposta.  Quello 
che a noi resta a fare è osservare la situazione con occhio disincantato analizzandone i 
contorni, traendo lezione dai fatti avvenuti e possibilmente evitando di compiere la ripetizione 
di errori già altrove commessi allorché ci si è affidati ad un eccessiva confidenza 
nell’applicazione di (pur interessanti) teorie e leggi economiche, piuttosto che non ad una 
conoscenza e ad un’analisi pratica delle concrete situazioni sul campo. 
 
- A questo punto si passerà all’uso della lingua inglese come tributo a tanti anni di 
appassionata ricerca e alla comunità scientifica di riferimento che tratta di water politics. 
 
 
 
Scientific Contributions to understand Water privatisation 
 
 Along time various works have been addressed by scientists to help the understanding and to 
oversight the water privatisation processes and several methodologies, based on case studies, 
have been developed to contribute to the give width and depth to the knowledge on this highly 
debated topic. Among these there are classification systems ( Bakker, et al 2003 ) , case-studies 
reported analysis (Castro, 2004, Loftus, Budds, Ruiter, Hall ), country case studies  ( Budds, 
Ruiter , Loftus et al.), regional and  comparative studies ( Hall, Barraque 2003 ) , sociological 
analysis of the consequences of privatisation ( Dalton 2004, Dawson ), country studies on the 
privatisation of the water rights ( Budds, & oth).  
 
The Pacific Institute Principles  
 
Other researchers have helped the discussion around water privatisation developing some 
media for ‘setting standards’, or guidelines to help orientate the policy makers and the 
administrators in charge of policy implementation when facing the issue of public-private 
agreements. Among these there are “ The Pacific Institute Principles “, as  described by the 
Financial Times, in its Global Water Report. These principles have been drawn on the study 
of a range of privatisation cases and draw useful guidance for public administrators in the 
design of future public-private agreements.  
  
 
Sustainability, Democracy and Regulation in  the 
Hydropolitical Discourse 
Regulation is the outcome of a democratic society, where all the social parts are equally 
acknowledged the possibility to express their interests and views, as well as the view of the 
environment, that usually has no voice, by itself, if not represented by specific advocates.  Allan’s 
diagram well identifies sustainability  as a result of the interests expressed and negotiated by the 
main socio-economic actors, which are the economy, pulled by technology advances, the society 
and the environment, as showed in his famous scheme :   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Sustainability  
          through the 
      Hydropolitical    
         Discourse  
Society 
Economy & 
Tech 
  
 
          Allan ( 2002 ) 
Allan’s Sustainability and  Hydropolitical Discourse 
 
 
 
According to Allan’s revisitation of the Bruntland3 Commission’s  concept,  as applied to water 
issues, sustainability can only be achieved when the balance is reached among different, often 
diverging interests and  pursued through the development of a proper hydropolitical discourse, at 
all levels of governance global, national , regional and local level. 
While governing water resources - whether they may be seen either as  freely flowing through the 
environment or as ‘ goods ‘ capitalistically managed through the market and delivered to paying 
consumers  - whatever the vision of the reader and his approach to water resources may be -  an 
accurate and transparent hydropolitical process for rule-setting should be accurately designed in 
order to realistically capture the needs and the constraints of  a set socio, environmental and 
economic system. 
 
 
Environment 
“ Sustainability is achieved 
when outcomes which are socially, 
economically and environmentally sustainable 
are successfully contended ”. 
 
    Tony Allan 
  
3. The first Report on sustainable development published by a specific Commission set by the 
UN, the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) also known as the 
Brundtland Commission.  Our common future. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987 p. 43. 
 
The Effects of Different Systems of Regulation 
 
When, towards the end of the 90s , lot of privatisation decisions took place in many countries the 
United Nation was monitoring the process of privatisation worldwide, with its effects on societies 
and populations, a number of studies were commissioned to evaluate its effects and were led 
comparatively in different parts of the world. It was found that the prices of utility services were 
extremely variable, and not necessarily connected to the economic development of each country. 
Rather,  Several cases throughout the world were taken into consideration across the different 
sectors of water, energy and gas and the findings were that not necessarily the prices reflected the 
level of advancement and the economic capacity of the country, rather in countries economically 
and technologically more advanced the price of the utilities, for registered consumers showed to 
be lower than in countries with developing economies, and among the latter a great difference 
between Europe and the United States. In the United Kingdom, consumers were found to pay in 
the late 1990s nearly 3 times (300 per cent) more for water than American consumers, 68 per cent 
more for electricity, 40 per cent more for natural gas.  And in comparison to the European 
standards, United Kingdom prices were considered low, and still are.  So the issue emerging was 
around  which process could led certain countries to develop a balanced system in establishing 
their utility prices respecting the need of consumers and, on the contrary, which causes brought 
some other countries to miss  or unbalance the governance of their utility system to such an 
extent that they registered a serious gap between the prices of utility good and the real possibility 
and availability to pay among average citizens.   Through compared analysis of a number of  
cases, patterns of converging  or diverging paths started to emerge in different economies and 
societies.  An analysis and comparison of these effects and causes has been the object of this 
study.  
 
 
PATTERNS OF SIMILARITY 
 
   POPULAR MOVEMENTS for People's Control over utilities 
 
 
 In the societies of both developed and the developing world a common feature emerged in 
correlation to the events which preceded or followed water privatisation decisions. Such a 
recurring event consists in the presence of a broad, rooted, interconnected movement of masses 
(of citizens) that, in different countries and different times, took serious motivated and 
coordinated stance around the political cycles of decisions that pertained their water utility ( 
or other utility ) ownership and governance, when their governments were imminent to facing 
such decisions.  The monopoly of utilities over essential goods, has always been recognised to 
be very dangerous and , in particular with water, where the dependence of the user from the 
one supplier - whoever actor, public or private, it may be  in charge to realise the connectivity 
to the network, either for drinking water purpose and for sewerage discharge -   well acquires 
this situation the definition of natural monopoly. This creates reasonable worries in every 
society as the spread of diseases and the health security so heavily depends  on the quality - 
and quantity - of the water supplies and of the sewerage that reach the each households. 
  
 
 
The Rise of Antitrust Regulation and Conservation Laws in US 
 
 
       Many authors agree that in regulating public utilities supplying goods like water, electricity 
and gas, the regulatory process works best if regulators endorse to a deep extent into a fully 
democratic process. The United States  traditionally, demonstrate to have one of the most well-
established systems in regulatory democracy as regards utility regulation, which is rooted on 
the traditions inherited by the New Deal of  President Franklin D. Roosvelt, and has been 
fostered by a broad popular movement of citizens for people’s control over the privately-
owned utility monopolies, in years marked by the culture of the Progressive Movement. 
 
  
            
The Progressive Movement was concerned  
about a variety of issues, including monopolies cornering the markets. 
 
The PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT  
At the beginning of the XXth century many Americans felt the need to change the relationship 
between government and society and address the growing social and political problems. Like 
the Populists before them, Progressives believed that unregulated capitalism and the urban 
boom required stronger government supervision and intervention. Specifically, Progressives 
wanted to regain control of the government from special interests like the railroads and trusts, 
while further protecting the rights of organized labor, women, blacks, and consumers in 
general. The Progressive Movement was a social, political & economic reform movement in 
the America of  the early 1900’s based on the idea that government could be a tool for helping 
society to overcome its inequalities and other major social and economical diseases of time. 
Supporters of the movement were found in both major political parties, of the time Democrats 
and Republicans. The recent experiences of other, still existing, alternative parties like the 
Populists, during the 1890s, had shown how hard it is to succeed outside of the two major 
existing parties. Therefore, proponents of the Progressive Movement tended to work within 
the major existing parties, building on the society through fostering political change and social 
improvement. The members of the progressive movement advanced a whole host of issues, 
always working across existing parties, with the goal of expanding democracy, strengthening 
social justice and limiting the power of big business against people. Drawing from the 
experiences of the past decades, in the new raising 20th Century, many businesses were 
becoming ‘big’ business. The rapidly expanding economy made the United States a huge 
marketplace with many potential consumers and businesses, as they grew bigger, began to try 
and monopolize that market. They aimed to control prices and profits, and attempted to limit 
or eliminate competition.  The Progressives claimed the unfairness of some corrupted practices 
of newly raising big business  and sought to break up their monopolies of "trusts."    
Political Reforms in the Progressive era: A New Regulatory Culture and the debate about Rules  
Democratizing Government 
A first major stake that progressive reformers took was to establish conditions for a more 
democratic form of government.  In fact, before the turn of the century, members of the U.S. 
Senate used to be elected not by citizens but by the politicians in each state legislature. In many 
states they pushed and obtained to give people more power in order to achieve a more democratic 
government.  With this objective many reforms took place,starting from obtaining direct 
primaries. Other major reforms were forged in order to allow citizen groups to initiate new laws 
themselves  - this called the Initiative   — and  to review the actions of legislatures — or 
referendum. The "Initiative and Referendum" systems allowed citizens to circulate petitions, and 
to put issues and proposals on the ballot. In many states, the progressive reformers also promoted 
systems to allow for the Recall of elected officials. In the senators chambers, the direct election 
of senators by voters was a major electoral achievement initiated by the progressive reformers. 
 
A new culture of Risk and Compensation 
The progressive reformers also devised, during the early 1900th century, a new system of 
compensations for work injuries, establishing a new regulatory culture on the issue of industrial 
risk, so far so hardly perceived by the firm owners. Till then , both young and old workers were 
simply dismissed out in the street  consequently  to a work accident, if they became unable to do 
their jobs. 
 
Populists  and Progressives  
During the same time, another party , the populists showed to have resonance and acceptance as 
an alternative to the democrats and the republicans. Although they shared a common interest in 
fighting the big ‘ trusts ‘ in the raising business, they differed from the progressives in many 
ways and to a number of extents.  The progressives were more popular amongst the educated 
middle class of the east coast of the States, particularly in the cities, claiming issues more familiar 
to thise living in urban areas. The populists were averagely less educated and more interested in 
issues regarding the rural America, particularly popular in the mid-west and the south of the 
States. In respect to the achievement of their goals, the populists rarely achieved their political 
objectives, while the progressives often succeeded in reaching those goals that the populist din 
not manage to conquer. Both populist and progressives were amongst the reform movements of 
the times sharing interest and common view on establishing anti-trust rules to the interest of  the 
community, both fostered the introduction of a graduated income tax, and strongly advocated 
rules to be put in place for reach more controls over the banks and the finance fluxes, generated 
by the new wave of production. 
 
 
Education and Government  Responsibility as Governance tools : 
Good Governance in the Progressive view  
 
The Progressives strongly believed that an efficient Government could protect the public interest 
restoring order into the society. They maintained high-level expectations into government’s 
effectiveness of intervention and outreach amongst all fringes of the society, especially among 
the poorest ones. According to the Progressives’s vision Government is an agency of human 
welfare,  in charge to establish those infrastructures that allow better conditions for human 
development. 
 
The Founders’ Vision of Government: Culture of Stateman and 
Responsibilities of  elector Citizens. 
In the US, capital of freedom, as we know it today, the Progressive Era can be considered the first 
attempt to promote a stricter regulation of liberalistic practises in modern times. This was grounded in 
the values and visions asserted by the political culture in the previous historical period, where the 
founders of the US nation gave their imprint on the US stateman and citizienship mentality through 
many of their their historical speeches. During the founding period the general expectation on a 
stateman , as well as the expectation posed on the average elector citizen, stressed  the necessity of  
values as  wisdom, common sense and virtue, for both statemen and electing citizens responsibility  as 
basic conditions for a free state.  In his famous speech,  President James Madison (1751-1836) attests: 
 
 “ To suppose liberty or happiness without any virtue in the 
people, is a chimerical idea. (..). If there is no virtue among 
us, no form of government can render us secure.  If there be 
sufficient virtue and intelligence in the community, it will be 
exercised in the selection of the (government) men.” 
                                                                                             
                                                                                          James Madison 
                                                                                          former U.S. President 
 
 Efficiency and the rise of technocrat-bureaucratic Governance 
 
      As a natural evolution from the approach of the founders to state management and the regulation of 
politics, with the advent of  progressive thinkers and their faith in progress, American images of 
politician shifted towards the roots of what we now define, a technocratic vision,  which started to 
regards at politics as a too complex affair to be coped with only on the basis on the founders’ common 
sense.  : 
 While according to Madison :   
 
‘  Laws should be made not by experts, but by a body of elected 
officials, with roots in local communities who should have  most 
wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the 
society" 
                                                      James Madison  
                                                                               U.S. President, 1751-1836 
 
 
 According to the progressive movement thought only government agencies staffed by experts 
informed by the most advanced modern science could manage tasks previously handled within 
the private sphere, which now the government had to deal with  (West) . 
 
A new concept of freedom: creating institutions for creating  
individuals 
The Progressives regarded the founders' scheme as defective because it took a too benign a 
view of nature, as they thought that the individual was ready-made by nature.  As Dewey 
remarked, ‘ the state has the responsibility for creating institutions under which individuals 
can effectively realize the potentialities that are theirs. For the Progressives, freedom is 
redefined as the fulfilment of human capacities, which becomes the primary task of the state. 
A West and Shambra (2007) remark  creating individuals -  via creating institutions that would 
allow for it - was the new prominent goal for Government, in comparison to the previous goal 
of protecting individuals against the violence of the others, in the former era. This meant that 
the progressives were starting to realise that freedom from violence didn’t equate freedom from 
necessity of freedom from poverty, the new evils of the emerging neo-industrializing society. 
 sums up the difference between the Founders' and the Progressives' conception of what 
government is for. 
 Therefore the political thought shifted towards the root of a more technocratic vision of the 
requirements for politicians and state administratives. The experts , of the Government 
agencies started to be hired amongst those educated in the top universities, preferably in the 
social sciences, reputed to be the ones with the capability of governing 
 
The believe was that:  
 ‘ Government needed to be led by those who see where history  is going, and who understand the 
ever-evolving idea of human dignity ‘. (West 2007) 
 
In practise , following Thomas West, interpretation : 
 
‘The Progressives  wanted the people's will to be more efficiently 
translated into government policy. Local politicians would be replaced 
by neutral city managers presiding over technically trained staffs. 
 
‘  Politics in the sense of favoritism and self-interest would disappear and 
be replaced by the universal rule of enlightened bureaucracy.’ 
 
 
America in the Early 1900s. 
The progressives wanted to establish policy reforms to better distribute welfare among the fringes 
of society, strengthening social justice, eradicating poverty, tackling many problems of the 
factory workers, affording the issue of child labour, cleaning up dirty cities, fostering the right to 
vote for women and affording the problem of racial segregation on the south of the country. 
Some of them reputed alcohol to be at the root of many social diseases and wanted to put around 
it’s use prohibitionists limitations.  
 
Population explosion and Wild Urbanization 
An issue that raises similarities between modern times and the America of the  early 1900s. 
Similarly to many mega-cities of today, where population is fastly growing, with severe 
implications fin water provision of water for poor of  in the urban and peri-urban areas, in 
America as well a wild urbanization process took place  the cities of the East coast in the end 
of the 19th century. In the decades between 1880 and 1920 about 27 million people migrated 
into the U.S., predominantly from Eastern & Southern Europe, filling cities and  
suburbia with their  hopes as well as social diseases. Many rural Americans, too , regarded the 
cities as  sources of increased opportunities : cities offered entertainment, shopping, electricity 
and plumbing ( the new technologies ) and anonymity. Nevertheless, cities infrastructures were 
very ill-equipped to deal with such a population explosion.  As a  
 
 
  
result, the living conditions in many parts of the large cities were revolting : working 
conditions were appalling, the exploitation of  women and child labour developed and crime, 
violence, gambling and prostitution became rampant.  
 
Business trusts and political machines.  
One of the emerging  issue for the country was the problem of the corruption in business, and 
politics with their consequent monopolies- to an extent that the term  political machines was 
coined to indicate the widespread corruption and collusions in business and in politics. In 
business, the progressive movement agenda played to make more accountable the big ‘trusts’, that 
were resulting in establishing consortiums with the aim to eliminate competition and provoking 
the failure of the small entrepreneurs to the exclusive apanage of a small oligarchy of big owners.  
On the political side, the heads of many districts and cities , regularly accepted bribes from 
special interests for favours, to the obvious detriment of the tax payer, making municipal politics 
out of the hands of the civic minded Americans. 
 
The Progressive’s Recipe  
     Tackling Societal Change through developing Democratic 
Resilience via Education and Optimisim    
 
The american society in Early XXth century shows characteristics that assimilates it to the 
society of our modern times, being subject to a rapid growth and change. During the decades 
between 1880s and the 1920 the US population increased by 27 million people, a share mainly 
composed by migrants coming from Europe in search of a new life. The discourse analysis on 
the debate around Education, that took place during the progressive era offers us useful 
elements which can be interestingly outdrawn for the major problem of XXIst century, being 
the ideas so well developed during the Progressive Era perfectly eligible to apply nowadays. 
This is particularly true with  particular reference to tackle the issue of change and resilience 
in modern societies.  None of the aforementioned reforms would have ever  been devised out 
of the auspices of withstanding a more developed society ( a concept that now we would define 
resilient)  through the mean of education to allow  a greater proportions of individuals to lead 
their life with dignity and therefore to better contribute to the public sphere. Among their most 
prominent thinkers of the progressive movement there was John Dewey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
John Dewey –  The basic intuition of  Social Capital 
 
 
 
‘We need more humility in our moments of success rather than in our defeats.’ 
[John Dewey  - Human Nature and Conduct] 
 
A philosopher, psychologist and educational reformer John Dewey deeply endorsed education as a 
crucial mean to fostering people living and working conditions. Dewey asserted that complete 
democracy was to be obtained not just by extending voting rights but also by ensuring that there 
exists a fully formed public opinion, accomplished by effective communication among citizens, 
experts, and politicians, with the latter being accountable for the policies they adopt Dewey thought 
that for achieving a strong  democratic society, each individual in the society should be put, via the 
mean of education, in condition to contribute to the unceasing democratic dialogue through allowing 
the development of the  following  features, which would have allowed the society to develop ability 
to keep up with the constant  :  
 literacy  
 acquiring cultural and social skills, that feed the interest into public life 
 an independent thinking, fundamental requisite of a democracy 
 propensity to share knowledge with others 
 
Dewey tacked a wide variety of  issues like growth, and other issues in society,  that we now may 
refer to as social capital * [ * Term forged by…] . 
 
“From a social standpoint, dependence denotes a power rather 
than a weakness; it involves interdependence. There is always a 
danger that increased personal independence will decrease the 
social capacity of an individual. In making him more self-reliant, 
it may make him more self-sufficient; it may lead to aloofness and 
indifference. It often makes an individual so insensitive in his 
relations to others as to develop an illusion of being really able to 
stand and act alone — an unnamed form of insanity which is 
responsible for a large part of the remedial suffering of the world 
(..)” 
                                               [The conditions of Growth ] 
 
 
Dewey succinctly  defines growth  as  ‘ the enhancement of a living  experience ‘ which 
should  prepare the individual for later experiences,  of a deeper and more expansive quality,  
Thanks to   the  exercise of critical thought and reflective action 
 
Dewey’s Concept of  Public and  faith in Technology    
 
Dewey exhibits his strong faith in the potential of human intelligence to solve the public's problems, 
describing all the powerful forces at work that eclipse citizens,  preventing it from articulating its 
needs, and making public deliberation difficult- Among these the special interests of powerful 
corporate capital, general selfishness of individuals, and the unpredictabilities of public 
comunication 
  
 “ What is the public? If there is a public, what are the obstacles 
in the way of its recognizing and articulating itself? Is the public 
a myth? Or does it come into being only in periods of marked 
social transition when crucial alternative issues stand out, such 
as that between throwing one’s lot in with the conservation of 
established institutions or with forwarding new tendencies ? “ 
 
In “ The Public and Its Problems ” John Dewey deeply questioned , providing definitions of  
concepts like  public,  State,  and Government 
 
 
“The external mark of the organization of a public or of a State 
is the existence of officials. “ 
 
“Governement is not the State, for that includes the public as 
well as the rulers charged with special duties and powers. The 
public, however, is organized in and through those officers who 
act in behalf of its interests.” 
 
“ The State is the organization of the public effected through 
officials for the protection of the interests shared by its 
members.. “  
 
 
Opposing to  others’s view, who believed that ‘ the public had little capacity to be a rational 
participant in democracy and was essentially non-existent ’  Dewey held a more optimistic 
view of the public and its potential. With communication and education , he hoped public 
would find itself and become a cohesive group, regaining a sense of self.  
 
              
 
Without  such communication the public will remain shadowy and formless. Dewey also 
blamed the distractions of modern society, pointing out that even in the past, the public has 
had other concerns than Political concerns. However, Dewey does have hopes that society can 
someday use its technology to improve communication and thus improve public interest in 
politics. 
 
Society and “Great Community” 
Dewey thought that the local community is where democracy must happen so that people can 
become active and express issues of public concern. In this way, until the Society is converted 
into a “Great Community”, the Public will remain in eclipse. 
 
 
The rise of Investigative Journalism and it’s cultural influence on the Regulatory Reforms 
 
‘Liberty produces wealth and wealth destroyes liberty’ 
 
[Henry Demarest Lloyds] 
 
 
 
Henry Demarest Lloyd  & the ‘ Muckrackers’. 
 
 Forerunning the cultural wave of the following decades, a group of journalists, pioneers of the 
investigative journalisms, also named by Roosvelt ‘ muckrackers’ , as Jacob A. Riis, and Henry 
Demarest Lloyd, Upton Sinclair, Ida M. Tarbell and many others started the first public 
investigations on the late 19th-century industrial monopolies, openly denouncing through their 
articles, pictures and novels the evils of the American society has fallen, caused by the uneven 
business practises in play at the time.   In 1894 the book, Wealth against Commonwealth, 
came out as the first masterpiece of investigative journalism, standing against the big economic 
trusts. It’s author,  Henry Demarest Lloyd denounced the very questionable business practises 
of some mayor US trusts, like the railroads companies  and the Standard Oil Company, arguing 
that the extreme wealth generated by few private monopolies was indeed against the interest 
of the commonwealth of the people.  
   .  
 
 
         Henry Demarest Lloyd (1847- 1903)  and his book, Wealth against Commonwealth, which 
won raised the public interest on monopolies. Lloyd’s book was inspirational to an entire 
generation of young investigative journalists. 
 
 
 
He argued and stressed that through the monopoly, the trusts were able to control all means of 
their business in order to profit themselves only, rather than the common interest. One 
example: business owners were legally allowed to reduce production and increase prices in 
order to sustain a high demand for their product. 
 
 On the consequences of following the myth of  self- interest in business, as consolidated and 
diffusive practise along time, Demarest Lloyd wrote  : 
 “History is condensed in the catchwords of the people.  In the phrases 
of individual self-interest which have been the shibboleths of the main 
activities of our last hundred years were prophesied: the filling up of 
the Mississippi by the forest-destroying, self-seeking lumber 
companies of the North (…).   Where the self-interest of the individual 
is allowed to be the rule both of social and personal action, the level of 
all is forced down to that of the lowest.  Business excuses itself for the 
things it does — cuts in wages, exactions in hours, tricks of 
competition (….).’ It is pleaded as an excuse by those (common 
carriers), who desire to obey the (Interstate Commerce) law, says 
Senator Cullom, that self-preservation drives them to violate it 
because other carriers persist in doing so “ 
 
 
 
On monopoly and corruption as extreme consequences of self interest touching all the spheres of life, as 
in contrast with the common interest:  
 
“Business motived by the self-interest of the individual runs into 
monopoly at every point it touches the social life-land monopoly, 
transportation monopoly, trade monopoly, political monopoly in all its 
forms, from contraction of the currency to corruption in office.” 
 
 
On the established hidden collusion of big business with politics and other powers: 
 
“We now have Captains of Industry, with a few aids, rearranging from 
office-chairs this or that industry, (..) setting, hundreds of properties, 
large and small, in a score of communities, to flying through invisible 
ways into their hands; sitting calm through all the hubbub raised in 
courts, legislatures, and public places, and by dictating letters and 
whispering words remaining the master magicians of the scene(..);  
 
 
 
 
On the acknowledged persuading power of the methods adopted by  big business : 
 
 
“.. defying, though private citizens, all the forces and authorities by 
the mere mastery of compelling brain, without putting hand to 
anything… ‘ 
 
 
and on the unavoidable cultural impact, resulting from their uneven business practises, when 
opposed by citizen’s protests :  
 
“.. against the protest of a whole civilization, making themselves, their 
methods and principles, its emblematic figures…”  
 
 
 
 
 Ida M. Tarbell’s writings  on  raising Trusts 
 
"There is no man more dangerous, in a position of power, than he 
who refuses to accept as a working truth that all a man does should 
make for rightness and soundness, that even the fixing of a tariff rate 
must be moral." 
      [Ida Tarbell, investigative journalists] 
 
Henry Demarest Lloyd writings and documents, together with additional wide search and 
analysis, through interviews and personal discussions with the officers of the Standard Oil, formed 
the basis of a more focused work published, few years later, by Ida Tarbell. Ida Tarbell was born in 
Pennsylvania in 1857 , educated in US and France, she became a prominent investigative journalist . 
She documented the birth of the Oil Industry in itself,  the way in which Rockefeller raised his trust, 
forcing small enterpreneurs to join his purposal or to sell to him, the way he laid the foundation of 
his trust, establishing secret alliances and private rules in his favour with railroad and shipping 
companies, to the detriment of his smaller competitors.  Through a series of denouncing articles 
published on McLure’s Magazine between 1902 and 1904, Ida Tarbell widely exposed on the 
ruthless tactics adopted by the Standard Oil Company to crush competition, focusing the public eye 
on the bad conduct of trust corporations.   The series were lately gathered in a book, The History of 
Standard Oil Company , published in 1904, which Preface clearly attests the reasons why Standard 
Oil  was chosen:  
 
 “ In order that their readers might have a clear and succinct 
notion of the processes by which a particular industry passes 
from the control of the many to that of the few, they (the 
editors of McClure's )  decided to publish a detailed narrative 
of the history of the growth of a particular trust. The 
Standard Oil Trust was chosen for obvious reasons. It was 
the first in the field, and it has furnished the methods, the 
charter, and the traditions for its followers. It is the most 
perfectly developed trust in existence; that is, it satisfies most 
nearly the trust ideal of entire control of the commodity in 
which it deals. (..) ” 
  [Ida Tarbell – Preface of The History of 
Standard Oil Company] 
 
 
Ida M. Tarbell  articles against  Rockfeller’s Standard Oil Company. 
 
 In 1870, John D. Rockefeller established the South Improvement Company ( later named  Standard Oil ). 
His scheme lately documented and disclosed by Ida Tarbell was of buying, entering into partnership, or 
destroying the numerous smaller companies that were dangerous to his business, integrating the oil 
industry activities all over the US under his umbrella enterprise with the aim to lessen the mushrooming 
competition from the small companies, which was reducing oil prices to his detriment.  Ida Tarbell 
spotlighted in her writings that Standard Oil was using illegal methods to reach its aims.   Her reports led 
to many legal cases that continued all the way to the Supreme Court of the United States. Ida Tarbell’s 
revelations culminated into a book published in 1904, called The History of the Standard Oil Company, 
listed as one of the top work in the American XXth century journalisms. The articles also helped to define 
a growing trend to investigation, exposé, and crusading in liberal journals of the day, a technique that in 
1906 President Theodore Roosevelt would label as  ‘ muckraking ‘. 
 
 
  
Ida M. Tarbell articles, as long as the work of Henry Demarest Lloyds’s and companions probably 
contributed, to the shaping of  President Theodore Roosvelt’s background culture in the field of trust – 
busting reforms. In 1891 she took her savings and went to Paris, where she enrolled in the Sorbonne and 
supported herself by writing articles for American magazines. 
              
 
Ida M. Tarbell , in 1904 , and the front cover of Mc Lure’s (1901 issue ) 
 
 
 
 
She discovered, during her job that that she was interested in stories that were too long for the paper 
to print. On a series of 19 episodes, published on McClure's between 1902 and 1904, Ida Tarbell 
wrote a detailed exposé of Rockefeller's unethical tactics, sympathetically portraying the plight of 
Pennsylvania's independent oil workers. For Mc Lures’ Ida Tarbell also wrote series of stories about 
the life of the French Emperor Napoleon, in 1894,and that became an immediate success, and later, a 
series about the life of American President Abraham Lincoln, based on her and research on 
documents by talking with people who had known him. This established her skill as research- based 
journalist The report series about  the Standard Oil Company gained Miss Tarbell her greatest 
notoriety 
 In the series Miss Tarbell carefully acknowledged Rockefeller's brilliance and the flawlessness of 
the business structure he had created. She did not condemn capitalism itself, but "the open disregard 
of decent ethical business practices by capitalists." In her reports showed that Standard Oil used 
illegal methods to make other companies lose business.  
 
 
 
 
 
Mis Tarbell described the trusts’ abilities in Mc Lure, in July of 1903  “ The History of the 
standard Oil Company ‘ with both analytical and dramatic skills :  
 
"Now, it takes time to secure and to keep that which the public has 
decided it is not for the general good that you have. It takes time and 
caution to perfect anything which must be concealed. It takes time to 
crush men who are pursuing legitimate trade. But one of Mr. 
Rockefeller's most impressive characteristics is patience. There 
never was a more patient man, or one who could dare more while he 
waited. … He was like a general who, besieging a city surrounded 
by fortified hills, views from a balloon the whole great field, and 
sees how, this point taken, that must fall; this hill reached, that fort is 
commanded. And nothing was too small: the corner grocery in 
Browntown, the humble refining still on Oil Creek, the shortest 
private pipe line. Nothing, for little things grow." 
 
 
A method adopted by these companies for example, was to sell oil in one area of the country for 
much less than the oil was worth; this caused smaller companies in that area to fail, as they could not 
sell their oil for that lower a price and still make a profit. After a company failed, Standard Oil 
would then increase the price of its oil, having won the monopoly on that area.  
 
 
Standard Oil refinery N.1 in Cleveland, Ohio, 1889. 
 
“I never had an animus against their size and wealth, never 
objected to their corporate form. I was willing that they 
should combine and grow as big and rich as they could, but 
only by legitimate means. But they had never played fair, 
and that ruined their greatness for me.”    
  [I. Tarbell – All In the Days’ Work, 1939] 
 
Precisely when writing about Standard Oil, she wrote: "They had never played fair, and that ruined 
their greatness for me."  For almost two years, she looked through volumes of public records, 
including court testimony, state and federal reports and newspaper coverage. From these, she 
gathered a big amount  of information on Rockefeller's ascent and on the methods used by Standard 
Oil. The breadth of her research was remarkable, and very impressive was her ability to translate  
Rockefeller's complicated business games into an accessible narrative 
understandable by the average reader.   
 
Tarbell analysis showed and documented how Standard Oil obtained information from the railroads 
about the sale and shipments its competitors made and then ensured that the shipments did not reach 
their destinations.  
 
 
Legal Consequences : The  Anti Trust  Decision of the Supreme 
Court, 1911. 
 
 
 
Ida Tarbell's investigations into Standard Oil were partly responsible for later legal action by the 
federal government against the company.  The case began in 1906.  In 1911, the Supreme Court of 
the United States ruled against Standard Oil because of its illegal dealings.  The decision was a 
major one.  It forced the huge company to separate into thirty-six different companies.  John D. 
Rockefeller never had to appear in court himself. 
Following the investigative work diffused by the muchrackers’ journalists articles – which helped 
greatly to form the public opinion of the time  - in 1911 the US Supreme Court ordered the Standard 
Oil Company, to split into several independent companies with separate boards of management. This 
anti-trust regulation against a company that controlled 90% of oil production in the USA became a 
groundbreaking  example of victory of the civil society’s and free information interest against private 
corporations. 
 
 
    
 
  
In 2002 the US Postal Service issued  
a set of “Four Women in Journalism” stamps, 
 including one for Ida Tarbell, as shown. 
 
 
 
Jacob Riis : Photographic reporter . 
 
 
"Long ago it was said that 'one half of the world does not know how the other 
half lives.' 
     [Jacob Riis] 
 
 
According to historian Robert Bremner, the progressive reformers' problem was ‘ to rouse the 
public from its lethargy, make consciences uneasy, and stir genial good will into enthusiasm 
for social betterment. Their first step was to lay bare the responsibility of the community for 
needless suffering.’  While according to the critics of charities poverty was ‘ the result of 
individual or moral weakness’, therefore not to be helped through charitable donations, Gilded 
Age reformers, like Jacob Riis believed that poverty was the result of environmental 
conditions, thus, reform efforts could help. 
 "I am a believer in organized, systematic charity upon the evidence of my 
senses" 
                 [Jacob Riis] 
 
On social issues, Jacob A. Riis a police photographer, exposed in his book published in 1890, under 
the title How the Other Half Lives, the dirt, the disease, the vice, and the misery among the rat-
infested slums of New York,  turning to be equivalently influencial on Roosvelt’s forthcoming 
health and social reforming policies. 
Through his photojournalistic activity,  working as a police reporter, Jacob Riis documented the 
horrible conditions of the slums in which New York lower classes lived. He showed the details about 
the immigrant neighborhoods of New York City’s slums through the use of flashlight powder which 
allowed him to reach the dark interiors of neglected tenement housing, realising images of extreme 
poverty that shocked the New York middle and upper classes.   
Riis believed that moral citizens, regardless of their economic status, should be given a chance to 
improve their lives. Like Riis himself, given that chance, many could rise out of poverty and into 
the ranks of the middle class. The book proposed solutions to New York City's tenement problems, 
including engravings of many of Riis's photographs, which enabled readers to better understand the 
problems that plagued the city. The book became very popular, selling 11 editions in less than 5 
years.  
Riis chose to work with middle-class and upper-class philanthropists to bring about reform. He 
believed that private wealth could help transform the slums into better places to live.  
 
Jacob Riis , baby poor 
Beaumont Newhall, in his History of photography, comments, as regards Jacob Riis :  
 
 “ … his dazzling light discloses with merciless details those sordid interiors, but 
enlightens almost with tenderness the faces of those doomed to live in it. He always 
sympathised with people, regardless he was taking pictures of the street arabs ( street 
boys ) stealing from a wagon, or the inhabitants of Bandit’s Roost, who stared scornfully at 
the machine from doors, windows, balconies. These images are important not only as 
source of  information but also for their emotional strength. They are interpretations  and  
witness at the same time. Although  not referred to today, their quality will last as long as 
man will be concerned in his brothers. “  
      
          
Jacob Riis, 1889. Five cents lodging, Bayard Street. 
 
Riis Social Reformer 
 
Riis's work raised  the attention Theodore Roosevelt, at the time President of the New York Board 
of Police Commissioners from 1895 to 1897, and this friendship might have brought to Roosvelt 
some decisive insight  within the country’s slums. 
Riis , as well as the other  progressive reformers contended that poverty was the product of 
imperfect social and economic systems, and that it could be reduced through increased government 
regulation of the economy.  
 
          
The Other Half        
       Jacob Riis, 1888, A plank for bed. 
 
Riis wrote How the Other Half Lives to call attention to the living conditions of more than half of 
New York City's residents. He described the cheap construction of the tenements, the high rents, and 
the absentee landlords. He lamented the city's ineffectual laws and urged private enterprise to 
provide funding to remodel existing tenements or build new tenements. 
 
Riis argued for better housing, adequate lighting and sanitation, and the construction of city parks 
and playgrounds. Publishing his photographic book : ‘ How the Other Half Lives ‘ , in 1890 , Riis 
believed that charitable citizens would help the poor when they saw or themselves how "the other 
half" lived. Riis and his progressive companions initiated the idea that suitable political reforms, 
sponsored by government, can eradicate poverty – started to promote the idea of modern social 
reforms, in the way that still exists nowadays. 
 
 
Jacob Riis , Women lodging room, 1892. 
 
 
He often de-emphasized the individual in favour of the total setting. Accordingly, he photographed 
many of his subjects at a distance to show them in their squalid surroundings.  
 
 
 
 Jacob Riis , Slums. 
         
Jacob Riis , and his volume ‘How The Other Half Lives’. 
 
 Riis, Slum’s children. 
 
              
 
Upton Sinclair                                                                        
 
 
          
 
Upton Sinclair’s  novel , The Jungle, (1906), one of the assigned readings in the Business Ethics 
classes, nowadays, in the US. 
Upton Sinclair, in his novel, The Jungle (1906), gave many  graphic and detailed depictions of the 
unsanitary conditions in the packing plant of the meat industry sparking a reaction which  eventually 
led to regulation of this sector as well . Under Theodore Roosevelt, the Meat Inspection Act and Pure 
Food and Drug Act  was passed, in 1906.  
 
“ . . . And then there was the condemned meat industry, with 
its endless horrors. The  people of Chicago saw the 
government inspectors in Packingtown, and they all took that 
to mean that they were protected from diseased meat; they 
did not understand that these hundred and sixty-three 
inspectors had been appointed at the request of the packers, 
and that they were paid by the United States government to 
certify that all the diseased meat was kept in the state. They 
had no authority beyond that; for the inspection of meat to be 
sold in the city and state the whole force in Packingtown 
consisted of three henchmen of the local political machine! . 
. . “  
       [ Upton Siclair – The Iungle ] 
 
 
 
The Reforms in America during the Progressive Age  
 
 
As C. C. Regiers, author of  ‘The era of the muckrackers’ describes in his characterization of the Progressive 
Age,  the achievements of the investigative journalistic activity of Ida Tarbell and friends who gained a 
strong support from the public  all over  US and this, inevitably, was followed by consequent  impact on 
the public policies in most of the sectors. The list of reforms accomplished between 1900 and 1915 is an 
impressive one. The convict and peonage systems were destroyed in some states; prison reforms were 
undertaken; a federal pure food act was passed in 1906; child labour laws were adopted by many states; a 
federal employers' liability act was passed in 1906, and a second one in 1908, which was amended in 1910; 
forest reserves were set aside; the Newlands Act of 1902 made reclamation of millions of acres of land 
possible; a policy of the conservation of natural resources was followed; eight-hour laws for women were 
passed in some states; race-track gambling was prohibited; twenty states passed mothers' pension acts 
between 1908 and 1913; twenty-five states had workmen's compensation laws in 1915; an income tax 
amendment was added to the Constitution; the Standard Oil and the Tobacco companies were dissolved; 
even Niagara Falls was saved from the greed of corporations and  Alaska was preserved from capitalists’ 
interest; and better insurance laws and packing-house laws were placed on the statute books. 
 
 
 
Theodore Roosvelt and the Regulatory reforms  
 
 
In 1901, at 42 years , succeeding to William McKinley ,  Teodore Roosvelt  became the youngest 
president of the United states. Roosvelt  interpreted his  presidency as a platform to publicize his 
views and gaining support transversally for his policies on reform in carious issues.  
 
The major areas where reforms took place, under Roosvelt presidency were in business regulation, 
both regarding regulating competition among firms and in the regulation of  the owners-workers 
relations and regarding the environmental policy field.   
 
Roosvelt and the Union Movement : The Square Deal  
 
 
Soon after Roosevelt took office, some 150,000 Pennsylvania coal miners went on strike for higher 
wages, shorter hours, and recognition of their union. In an economy heavily relying on coal, as 
principal energy source, as  winter neared, Roosevelt feared what might happen if the strike was not 
resolved, since Eastern cities depended upon Pennsylvania coal for heating. Roosevelt urged mine 
owners and the striking workers to accept arbitration. But although the workers accepted, the owners 
refused the arbitration.  Winter drew closer and Roosevelt threatened to take over the mines if the 
owners didn’t agree to arbitration marking the first time the federal government had intervened in a 
strike to protect the interests of the public. After a three-month investigation, the arbitrators decided 
to give the workers a shorter workday and higher pay although did not require the mining companies 
to recognize the Union.  Satisfied, Roosevelt pronounced the compromise a “square deal.”  The 
Square Deal became Roosevelt’s 1904 campaign slogan and the framework for his entire presidency. 
His electoral promise was:  
 
 “ to see that each is given a square deal, because he is    entitled to 
no more and should receive no less. ” 
              T. Roosvelt 
 
The Square Deal became Roosevelt’s 1904 campaign slogan and the framework for his entire 
presidency.. Roosevelt’s broadened the use of executive power over the course of his presidency . 
His promise revealed his belief that the needs of workers, business, and consumers should be 
balanced, as well as limiting the power of trusts, promoting public health and safety, and improving 
working conditions. The popular president faced no opposition for the nomination in his party. In the 
general election Roosevelt easily defeated his Democratic opponent, Judge Alton Parker of New 
York. 
 
The Regulation of Big Business : The Sherman Anti-trust Act, 1890 
"Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine 
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall 
be deemed guilty of a felony [. . . ]" 
 
     [ from the Sherman Antitrust Act ] 
 
 U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt depicted as  the infant Hercules grappling with trusts 
 [ 1906, Puck magazine cartoon ]  
 
Roosevelt believed big business was essential to the nation’s growth but also believed companies 
should behave responsibly.  He spent a great deal of attention on regulating corporations, determined 
that they should serve the public interest. The first fact that stimulated  Roosvelt’s intervention was 
related to the railroads. In 1901, when three tycoons of railroads joined their railroad companies 
together, in order to eliminate competition, their company, the Northern Securities Company, ended 
up in dominating all the rail shipping market, from Chicago to the Northwest. The following year, 
Roosvelt exerted his executive power in defence of regulation through directing the U.S. attorney 
general in sueing the company for violating the Sherman Antitrust Act, issued in 1890.  The Court 
ruled that the monopoly did, in fact, violate the act and should have been dissolved.  The Sherman 
Act, promoted by senator John Sherman, was passed by the Congress under President Harrison in 
1890 and represents the oldest antitrust regulation in the United States. It was aimed to set limits to 
monopolies and trusts (or cartels) although for the most part, politicians were unwilling to refer to it 
until Theodore Roosevelt's presidency (1901–1909).  Quoting Senator Sherman – a republican from 
Ohio – the Act was aimed : 
 
“ To protect the consumers by preventing arrangements designed, or which 
tend, to advance the cost of goods to the consumer  “ 
      [ Sen. John Sherman ] 
 
Under Roosvelt the act started to be used widely to oppose the combination of entities that could 
potentially harm competition, such as monopolies or cartels, enhancing an anti-trust campaign 
pursuing trusts that sold inferior products , competed unfairly and corrupted public officials. 
According to its authors, the Sherman Act was not intended to impact market gains obtained by honest 
means, but tracking unfair competition. 
 
 
 
 
      Sen John Sherman, 
      The Author of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
 
"... [a person] who merely by superior skill and intelligence...got the whole 
business because nobody could do it as well as he could was not a 
monopolist..(but was if) it involved something like the use of means which 
made it impossible for other persons to engage in fair competition." 
      [ Senator George Hoar  
Co-author of the Sherman Act] 
 
At the time of its passage, the trust was synonymous of monopolistic practice, because the trust was 
a popular way for monopolists to hold their businesses, and a way for cartel participants to create 
agreements enforceable to their clients. The evil at which the Sherman Act was enacted towards, was 
the tendency to built trusts as ‘combinations’ of  businesses and of capital organized and directed to 
control of the market by suppression of competition in the marketing of goods and services. This 
monopolistic tendency had become a matter of public concern. The goal of the Act was to prevent 
restraints of free competition in business and commercial transactions which tended to restrict 
production, to raise prices, or otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers and  
consumers of goods and services. All of these had come to be regarded as a special form of public 
harm. 
 
Critiques to the Sherman Act: Government as source of Monopoly  
Nevertheless much criticism arose along the XXth century against the limitations present in the 
Antitrust Law from Bork 6 ( 1978)  Posner 5 (2011, 2010) and other scholars from the Chicago Law 
School. Some criticism is well exemplified by Di Lorenzo 4 , asserts that the United  
 
4 -  According to Di Lorenzo: “Protectionists did not want prices paid by consumers to fall. But they also 
understood that to gain political support for high tariffs they would have to assure the public that industries 
would not combine to increase prices to politically prohibitive levels. Support for both an antitrust law and 
tariff hikes would maintain high prices while avoiding the more obvious bilking of consumers.In : The Origins 
of Antitrust: Rethoric vs. Reality - Cato handbook for Congress - retrieved on 10 March 2013. 
 
 
 States, in those years underwent a rapid transition from a predominant agrarian to an industrial society, 
and individuals and groups which were uncomfortable with rapid change were becoming  ‘ 
increasingly adept at using regulatory powers  of the state. In this atmosphere the Sherman Act was 
passed ‘. Always according to Di Lorenzo the Sherman Act was simply a diversion of the interest of 
the general public from the true source of monopoly are the Governments.  In the Sherman Act, 
Government made no provisions for attacking tariffs, or other barriers to competitive entry and ‘ 
evidence exists that a major political function of the Sherman Act  was to serve as a ‘ smoke screen ‘ 
, behind which politicians could grant tariff protections to their big business constituents, while 
assuring the public that 
‘ something was being done ‘ about the monopoly problem. The Sherman Act won legislators  
votes and campaign contributions from farmers and small businessmen who thought antitrusts 
regulation would protect them from their more efficient competitors. After the Sherman Act was 
passed, Sen Sherman sponsored a legislation known as ‘ Campaign Contribution Tariff  Bill ‘ that, 
according to Di Lorenzo, sharply raised tariff rates of manufacturing products,  for the profit of the 
US manufacturers’ interests.  Big and small.  
 
 
5    Richard Posner, jurist, economist and legal theorist of the Chicago Law School, helped shaping the antitrust 
policy changes in the 1970s, based on his idea that 1960s antitrust laws were in fact making prices higher 
for the consumer rather than lower - while he viewed lower prices as the essential end goal of any antitrust 
policy  - expresses concern with the potential that antitrusts law could be applied to create inefficiency, rather than 
to avoid inefficiency. Economic Analysis of Law, 2010 & oth.  
 
6 Robert H. Bork, judge, attorney general and legal scholar at Yale, in  The Antitrust Paradox most 
cited book on antitrust. In his book he argued that consumers were often beneficiaries of corporate 
mergers, and that many then-current readings of the anti trusts laws were economically irrational 
and hurt consumers. Bork’s theory became  heavily influential, causing a shift in the U.S. 
Supreme Court's approach to antitrust laws since the 1970s . His theory became dominant 
thinking on the subject shaped US antitrust law r e-focusing the discipline on efficiency and 
articulating its goal as ‘ consumer welfare’. Bork’s book one of the most referred legal 
interpretation in courts until nowadays. 
According to Di Lorenzo, ‘ there is little evidence that the legislative intent of the Sherman  
Act was to protect consumers. Evidence indicates the intent was to protect politically powerful 
producers groups at the expense of consumers. Antitrust was the Government response to politically 
powerfull farmers and small businessmen who were opposed to economic change and sought 
protectionist legislation ‘ . Nevertheless Di Lorenzo reveals his ultra-liberalistic position when he 
lastly declares:  
 
 “   .. It is a world in which actions designed to limit competition  
are branded as criminal when branded by businessmen, yet 
praised as ‘ enlightened ‘ when initiated by the government. “  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Environmental Movement in early XXth century America 
 
 
Urban movements and Women Activists  
 
Prof. Taylor, in her book "The Environment and the People in American Cities, 1600s-1900s: 
Disorder, Inequality, and Social Change" (2009, Duke University Press ) traces the progression of 
several major thrusts in urban environmental activism, including the alleviation of poverty, public 
health, housing, parks, playgrounds, food safety and land use. 
"While all-male expeditions and solitary males who retreat to the woods for months or years  
at a time are idealized in many environmental history accounts, the urban activists receive no such 
acclaim or glory” argued Prof. Taylor noting that female, working class and ethnic minorities were 
active in environmental activism and affairs.  "In the city, the classes, races and genders interacted 
with each other to create a kind of environmentalism that was very fluid and dynamic." 
 
In cities the Environmental Movement is perhaps the largest, the most long lived and complex social 
movement of the U.S. With over 6,500 national and 20,000 local environmental organizations, along 
with an estimated 20-30 million members, this movement is much wider that other modern social 
movements, such as the civil rights or the peace movements. To understand it, from a sociological 
point of view, requires an analysis of the different systems of belief or  discursive frames  that 
charaterizes the different communities that made up this movement, in the first part of XXth century.  
It is also the oldest, as the first local environmental organizations were founded before the Civil War 
and several still existing national environmental organizations, such as the Sierra Club, the National 
Audubon Society, and American Forests, were founded in the late 19th century. There are eleven major 
discursive frames that define the environmental movement in the U.S.  
 
The current environmental movement is the result of the cumulative historical development of the 
different discursive communities over the past 150 years. 
 In the late nineteenth century, hundreds of American towns became congested, polluted industrial 
cities. The vast forests of the Great lakes were cut down. Millions of acres of grassland were 
transformed into farms and ranches. In response to these profound changes in the environment, 
citizens of many types organized to stop pollution, conserve natural resources, and preserve wild 
places and wild creatures ( Rome, 2005)  
“Their efforts led to many laws, institutions, and government agencies that still shape the American 
landscape.  
The environmental reforms of the period also had far-reaching political, social, and cultural 
consequences.  
For example, environmental activism was one of the principal ways women entered the public sphere 
in the years around 1900, and the energy of women in addressing environmental problems 
strengthened the campaign for suffrage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Environmental Conservation Laws in early 1900s America 
 
 
 
In the late 1800s natural resources were used at an alarming rate, and foresting, polluting, and 
overgrazing were common.  
 
Roosvelt recognized that natural resources were limited and that part of the government’s tasks was 
to regulate the use of resources.  Roosvelt’s  view on the management of natural resources was mixed 
:  he believed that conservation should involve the active management of public land for a variety of 
uses, some of which preservationist, some other  economical. 
In this vision, Roosvelt was in disagreement with the naturalist John Muir, the enhancer of Yosemite 
National Park, who thought that the wilderness should have been  preserved.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Preservationists and Conservationists: Discursive frames and  
Wilderness in the American mind: Visual Recalls 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
The Newlands Reclamation Act, 1902 
 
The Newlands Reclamation Act of 1902, reflected Roosevelt’s beliefs. The law allowed federal 
government to create irrigation projects to make dry lands productive. The projects would be funded 
from money raised by selling off public lands. During Roosevelt’s presidency,  24 reclamation 
projects were launched. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BRITISH  WATER  SOCIAL  MOVEMENTS   
 
 
The Case of Ennerdale Water and Wastwater: a Struggle for Water Protection in the 
Lake District.  
 
 
Ennerdale Water 
 
The history of  Ennerdale Water is the history of a struggle around water which raised in Great Britain 
at the beginning of the 80s for the protection of the waters of Ennerdale Lake, in the heart of  Lake 
District (Cumbria)1. The issue was raised by a  project, issued during the Spring of 1978 by the local 
Water Autority -  the North West Water Authority - for a further abstraction of water from Ennerdale 
Lake to feed a local nuclear plant, the Windscale Nuclear Plant, as well as to provide more water 
supply in general the district of West Cumbria.  A legal process was set to go ahead to obtain the legal 
permission and the necessary statutory orders to allow the project to come to a realization. The view 
from the western shore of the lake is with no doubt one of the finest lake and mountain views in all 
England. At the time of the struggle, no building stood upon the lake shore and no public motor road 
reached beyond its entrance. It could only be explored on foot. Since the half of the XIXth century 
the lake has supplied water to the close village of Whitehaven and to the surrounding countryside, 
and the modest demands had, except in times of drought, made little impact on the scenery. 
 
 
 
 1 The venue is famous for its wonderful scenery, that attract a wide public of ramblers from Uk and abroad. 
Even the former US President Bill Clinton proposed to his wife Hillary  sitting on the banks of Ennerdale 
Water in 1973. 
 
 
 
 
The Ennerdale Lake, Lake District. 
 
 
 
 
The plan advanced by the Water Authority was to raise the level by four feet , which involved the 
construction of lengthy embankments, six to ten feet high, building a new large weir, and re-shaping 
the River Ehen where it flows out of the lake.  
The scheme provided also for a greater degree of drawdown in times of low rainfall , with the 
consequence that extensive areas of sterile mud and stones would, on such occasions, be exposed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oppositions to the Project of water withdrawal from Ennersdale Lake. 
 
 
The Friends of the Lake District ( FLD ) immediately took action against the purposal, objecting that 
the scheme would have a damaging effect on Ennerdale not only during the period of construction – 
when extensive earth moving operations and heavy machinery would have been in progress, but also 
permanent damage. An artificial object would have been imposed upon Ennerdale Water and its 
shores, that would be entirely alien to the wildness of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
 
. The Countryside Commission ceased to exist in 1999 when it was merged with the Rural Development Commission to form the Countryside Agency.  
See the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949 (c. 97)" 
 
the Valley. Other organisations and bodies representing a wide variety of interests, like Angling 
Associations, Farming Associations and other organisations soon joined the Friends of the Lake.   
 
Also the Countryside Commission1, a statutory body established to co-ordinate government activity 
in relation to the National Parks and countryside as whole, expressed its objection.  
 
On the other side of the planning authorities the Lake District Special Planning Board, although it 
pronounced formally its objection, had inside it, some members of the other major Planning Authority 
of the area, the Cumbria County Council, that had voted 55 to 9 in favour of the scheme fought 
internally to secure support to the Water Authority’s project; therefore the Lake District Special 
Planning Board was divided within itself. So the two major planning authorities of the region were 
found to hold opposing views regarding the project. 
 
 
 
The National Trust, the admirable body for the protection of natural and historical beauties of the 
country founded in XIX century by  Octavia Hill (*), owned extensive lands about the lake and had 
at the time just acquired a farm nearby, called Mireside, a property that would have been heavily 
affected by the proposals, was strongly opposed to the Ennerdale plan. Furthermore, the Trusts’ 
fundamental purpose of ‘ protecting the Natural Beauties permanently for the benefit of the nation  ‘ 
called for its reliable objection in all the dispute. 
Other public bodies that were against the scheme were : the District Councils for West Cumbria, 
Allerdale and Copeland, and on the same line were the Country Landowners’ Association and the 
National Farmers’ Union. In total 8 bodies, between associations and public bodies , pronounced 
their voice against the project. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The idea to unify and coordinate all the objections to the project among the Conservation and 
amenities bodies gave rise to a Save Ennerdale Campaign Committee, led by the Friends of the Lake 
District, which comprehended the British Mountaineering Council, the Cumbria Trust for Nature 
Conservation, the National Trust, the Ramblers’ Association, the Youth Hostels’ Association  the 
Countrywide Holidays Association, Egremont Anglers’ Association, and the West Cumbria branch of 
the Friends of the Earth. The unification of the groups allowed for a more efficient coordination in 
the request for funding.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Procedural Fight 
 
 
 
Despite the raising requests to stop the project, the North West Water Authority went ahead in 
requesting planning permissions to the competent authority in the national park, the Lake District 
Special Planning Board.  The permit was refused, but the Water Authority went ahead and appealed, 
and , by early 1980, the procedure led to a public enquiry.  
 
 
Alternative Proposal from the Opponents to the Ennerdale Scheme  
 
 
 
 
 
The North eastern shore of Ennerdale Lake: farmland of Roughton and Mireside. The Water Authority Scheme entailed the flooding of 11.5 acres of 
Mireside’s land. 
 
 
From the beginning the argument brought by the opponents to the Ennerdale Scheme was that an 
alternative possible scheme could have been conducted, abstracting water from the river Derwent at 
the Yearl Weir near Workington, which was a river with a huge catchment area nearby with a 
possibility to provide water without being much impacted on its water flow. The Water Authority had 
previously considered this scheme, but then abandoned it for the higher cost involved. In any case, 
the Committee of Conservation organisations declared that a much lower impact on the amenities 
associated with the Derwent scheme rather than the Ennerdale scheme should have been considered. 
 
 
The Wastwater Project 
 
Almost contemporary to the proposal of the Ennerdale, another project to abstract water from another 
lake of the District was  promoted by the company  British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. in 1979, to afford 
their water requirements by taking an increased supply from the lake of  Wastwater, the deepest lake 
in England, in the county of Cumbria, Lake District. The public application procedure to the Water 
Authority made the details of the company plans accessible to everybody and advertised to the 
common public, and their requirement of a new licence for further abstraction became generally 
known. 
 
The Wastewater Scheme was intended to triplicate the actual withdrawal of water already granted to 
supply water to a factory on the Windscale industrial site under emergency power since the Second 
World War. During the 1950s, the factory was replaced by other two productive sites, the Calder Hall 
Power Station and the same amount of water was conceded to the new plants. At the moment there 
were no weirs (in it.: diga, briglia di ritenzione) or sluices (it. canali di defluizione artificiale ) that 
impacted on the beauty of the lake, and the withdrawal was abstracted by pipeline near the outflow 
of the lake and the pumphouse made in stone and lightly ‘disguised’ as a barn looks standing lonely 
and quiet on the pebbly shore of a tranquil pool of water. 
 
Wastwater and the Great Gable, Cumbria. 
 
 
 
The new proposal was to abstract at least three times the previously agreed amount of water, and a 
greater use of Wastwater would have definitely been damaging that lovely and tranquil space. Very 
likely , a weir or a dam would have strongly impacted on the wild natural landscape, and raising the 
average level of the lake, the fluctuations of water usage would have leaved much of that scenary like 
a area of arid mud and exposed desertic stones.  
 
 
 
  
 
Wastwater, Map of 1925. 
 
 
 
 Wasdale 
 
Wasdale is the valley of the Wastwater, and etimologically gives the origins to the name of the lake. 
Wastwater comes from ‘ Wasdale ‘ plus English ‘ water ’. Wasdale, in local dialect,  has the meaning 
‘ valley of the water’. A large part of the main valley floor is occupied by Wastwater, which is the 
deepest lake in England, and it’s located in the western part of the Lake District National Park in 
Cumbria.  The River Irt flows through the valley , out of Wastwater, to its estuary at Ravenglass. Was 
dale is in the southwest of Lake District and is reached only by circuitous roads that edge round the 
hills from north to south. 
 
 
Landscape Value 
 
 
 
According to the Conservational Associations, and also following the large number of public that 
every year visits the Valley, Wasdale, among all the English landscapes, has one of the most 
spectacular. It is one of the most photographically reported and many artists find their inspiration for 
their paintings, as this thesis attempts to illustrate. Approaching the valley from Gosforth, on the 
A595, gives the traveller the great view of the scree, towering directly on the dark waters of the lake, 
while approaching it from Santon Bridge is very  impressive too, opening up the valley head with its 
shapely mountains at the centre of which stands the cone of Great Gable. The lovers of the District 
claim the Wasdale to be one of the most spectacular of England, with its highest mountains, the Scafell 
and Scafell Pike, raising massively from the lake shore to the shadowed crags (it. sommità, sporgenze 
rocciose ) about their summits. To visit Wasdale is ‘ to experience the power of the english landscape 
at its greatest2 ‘ , with its constantly changing light and the varying clarity of its atmosophere ‘ 
bringing infinite variety to the majesty and the wildness of the scenery 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 According to the way the Friends of the Lake District use to portray the Valley. 
 
 
 
Wasdale and Wastewater from Great Gable, by Mick Knapton, 2010. 
 
 
Symbolic and Spiritual Value  
 
 
The environment of the valley that, was remaining untouched and in its beauty gives the solitary visitors 
that approache the valley on foot along the path running at the feet of the screes, the possibility to enjoy 
a meditative and solitary environment, integrally preserved, which can be found in very few places 
nowadays and where man’s influence has made little or no impact where there is unique chance to 
experience the symbolic nature water and nature. 
 
 
 
 
Wastwater Road, by Darren Pullman. 
 
 
Recreational Value  
 
Wasdale is also famous amongst rock climbers as ‘ the home ‘ of British rock climbing activities.  
It was here that, at the end of XIXth century mountaineering and rock-climbing were born. Haning 
on the wall of Wastwater Hotel, at the head of the dale, there still are photographs of the men who 
explored the first routes on those crags. On the south-eastern side of the lake are very steep screes, 
below the summits of Whin Rigg and Illgill Head, while on the head of the valley is dominated by the 
Great Gable and the Scafell Pike, the highest peaks in England, which, along with Kirk Fell and 
Yewbarrow, surround the small community of Wasdale Head. Wasdale claims therefore a special 
place in the affection of the British people and there is  no surprise if a scheme that may threathen 
Wasdale beauty have risen such a strong and emotional resistance. 
 
       
Wastwater Screes 
 
 
 
Wastwater, by Heaton Cooper 
 
 
Wastwater, Autumn, Dusk 
 
 
 
Wastwater, reflections of Scree Slopes in Wastwater 
 
 
Scafell Pinnacle, 1890. 
 
 
 
Napes Needle, Cliffs on the Face of the Great Gable, Haskett Smitt, 1886. 
 
The Opposition to Wastwater Scheme 
 
The oppositions to the Ennerdale Scheme were enforced when in 1979 people came to know about 
the plans to triplicate the withdrawals of water from the Wastwater basin, too. The Wastwater 
Scheme, proposed by the British Nuclear Fuels, was seen as an attack to the most spectacular and 
breath-taking English lake and raised a strong opposition among all those who cared for the future of 
the Lake District.  
 
The proposal was to construct a weir, to canalise the river towards Lund bridge, to build sluices  and 
a fishpass, as required by law and, similarly to the Ennerdale proposal an application was made in 
1979 to get permission from the National Park authority, the  Lake District Special Planning Board.  
 
 
 
The Secretary of State Intervention  
 
Due to the public relevance of the issue, the whole procedure regarding the application of British 
Nuclear Fuels Ltd. For a new licence to get a greater quantity of water was called in by the Secretary 
of State for the Environment, for his own decision. The Secretary of State decided that the applications 
were to be the subject of a Public Inquiry.  
 
 
 
 
The Joint destiny of Ennerdale and Wastwater 
 
At the moment of calculating West Cumbria ‘s water needs in the future, the North West Water 
Authority had made provision also for British Nuclear Fuels, from the Ennerdale Scheme. The 
purposal from British Nuclear Fuels to obtain their supply from Wastwater weakened  the Water 
Authority’s Ennerdale scheme justification. Therefore, the Water Authority was strongly opposed to 
the Wastwater Scheme, proposed by British Nuclear Fuels. 
 
The British Nuclear Fuels’ position 
 
 
 
The British Nuclear Fuels contended position to stand for the use of Wastewater was that the purity 
of the Wastwater source was essential to their processes, differently from  the Ennerdale source.  
Therefore , the two major player on the scenery , the Water Authority and the British Nuclear Fuels 
Ltd. found themselves in conflict.  
 
Newspaper’s  Publicity 
 
The National daily papers gave great resonance to the issue , and published many articles on the two 
schemes. The headlines titled : 
 
“  WINDSCALE’S NEED IS THREAT  TO  WILD AND UNTAMED AREA “ 
 
         [ Daily Telegraph  - 5 november 1979] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From The Daily Telegraph  of  5 November 1979 :  
 
 
 
“ FARMING FAMILIES READY TO DEFEND THEIR RUGGED VALLEY “ 
 
 
“ … The Naylors of Wasdale Head are much the same as other farming families, in this  rugged 
part of Cumbria. Twice a year their flock of 3,000 Herdwick sheep - descended from Vicking stock 
– are rounded up on the high fells and driven to pastures in the Valley … In a way that has 
changed little since the Norsemen(*) settled in this corner of the Lake District, they farm and raise 
their sheep and attend on the Sunday in the tiny St. Olaf’s Chapel, built, it is said, by the first 
settlers… 
 
 “ … The family , Mr Scott Naylor, 52, and his wife Kathy and his grown up 
children. Like the Valley and its lake, the deep and mysterious Wastwater. The 
community a mile from the head of the lake, is no more than an isolated hamlet, 
reached by a ribbon of road barely wide enough for two vehicles to pass.    Apart 
from the Naylors, in their 17th century white washed farmhouse, there is little more 
than the ancient chapel, the Wastwater Inn, and several stone cottages.  In the 
summer months the community bulges with visitors. They arrive in their thousands 
from all parts of the country and abroad to climb  the steep slopes of the fells, 
raising to more than 2,000 feet, or simply to gaze in awe at what others have 
described as the Valley’s savage beauty…. “ 
 
(*) Norsemen, name given to the Scandinavian Vikings, who raided and settled on the coasts of the 
European continent in the 9th and 10th cent. They are also referred to as Northmen or Normans. 
 
 
  
Ennerdale, Historical picture. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Daily Telegraph concluded : 
 
 
“ .. But remote as they are, the Naylors, their neighbours and the villagers of 
Nether Wasdale at the other end of the lake can no longer remain aloof from the 
mainstream of  the Nuclear age… “ 
“…They now fear that their way of life and the beauty  of their surroundings 
is under dire threath “ . 
 
 
 
  
The ‘ No – Nuke ‘ Campaign  for the Ennerdale Lake. 
 
 
Strengthening the Opposition :  The National Trust intervention 
 
 
Contemporary to these events the National Trust became the owners of Wastwater, acquiring in 
addition, Wastwater Screes and vast stretches of Copeland Forest including the peaks of Seatallen 
and Buckbarrow , west of Wastwater. In addition to this, the Trust already owned extensive lands and 
mountains around Wasdale and its interest in the area was great. The Trust declared itself strongly 
against any interference with the Lake. The position of the trust was determinant because much of 
the land, required for the proposed scheme, that belong to the Trust was held inalienably, that meant 
that, without the Trust’s consent, both the British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. and the Water Authority would 
need to resort to a special Parliamentary procedure to acquire the land. This obstaculated 
bureaucratically the proceeding of the cases. 
 
  
The Countryside Commission (*) and other Conservation Bodies 
 
 
The Countryside Commission declared soon its opposition to the Wastwater scheme . The other 
Conservation and amenities bodies, already joined in the Committee for the Save the Ennerdale 
Campaign, declared their opposition and availability to defend Wastewater too. The Campaign 
Committee gave great publicity to the destructive proposal , also promoting an extensive fundraising 
to bear the costs of the Public Inquiry. 
 
Main Objections  
Among the main objections posed by the Conservationists was the fact that neither the Water 
Authority, nor the British Nuclear Fuel Ltd. Had made a proper study on the environmental impact 
of their schemes, in support and justification of the claimed ‘ immediate necessity ‘ forthe Ennerdale 
Water and Wastwater  schemes. Only later on the British Nuclear Fuel Ltd engaged its own consultant 
to produce a Report on their Wastwater proposal, published in end 1979 with the title:  
“ WASTEWATER – AN ENVIRONMENTAL APPRAISAL “. 
(*) The Countryside Commission was a statutory body in England and Wales, later in England only. Its 
forerunner, the National Parks Commission, was established in 1949 by the National Parks and Access to the 
countryside Act 1949 to coordinate government activity in relation to the National Parks. The Countryside 
Commission ceased to exist in 1999 when it was merged with the Rural Development Commission to form the 
Countryside Agency. This, lately evolved into Natural England, a non-departmental public body of the UK 
government responsible for ensuring that England’s natural environment, including land, flora and fauna, its 
freshwater and marine environments, the geology and soils, are protected and improved. It also has a 
responsibility to help people enjoy, understand and access the natural environment. As a non-departmental 
public body is independent of government, although the Secretary of State for Environment, Food & Rural 
Affairs has now the legal power to issue guidance to Natural England. Its powers include defining Ancient 
Woodlands, awarding grants, designating Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty and Sites of Special Scientific 
Interest, managing certain National Nature Reserves, overseeing access to open country and other recreation 
rights, and enforcing the associated regulations. It is also responsible for the administration of numerous grant 
schemes and frameworks that finance the development and conservation of the natural environment(..) 
In resisting the proposals, the conservationist submitted as  alternative scheme , the River Derwent 
Scheme, that they claimed to be capable of both satisfying West Cumbria’s needs and supplying the 
Nuclear plants increased water requirements. 
Newspaper‘s position 
The daily and Sunday newspapers , meanwhile, continued to support the conservationist argument 
through stories and comments . 
 
The Yorkshire Post, on 22 November 1979 : 
 
 
“  BEAUTY AT RISK “ 
 
 
“ .. when the Post-War Labour Government created the National Parks, the 
intention was ‘ to preserve and enhance their natural beauty and to promote 
their enjoyment by the public ‘.  That ideal has sometimes taken a battering in 
the face of commercial pressures, not least in the largest and most dramatic 
of the Parks, the Lake District, where a major road now cuts across the flanks 
of Skiddaw. Now the Lakes faces what may be the strongest threat so far, in 
the form of proposals to abstract vastly more water from both Wastwater and 
Ennerdale water. “ 
 
 
“ .. A photograph of the pyramid shaped Great Gable is featured on the front 
of the Booklet explaining the work of the Lake District Special Planning 
Board , the body endowed with powers to control development in the Park… 
The inference of this is that, here, we have machinery set up to prevent our 
unspoiled and much loved national heritage from being interfered with in a 
way which would alter its appearance . “ 
 
(…) for example Environmental Stewardship, Countryside Stewardship,  Environmentally Sensitive Areas, 
and Access to Nature. Natural England is now also  responsible for the delivery of some of Defra's Public 
Service Agreements (e.g. reversing the long-term decline in the number of farmland birds by 2020 and 
improving public access to the countryside). Natural England takes its Finance, Human Resources and Estates 
services from the Defra Shared Services organisation.   
 
 
The Campaign  
 
 
The representatives of the bodies composing the Campaign Committee first met on May 1978, 
at the Borrowdale Youth Hostel, where each body’a attitude and grounds of objection were 
discussed. The grounds upon which opposition was based were carefully specified and detailed. 
It was insufficient ‘to be against’ the proposal , without clearly defined reasons, and also there 
was the issue to define a more acceptable alternative proposal.  
 
The Committee first tasks were to gather public opposition and to raise funds for legal 
representation during the Inquiry. They channelled their previous experience by publishing a two 
leaflets entitled : 
 
 
“ SAVE  ENNERDALE “    and   “ DEFEND WASTEWATER “ 
 
[ Informative LeafletS of the Campaign Committee  
on the Ennerdale and Wastwater Schemes  ] 
 
 
The Leaflet summarized the proposals , stated the ground of objection and raised funds ,  
- through a detachable form  ( see picture )  - to be sent directly to the Campaign’s bank 
account. 30,000 Leaflets were printed and distributed bu the Committes constituent 
bodies. The Leaflets were included in the periodic literature ordinarily sent to the 
members, and this involved no additional postage costs, ensuring that it may have 
reached people more likely to be sympathetic with the cause.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            The’ Save The Ennerdale’ Leaflet, distributed by the Campaign Committee. 
 
 
The Save the Ennerdale Campaign Committee. 
 
 
 
 
A press clipping from the Westmorland Gazette, indicating the Committee members 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Leaflet  of the Fundraising Campaign  for the Ennerdale Water and Wastewater 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ‘ DEFEND WASTWATER ‘  Leaflet, 1978-79. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Farming Community in Ennerdale and  Wasdale 
 
The Farming Comunity was strongly and vociferously opposed, in both dales, to the projects for the 
encroachment on what they rightly regarded as their territory. In both valleys there was a strong 
leadership which rested on few individuals. In Ennerdale there was a well known farmer, Mr Bill 
Rowling, Chairman of the Parish Council, closely connected with the National Farmers’ Union, 
always ready to counter-argument with suitable phrases the Water Authority position. Another 
farmer, Mr Tom Jackson from Roughton, Ennerdale,  represented the Country Landowners’ 
Association and was strongly supported by his wife, Mrs. Jill Jackson, a strongly dedicated and 
energic woman during the distribution of the Campaign leaflets and during the fundraising.  
 
 
 
 
Mrs Kathy Naylor, who excelled in publicizing the cause. 
 
In Wasdale, the Community , through the Parish Council, was led by the strong and forthright 
character of Mrs. Rosamund Templer , of Strands, that knew the Valley intimately from long time. 
Mrs. Kathy Naylor, wife of the farmer who farmed a flock of 3,000 Herdwick sheeps at the dale head, 
became the other outstanding figure in the Wasdale scene. She discovered an unknown ability to 
mobilitate the press and attracting television and media’s attention on Wasdale. Kathy Naylor, 
received letters from afar in encouragement to pursue the fight. Kathy was also very entrepreneurial 
and conceived a lot of ideas for raising funds and making known the point of view of Wasdale people.  
Mrs Templer and Mrs. Naylor established their own Committee, the Wasdale Defence Committee 
that dealt specifically with the local issues. The committee decided to take its own solicitor. The 
Wadale committee continued however to work in close cooperation with the Campaign Committee. 
 
 
The March into the Parliament House. 
 
On the 11 December 1979 she organised a march through the streets of  London, aimed to lobby the 
Parliament on the issue. The group of demonstrators at the beginning was small and tranquil, but 
when it reached the Houses of Parliament, at St Stephen’s entrance, there were the Television cameras 
awaiting for them and a crowd of further supporters. The group, substancially reinforced, went 
through the corridors of the Parliament, to meet the Members for Barrow.in-Furness, Whitehaven, 
and Workington to express them the opposition to the water proposal and to hear the sympathetic 
views of the Members of the Parliament. The beginning of the Public Inquiry was only a month away 
, and it needed to take its course before the Secretary of State could make his decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
Publicity and Support  from Common people  
 
The two Leaflets were made available at the National Trusts Information Centers and supplied in 
quantity to any person or organisation who wanted to distribute them. The Campaign Committee 
also decided to seek as much publicity as possible  in the press and the media. Articles were 
published on ‘ Country Life ‘  as well as in many national Sunday and daily newspapers and in 
the northern provincial press. Also the BBC and the ITV put out programmes on the issue. The 
funding contribution of the campaign came from all over the country; curiously the contributions 
varied , from  £ 500 to £ 1 pound . An elderly gentleman gave  £ 61 ‘ one for every year he 
had visited Wasdale since 1917’. His rate of contribution was soon followed by many others. 
Many ideas arose spontaneously from the love for these beautiful dales. Cheques and 
letters of support flowed in, and funds gathered. By 1980, when the Inquiry was about to start, the 
collected funds for Ennerdale and Wastwater were above  £10,000, enough to sustain the legal 
expenses. In the end the total sum raised by the Campaign was above £15,000, with further 
possibility, in case needed, promised by many contributors.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
Campaigners outside the Civic Hall, Whitehaven. 
The group was supported by other counties campaigners, as East Anglia. 
 
 
 
 
Search for Juridical and for Landscape Experts Assistance 
 
The Campaign Committee decided to take a  solicitor (the firm Temple and Bargh, of Kendal)  to 
be represented during the Inquiry, and  a landscape architect to examine closely the evidences 
brought by the Water Authority and the British Nuclear Fuel Ltd. And also to counter-examine the 
expert witnesses of the proponents of the schemes. A firm of landscape architects from Oxford 
(Cobham Resource Consultants)  were engaged for this purpose. 
 
 
The Public Inquiry  
 
 
 
 
 
The Inspector – Mr D.H. Komlosy , with is two Assessors, Mr J.L Milverton ( left) and Mr P.H 
Garnett (right) . 
 
The detailed description of the inquiry was reported by the Friends of the Lake District, after the 
Inquiry took place. 
 
The Public Inquiry lasted  three months and a half, starting on 15th January 1980 and ending on 
the 9th of may 1980. The words during the Inquiry were recorded in a daily transcript, a service 
produced by an American firm and copies of the transcript were provided daily to the main 
participants. The cost of the service was principally born by the British Nuclear Fuels Ltd.  The 
Inquiry took place in the Civic Hall, in Whitehaven.  
 
 
 
 
 
The Opening morning of the Inquiry 
Whitehaven Civic Hall, 15 January 1980. 
 
 
 
Setting of the Inquiry 
 
On the north side there was the Water Authority’s team, promoting the Ennerdale Scheme and 
objecting to the Wastwater Scheme. Facing them, were British Nuclear Fuels Ltd advocates, 
officials and advisers, promoting the Wastwater Scheme and objecting the Ennerdale Scheme. At 
other desks there were representatives of the Cumbria County Council, supporting the Ennerdale 
Scheme and opposing the Wastwater Scheme.  
In the room there were rows of chairs for public use. Members of the public could come and go as 
they pleased. Sometimes parties of students or school children came in to listen, for an hour. 
Occasionally elderly people dozed comfortably in the back rows, while some witness went through 
his long and technical proof  of evidence. The Inspector was always anxious to ensure that the 
public could hear everything said and to participate, if they wished so. The Inspector’s clerk, sitting 
behind him, was in charge of keeping a summary of the proceeding and to produce a daily progress 
report.  He also filed, and found when required, copies of the hundreds of documents, drawings 
and statements produced at the Inquiry. 
 
 
Thematic Issues Emerged During the Inquiry  
 
 
Impact on Ennerdale Landscape  
 
 
On the Ennerdale case, the Water Authority witnesses dealt in great deal with the ameliorative 
measures which would have been taken if the Ennerdale Scheme had been permitted, and how the 
landscape would have been rehabilitated, illustrating their arguments with photographs, diagrams 
and drawings. The effect to be mitigated should have been the variations  in water levels , both in 
flooding and in drawn-down of the level. Among the objectors the major landscape concern raised 
were about the size of the embankment, the construction of an artificial shore-line and the  
extensive escavations proposed at Mireside and the Liza Delta, and the effects of the works on 
farming and generally the impact of the Scheme on Ennerdale Water and its surrounding.  
 
 
 
Impact on Ennerdale Ecology  
 
 
Another expert witness of the Water Authority proponent of the scheme, a consultant ecologist, argued 
that the proposal ‘ would have minimal influence on the flora of the Lake and its surrounding ‘. 
Nevertheless the opponents showed their worries, still. 
 
 
 
 
Ennerdale Water drawn-down in June 1978 , exposing wide expanses of stones and mud. 
View from the path along the Western shore. 
 
 
 
 
Rim effect, caused by the changing water level in a similar reservoir 
 
 
Wastewater Variant Schemes: Impacts and Objections 
 
 
Regarding the Wastwater  Scheme, 5 possible alternatives were illustrated, by the British Nuclear 
Fuels Ltd  technical experts, starting from the ‘simple drawdown‘, realised through the 
construction of larger pipelines set deeply into the lake near its outflow, passing to other schemes 
which involved the construction of weirs of different types to raise the lake level of various 
degrees. Two last schemes entailed, in addition, involved the canalisation of the out-flowing River 
Irt towards Lund Bridge.  Opposing questions to these projects regarded:  
 
1. the extent and frequency of unsightly drawdowns; 
 
2.  the design of the weirs; 
 
3.  the necessity for the construction of a fish pass; 
 
and lastly, not less important:  
 
4.  and the British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. future water plans. 
 
 
 
 
Ennerdale Water. Expanses of Stones, revealed by the operations of the pumps installed at the weir 
to maintain the flow in the River Ehen. The Water Authority new Scheme provided for lowering the 
level of the lake by further two feet, which would have exposed even greater expanses of stone and 
mud in this shallow area. 
 
 
These aspect were pursues at lengths by advocates of the Water Authority, Cumbria County 
Council, and the Lake District Special Planning Board, who were united in opposing British 
Nuclear Fuels’ plans for Wastwater.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participation and Questions from the Public  
 
 
Many times, questions from local farmers revealed to be very concrete, blunt and based on earthy 
common sense, as well as spiced with a rich humour. Furthermore, the Inspector showed his 
anxiety to ensure that everyone wishing to question an expert witness should have the possibility 
of doing so. Towards the end of one morning , he said :  
 
 “ …I would like to address for a moment the members of the public sitting 
at the back. You might feel that you are sort of separated from this end of the 
room by a barrage of experts, but I do want to remind you that I give an 
opportunity at the end of each cross-examination for questions to be asked, 
and these are in fact most welcome. “  
 
                      [ Mr Komlosy, Inspector of the Public Enquiry  
on Wastwater and Ennerdale Water Schemes , 1980 ] 
 
 
 
 
Education of the Public within the Participatory Process 
 
 
Private objectors, sometimes, mistook the participatory occasion as a chance to make statements of 
their own views. Sometimes such interventions were amusing and surprising. One afternoon, in late 
February, a white haired gentleman requested permission to question a witness. The man  asked: 
 
 
 ‘what the effect would be of tipping a few lorry loads of rock across the bar, 
  at Wastwater … ( he seemed to have done this, at a smaller scale, in his young  
  years…and was wondering whether ‘ dumping loads of stones some dark night’  
  would have rather solved the problem , preventing the Authority to spending  
  a huge amount of money..) “. 
      [ The Objector, from the Public ] 
 
 
The reaction of the Inspector to such non-pertinent newly raised issue, was refined and 
commendable. The Inspector reminded the objector that: 
 
 ‘ his questions must be related to the witness’ evidence and that he must not  
  develop his own arguments. There would be an opportunity to put his own  
  views later in the Inquiry ‘ 
 
        [ The Inspector ] 
 
 
Which, in fact, he never did. 
 
 
 
 
Different Expert’s Opinions 
 
 
 
Many Experts were brought by all the parts involved, each one trying to expose his own particular 
technical rationale. The number of witnesses was high, each one producing charts , diagrams and 
photographs, or simply testifying with their expertise. British National Fuels Ltd introduced their 
witness limnologist , attesting that ‘ no harm would have occurred to the ecology of the lake’, while  
the Water Authority consultant ecologist argued that ‘ the proposal would have a minimal influence 
on the flora of the lake ‘.  
 
The Water Authority then called two witnesses to express critical view on the Wastwater proposal: 
Dr. Marshall, engineers of the River Division and Mr Kellsall, Regional Fishery 
Officer. They showed, with flow records and graphs, that: ‘ the behaviour and the 
characteristics of the lake at the present rate of abstraction were very close to those of 
a completely natural lake, however, in case of increased abstraction of 50 ml/d there 
would be greater draw-down in period of dry weather. There would have been exposed 
additional areas of the lake bed .The flow in the River Irt would also be significantly 
and detrimentally affected’ . 
 
  
 
 
The pupils of Ennerdale Bridge School, with the teacher John Cox, on the day April gave her evidence 
 
The Public and Children Concerns 
 
On Friday April 18th 1980, the advocate of the Friends of the Lake District called the youngest witness 
to appear at the Inquiry. Miss April Roberts, aged 11, and the senior pupil from Ennerdale Bridge 
Primary School. April read her evidence with confidence and in a clear voice. The evidence had been 
compiled by all the pupils of the little village school, who were sitting at the back of the hall listening. 
The evidence contained diagrams and drawings, including one of the threatened plant Elatine exandra 
. April said that ‘ they regarded Ennerdale as their lake ‘.The pupils of Ennerdale Bridge Primary 
School  said :  
 
“ We live by it, walk there, and play there “ 
 
 
 
The school children thought that the Scheme ‘ would spoil the most beautiful and untouched of all 
the lakes’ and they hoped that ‘ the next generation at Ennerdale School would be able to enjoy an 
unspoiled lake as they had done ‘. They were worried too, April said, about the ‘ heavy construction 
traffic ‘ which, using the narrow road for a period of two years, would be dangerous for them and 
everyone else who lived in Ennerdale. Among the school children at the back sat Janice Vickers, aged 
8, of Mireside Farm, whose father gave, the next day, evidence for the National Farmers’ Union. 
 
Resonance in the Press and the Media  
 
 
The local press came to photograph April and her school mates and Radio Carlisle recorded and 
broadcast some of the children comments. Mr. Lockhart-Mummery, Junior Counsel for the Water 
Authority, congratulated April on her submission and asked her a few questions. Mr Komlosy, the 
Inspector, thanked her in a kind and grand-fatherly voice wishing that ‘ she might be able to show 
him some of the plants which have been referred to when he made his site inspection’ . April’s mother, 
at the back glowed with pride ‘ It was an experience which April will remember all her life’ she said. 
 
Land Loss and  the Disturbance to General Farming Activities  
 
Other witnesses followed in those days, all stressing the loss that would have occurred personally or 
upon the environment. David Vickers, farmer of Mireside Farm, spoke representing the National 
Farmers’ Union, issuing the question of loss of land to agriculture and the general disturbance to 
farming activities caused by such works.  
 
 
The Farmers’s view 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mrs Julie Vickers feeding her goats  at Mirehouse. The raised water level would have flooded this field. 
 
According to the Farmers : 
 
“ I am no expert , but I am extremely worried that the effect of the temporary 
and permanent land losses will prove much greater. All the land to be taken 
comes out of my in-by, my vital grassland. “ 
          [ Mr D. Vickers, farmer ] 
 
 
David Vickers’ s witness on Land Loss 
 
 
 
David Vickers, the farmer at Mirehouse, the man who stood to lose most. 
 
 
Mr. Vickers Said :  
 
“ Although the Agricultural witness for the Water Authority felt that the 
Ennerdale scheme ‘ would have a negligible effect on the long-term farming 
in the area ‘  
 I fear the worst… 
 
Other witnesses have explained the importance of the in-bye land. On a hill-
farms it is important. I need it for the ewes at lambing time in late April to the 
end of May. I then need it for grazing the suckler cows, and for the growing 
of my hay crop for the winter fodder… 
 
Grass is indeed my only crop…”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Growing Regard for the Environment 
 
 The last day, in the closing speech in the 2nd of May a number the representative for the Friends of 
the Lake District and the Campaign Committee, Mr. R. Broady, reminded the Inspector of the strength 
of the public opinion against the Ennerdale and the Wastwater proposal, as evidenced by the large 
number of people, in the various bodies which he was representing and also by the many thousands 
of pounds raised to defend the two lakes. Mr.Broady evidenced that there was a Responsibility on the 
Water Authority to find the least damaging scheme possible. Unfirtunately, till then the Water 
Authority main concern had become the question of the costs and they had chosen the cheapest 
scheme.  
 
The proceedings were closed by the speech of Mr C. Vane, representative of the Wasdale Defence 
Committee,by Mr. A. Wheland of the National Trust and by Mr Hordern, of the Lake District Special 
Planning Board. The points made in front of the Inspector were 
 
1. The importance of  prioritising the Protection of  the Landscape of the National Park, as the 
Protection of the Lake district was a matter of national importance.; 
 
2. Not to allow to Short-term financial solutions to override the Long Term interest of the two 
dales and their Communities; 
 
3. The Growing national Regard for the Environment could not be ignored; 
 
4. The strong recommendation, from the Trust, was to adopt the ‘Derwent alternative’. 
 
 
Only Mr. M. Rich, representative of the Cumbria County Council stood alone in favour of the 
Water Authority Ennerdale Scheme, ‘ a scheme which did not have any grave environmental 
consequences ‘ -  in the County Council view.  However, Mr. Rich reiterated the County Council 
opposition to the Wastwater proposals. 
The Recognized Value of  Lake District as ‘ Work of Art’ 
 
 
 According to Mr . Hordern , of the value of  Wastwater and Ennerdale Water was important as 
much as any other valuable ‘ work of art’ or ‘ piece of architecture’  in the country.  
 
 
“ That value is intrinsic. It does not depend upon the number of people 
who see it, or upon their appreciation of it. It is to be protected, 
preserved for what it is and it can be harmed by careless handling, just 
as a great picture or statue may be. “ 
[ Mr Hordern, on behalf of the Lake District 
Special Planning Board ] 
 
 
Wastwater, in autumn. 
  
Ennerdale Water, Lake District, painting. 
 
 
And concludes : 
 
“.. If these proposals were allowed  it would be inevitable be seen that 
even in some of the wildest and most beautiful parts of England’s 
premier National Parks, and even when a reasonable alternative is 
available, yet in practice the intangible values are set aside or given a 
second place. That would be a grave blow.  “ 
[ Mr Hordern, on behalf of the Lake District  
  Special Planning Board ] 
 
 
Internalising  or Not The Cost of Water ? 
  
The Environmental Journalist Tony Aldous, in The Countryman said :  
 
“… The absurd position appeared to have been reached that the North 
West Water Authority accepted that there were less damaging ways of 
providing water to the Nuclear industry on the coast, but felt unable to 
screw the extra costs out of its customers. Yet, that extra cost is peanuts 
in the national nuclear power budget. It is hoped that the Inspector, and 
the Minister, will tell the Water Authority and British Nuclear Fuels that  
if they want the extra water they will have to pay the full cost of 
providing it in the way that least damages the Lake District National 
Park. “  
 
 
Ennerdale Lake 
The Final Decision 
On the afternoon of the 22nd December the decision was made : on the recommendations of the 
Inquiry Inspector, both the schemes had been rejected by the Secretary of State. Ennerdale and 
Wastwater were save.  
 
The Guardian headline on 23rd December stated :  
 
 
 
“ HESELTINE DECISION DELIGHTS THE LAKE DISTRICT  
 
“ Lovers of the Lake District were cock-a-hoop last night at the 
decision of Mr. Michael Heseltine, the Environment Secretary of 
State, to ban planned developments at Ennerdale and Wastwater “ 
 
 
 
Ennerdale 
 
 
The Planning  Board said it was :  
 
“ … Specially pleased that the Secretary of State for the Environment 
has shown such concern and care for the National Park and regards it as 
a confirmation of the importance of these areas to the Nation. .. “ 
 
“ …The planning board would be pleased to work with the North West 
Water Authority and British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. on alternative ways of 
making water available for the needs of the industry in West Cumbria. 
This is the best Christmas present the Lake District National Park 
Authority could have had. “  
 
 
Ennerdale, Painting 
 
The North West Water Authority and British Nuclear Fuels Limited were of course less happy.  
 
The Inspector Findings 
 
“ ..As in the case of Ennerdale, Wastwater is in a particularly sensitive area 
within the National Park and in my view must also be considered as a special 
case. The virtues of Wastwater, its unique quality, the fact that it is regarded by 
many as the most impressive of the lakes has been expressed by a number of 
objectors to the scheme. I agree with them and accept in principle that this lake 
should not be further exploited . “ 
 
 
The Inspector was impressed by the argument that, in its present state, at the present rate of 
abstraction, Wastwater still behaved as a natural lake, it was in a state of equilibrium that would be 
upset by any further abstraction. The inspector did not accept the British Nuclear Fuels’ argument 
that ‘ their future demands, beyond 1990s, should not be a cause of concern now, if their present 
wishes were acceded to’ . 
 
The Inspector also grew attention to the position of the National Trust, and its inalienable ownership 
of the land required to put in place the schemes. In view of the possible delays entailed in 
Parliamentary procedure to secure inalienable land it was ‘desirable’ that a solution should be found 
outside the National Park, on land which was not owned inalienably by the National Trust.   
However the Inspector did not submit this as a reason for refusal. His grounds were entirely 
environmental.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 The Final Concessions  to the Applicants 
 
 
 
The only concession made to the applicant authorities was a temporary consent for 
increased abstraction of 11 Ml / d from Wastwater ( 50% increase of the present rate 
of abstraction)  pending the provision of a satisfactory supply from another source.  
 
The Associations involved, despite the victory, kept on maintaining close watch on the terms of  the ‘ 
temporary licence’ issued by the Water Authority.  
 
GLOSSARY 
 
 
 
“Discursive frames” :   A discursive frame is the set of cultural viewpoints that informs 
       the practices of a community of social movement organizations.  This 
discursive frame defines the goals and purposes of the organization, and 
provides guidance for the actions of the organisation. It provides the 
cultural view-point, from which the organization acts. 
 
 
Discourse Analysis :     the belief systems that define the various components of a social 
                                           Movement. It was purposed by the anthropologist Mary Douglas. 
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Chapter 2 
Modes of Regulation for Water and Electricity 
The View of the Economist : The American versus 
Others Regulatory models. 
 
ABSTRACT  
When we speak of Regulation, most often, the technical mind slips towards the elaborate explanations 
of those regulatory theories that across the XX century so well depicted the games and counter-moves 
that most powerful actors on a country’s economic scene tent to put in place in order to acquire for 
themselves privileged position and competitive advantage for their business. The first part of the 
chapter affords the issue of the Regulation of Water and Electricity utilities through the glance of the 
Economic History in the Public Management of Water and Electricity utilities in America, during the 
XIX and XX centuries and, more recently, in UK. The attempt is to illustrate how these two Regulatory 
models are structured and to explain, through different stories, how they confirmed to be among the 
two most replicated models of economic regulation of utilities in the world, and in most of  the 
developing countries nowadays. The central part of the chapter illustrates the history and the 
institutional design of some major Regulatory Agencies in the US, good examples for a democratic 
approach to Regulation, that the writer assumes could be purposed as a ‘comparative suggestion’ 
for the design and development of a ‘proper’ system of Regulation in Italy, where the same is still  far 
to be perfect. Although it may not be seen as the only model, being Italy home of a different tradition  
of public management, a knowledge of what ‘ can be possible ‘ – with the shown effective results – 
elsewhere may always be of inspiration for the Italian legislator, the public administrator or simply  
for the common citizen wanting to broaden his knowledge on what happened, and is happening, 
somewhere else, and/or in other historical times, as regards some Democratic means for Regulation 
in private (or public) Water utility systems. The final part goes through some possible Alternative 
Solutions for the involvement of Citizen in the Regulation of Water Utilities, studying Cases which 
are already experimented Developing countries. The lessons learn from the illustrated cases in India 
and Philippines, are worthy to be applicable in any context  worldwide. 
The History of Regulatory Policy in Water and Electricity in XIX 
and XX century America 
 
Both American continents share an history of the water and electricity industry that since the 
nineteenth century very well brings about examples regarding that private versus public debate that 
clearly still takes place nowadays and it’s history represent a good lens of comparison for our century. 
Taking a look backward into the past century dynamics can help us to recover an overview of some 
major happenings that affected the regulatory disputes in water and electricity sector from a 
regulatory policy point a view, showing the many interconnections and similarities, in infrastructure 
management and regulation aspects, between electricity and water sector, as well as the direct impact 
on water use deriving from the production of energy, or the regulatory transpositions that happened 
between these two sectors. 
 
A Historic Overview of the electricity regulatory policy in 
America 
 
As many researches published by a number of American scholars1 show, the history of electricity 
industry in North and South America at the end of nineteenth century reveals common factors but 
also a certain range of variety of patterns. One is that a common technology was applied in a variety 
of places, but often showing very different results, due to the different socio-political conditions in 
different parts of America. In Latin America, many of the larger utilities, and some in Canada, result 
to be foreign owned, but we find also some cases of domestically owned firms ( one major in Latin 
America and many in Canada), while in the U.S. most of the electricity utilities at the end of the 
XIXth and throughout the XXTh century were domestically owned. In some countries Regulation 
was a responsibility of municipal or provincial authority, while in others it was a responsibility of the 
national government to regulate the sector. 
 
 
 
Trends of Private Ownership in Electricity Companies in XXth century America 
 
Substantially, many infrastructure companies survived in private hands, in the United States for a 
hundred years or more, while most of them became eventually nationalized  in Latin America and 
Canada. Nevertheless, in Latin America, three exceptions of privately owned electricity companies 
survived , while, in Canada, three provinces allowed a private electricity company to survive 
throughout the XX century2.   
 
Early 1900s : A wave of Nationalizations 
Most of the nationalizations , especially those based in Latin America, happened within the frame of 
less stable governments and often of civil war conditions, although it is difficult to prove a correlation 
between these factors. In four provinces of Canada – as the researches show3  - a first wave of the 
process of nationalization started taking place in 1906 and 1919, followed by a second one after the 
World War II I in other four provinces.  The history of many private electricity companies is well 
documented by a number of scholars 4. 
 
Factors for Expropriation and  Nationalization of Private Companies. 
 
It seems rather difficult to ascertain why some companies survived, and why others didn’t, but we 
can try to identify some of the factors that may have played some role. According to some authors5 
private utilities are more likely to survive when expropriation costs are high, both from a political or 
a financial point of view, and, always according the same authors,  this is tightly linked to a variety 
of elements, like the ownership of the utilities by foreign companies ,whether the firm is regulated by 
a national or municipal authority,  the extent to which the firm’s stock are held by a wide number of  
stockholders and the presence of specific legal constraints. 
 
History 
 
The first electricity companies started in US and Canada in the 1880s and in Latin American countries 
in 1890s. They started  generating power for large industrial or mining firms, and for the public 
lighting replacing gas and kerosene. Almost all the original electric companies were privately owned 
, financed by private local investors. They usually obtained concessions from the municipal 
government for  an extended period of  20 to 50 years, with the concession, when needed,  from 
national or provincial government to obtain the water rights to build hydroelectric plants. The 
industry consolidated between the last decade of the nineteenth century up to the 1930s. At the end 
of this period, most cities had only one electricity supplier, and often, merge across industries.  
 
Corruption and the mistrust of  Local Politics.  
 
In early 1900s, many states experienced a gradual transition becoming regulators of utilities in 
various industrial sectors. Usually, this transition was characterized by a strong debate about charges 
, brought about  by the Progressive reformers and even by utilities themselves, a debate that the cities 
weren’t able, incompetent or too much affected by corruption , to manage themselves. Samuel Insull6 
head of Chicago’s largest electricity company, was one of the organizers of this coalition. In 1898 
Insull during his presidential address, surprised the delegates of the National Electric Light 
Association meeting proposing the acknowledgement by the industry that electricity was a natural 
monopoly and therefore it should adopt a regulation of electric rates done by  the state. Insull’s 
proposal was not adopted immediately, but later in the reforms brought about by President Roosvelt, 
of 1907. 
Insull’s proposal originated by his experience with municipal regulation in Chicago  
  CHARACTERS 
 
  Samuel Insull : The man who enlighted America  ( issuing Electricity Bonds ) 
Samuel Insull  
( 1859 – 1938 )   
     from Forrest Mc Donald , 1962. 
       
 
Insull was able to weather the investigations and trials of the 1930s with a certain degree 
of public support because his background was, in many ways, a classic Horatio Alger story 
of a poor boy rising to wealth. Born and reared in England, Insull was one of eight children. 
His father was a temperance crusader of modest means, Young Insull briefly attended 
private school in Oxford with some of England's most privileged children. Teased and 
slighted by his upper-class school-mates, Insull embarked on a lifelong drive to earn 
respectability and wealth. In 1874 the Insull family moved to London, and Insull took work 
as an office boy. He quickly proved to be diligent and precise in his work habits, learning 
shorthand after hours and establishing a good reputation as a clerk. In 1879 he began work 
with the London branch of Thomas Edison's company. He was so successful at his job that 
in 1881 he immigrated to America to become Edison's personal secretary. He became an 
American citizen in 1896. 
Utilities 
 
 
 
Insull arrived just as Edison was about to introduce commercial electric lighting. Insull 
became Edison's financial manager, finding the money necessary to build the nation's first 
electricity-generating plants and electric lines. Insull managed to hunt up investors such as 
Henry Villard and J. P. Morgan to finance the projects. In 1889 he was one of the original 
directors of the Edison General Electric Company, organizing its manufacturing base and 
corporate and sales operations. A takeover of General Electric by eastern financiers such 
as Morgan left Insull powerless and bitter. In 1892 he relocated west, out of the circle of 
eastern financiers, becoming the president of the Chicago Edison Company. He went on 
to make Chicago Edison a model of the industry. 
 
 
 
Monopolist 
 
The early days of the electricity-generating industry were dominated by several problems 
Insull deftly resolved. One was competition from the gas industry, which at the turn of the 
century produced light as cheaply and effectively as did electricity. Another problem 
concerned the virtues of decentralized versus centralized power generation. Initially 
bankers and investors would only fund decentralized power generators, building by 
building, localizing power use. Centralized power required enormous sums of capital up 
front, and the returns were not certain: central plants, for example, continued operating 
during the day when usage was low, wasting electricity, whereas power plants located in 
individual buildings could tailor their electricity generation to specific uses. These factors 
combined to lead most observers to guess that electricity would be a luxury item, of limited 
use in the future, Insull's vision was far grander. He was among the first to postulate the 
idea of generating electricity for mass use (in fact coining the term mass production). First, 
however, he had to resolve the problems plaguing the electricity industry. He recruited 
bright engineering talent to help refine the production of electricity, introducing the world's 
first steam turbines to his plants in 1902. Second, he revolutionized utilities financing, 
introducing open-end mortgages and high-yield bonds to gain investor support. Third, he 
proved centralized generation profitable by powering electric railways, industry, and an 
ever-expanding base of consumers. His objective was to supply consumers at the lowest 
possible price, expanding electric service to millions of homes and broadening the base of 
his returns. In order to do this, of course, Chicago Edison had to be the exclusive electricity 
generator for the Chicago area. He made Edison a powerful monopoly, gobbling up 
competitors, especially during the economic depression of 1893 to 1897. By 1905 annual 
electricity production for Chicago Edison doubled for the seventh time in thirteen years; 
by 1907 the company was sixty times larger than it was when Insull took the helm. Chicago 
Edison was the nation's leading electricity-generating company. 
  
 
Success 
 
Insull's success in Chicago laid the foundation for his national ambitions. In 1912 he 
formed the Middle West Utilities Company, a holding company designed to facilitate 
electrification of the Midwest. It began acquiring local generating companies and electric 
traction systems, expanding their operations to wider groups of consumers. World War I 
advanced Insull's efforts. He was head of the Illinois Council of National Defense, a state 
agency formed to coordinate propaganda and regulate the economy. The federal Council 
of National Defense spent $2 million to improve electrification of vital industries, moneys 
naturally benefiting Insull and other utilities magnates in the long run. During the war 
Chicago Edison (now named Commonwealth Edison) increased its sales fivefold. Insull's 
participation in the war effort also transformed his business in two other ways. First, his 
experience as a war propagandist familiarized him with modern advertising techniques, 
and after the war he formed the Illinois Public Utility Information Committee and other 
public relations firms to promote the public reputation of the utilities industries. Second, 
his experience on war-bond drives convinced him to restructure public investment in his 
utilities. Insull began selling cheap corporate bonds to his electricity customers. By 1930 
more than one million people had invested in the Insull companies. 
 
 
 
 
Financial supporter  in  World War I 
 
 
At the time the US entered World War I, Insull was named head of the Illinois Defense 
Council by President Woodrow Wilson ; his efforts sold over a million dollars of War 
Bonds 
 
 
 
 
Patron of Arts   
 
On May 22, 1899,[Samuel Insull married a "tiny, exquisitely beautiful and clever" 
Broadway ingénue actress whose stage name was (Alis) Gladys Wallis, whose real name 
was Margaret Anna Bird, who had been on stage since the childhood. At the time of their 
marriage, Insull was 41 and Gladys was 24. Husband and wife were patrons of the Arts 
Insull was instrumental in the building of Chicago's Civic Opera House 
 
 
 
Humanitarian and Charity  Supporter 
 
Samuel Insull was also known for his charitable works in other areas; donating large sums 
of money to local hospitals and then calling on others with similar resources to  
do the same. He donated freely to African-American charities in Chicago, asking the 
wealthy to follow his example. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Glady Wallis Insull and Samuel Insull. 
 
  
See also the VIDEO:  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=Q_Uqx-XLWNU  
         
 
 
Power 
 
Insull's innovative financial and operational strategies made the 1920s the heyday of his 
success. Three Insull companies—Commonwealth Edison; Peoples Gas, Light and Coke; 
and Public Service of Northern Illinois—each earned more than SI75 million annually. 
Middle West and several hundred subsidiaries were worth $1.2 billion. All totaled, Insull 
companies were worth nearly $3 billion, had more than one million stockholders, served 
four million customers, and produced as much electricity and gas as any entire nation on 
earth other than the United States. Insull's personal fortune was $150 million in 1929. His 
prestige and power in the United States were matched only by other industrialists of the 
caliber of Henry Ford or J. P. Morgan. Yet he was about to suffer a devastating series of 
attacks that would make him one of the most vilified individuals in the nation. “ 
 
 
 
 
 
Crash 
 
For Insull several different problems combined with the stock-market crash of 1929 to destroy his 
fortune and fame. The first was a series of scandals in the utilities business that badly tarnished the 
reputation of power generation. In 1927 and 1928 congressional committees revealed widespread 
influence peddling by utilities companies in the Pennsylvania and Illinois elections of 1926. Public 
sympathy for the utilities business was further undermined by disputes over the proposed Boulder 
Dam and the federally owned Muscle Shoals plant in Alabama. Politicians hostile to the utilities 
began speaking of a "power trust," rhetoric bound to impact a monopolist such as Insull. What really 
destroyed Insull, however, was an attempt to protect Commonwealth Edison from a stock buyout by 
Cyrus S. Eaton, a Cleveland financial raider. To protect his shares Insull formed the Insull Utility 
Investments Company and Corporation Securities Company of Chicago, pyramiding his utilities 
holdings and investment holdings. He refinanced Middle West Utilities, splitting its stock, 
eliminating its debt, and placing future dividends on a stock, rather than a cash, basis. These moves 
protected Insull's control of his stock but did not help with shares Eaton had already purchased, as 
the stock boom of 1929 continually raised the value of Eaton's shares of Commonwealth Edison. 
Following the crash, with prices declining, Insull bought out Eaton, borrowing money from a variety 
of sources, including his former enemies in New York. Confident that the Depression would turn out 
to be brief, Insull was sure he could repay the debt. He was, of course, wrong. As prices in Insull 
securities continued to fall, the New York bankers turned bearish, driving the stock to lower levels 
and eliminating their worth as loan collateral. Insull Utility Investments and Corporation Securities 
were bankrupt; New York took control of Commonwealth, Middle West, and Insull's remaining 
holdings; Insull resigned from the chairmanships of more than seventy of his companies that were 
defeated. He had lost everything. 
 
 
 
 
Scapegoat 
 
What happened next was sensational and occupied the press for months. In defeat Insull became a 
public scapegoat for the impersonal economic forces that had brought on the Depression. He was a 
ready candidate for the task, as the public stockholders of Insull's companies—ordinary people such 
as farmers, teamsters, and schoolteachers—had lost their investments when Insull lost his companies. 
His financial maneuverings of 1930 and 1931 were complex, multifaceted, amoral, and quite 
possibly illegal; the taint of scandals of the 1920s burdened Insull. John Swanson, state's attorney 
for Cook County in Chicago, maximized the political potential of this burden during the elections of 
1932: on 4 October he secured from a grand jury indictments against Insull for embezzlement, 
larceny, and mail fraud. 
 
 
 
Insull controlled an empire of $500 million with only $27 million in equity. Due 
to the highy leveraged structure of Insull's holdings, he is sometimes wrongly 
credited with the invention of the holding company His holding company 
collapsed during the Great Depression wiping out the life savings of 600,000 
shareholders. This led to the enactment of Public Utility Holding Act 
 
 
 
 
Trial 
 
 
Getting Insull to face trial was more difficult. After the loss of his power empire, 
Insull had gone to Europe to rest and recuperate. In 1933 the government moved 
to force his return for the criminal indictments, chasing him from Paris to Italy to 
Greece. Greece had no extradition treaties with the United States, but political 
pressure from the Roosevelt administration prevailed: Insull was returned to the 
United States in May 1934. On 2 October 1934, at age seventy-four, Insull went 
on trial in Chicago. The gist of the fifty-page, twenty-five-count indictment was 
that Insull had engaged in a "simple conspiracy to swindle, cheat and defraud the 
public." The affair was hardly simple, and the details of Insull's finances bored the 
jury. But Insull's testimony was riveting, and it was wired to papers around the 
country. Rather than focus on the details of the indictment, Insull's attorney deftly 
led the old man to recount his rise from poverty to wealth. In the end the trial was 
about contrasting stereotypes: Insull the unscrupulous magnate versus Insull the 
poor boy made good. Insull was acquitted of all charges. He spent the remainder 
of his life in exile, retired on the pensions from his former companies. He died in 
Paris on 16 July 1938. 
 
  
 
By 1932, the eight largest utility holding companies controlled 73 % of the investor-owned electric 
industry. (*)  Their complex, highly leveraged, and corporate structures were very difficult for 
individual states to regulate. 
 
 
 
 
 
American  Regulatory Agencies  in Water and Energy  
 First Anti –Trust Laws in Early XXth century America 
    The Public Utility Holding Company Act ( PUHCA ) 
 
The PUHC Act was one of a number of trust- busting  and securities regulation initiatives that were 
enacted in response to the Wall Street Crash of 1929 and ensuing Great Depression including the 
collapse of Insull’ s Public Utility holding companies.  
 
The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Power Commission 
 
The Public Utility Holding Company Act required the  Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
approval before a holding company may engage in a non-utility business and that such businesses is 
kept separate from the utility's regulated business.   
                                 
Logo of the Security and Exchange Federal Commission,  1934, 
And the Federal Power Commission, 1930,   based in Washington 
 
The SEC was established by President F. D. Roosevelt in 1934 as an independent, quasi – judicial 
Regulatory Agency, during the Great Depression that followed the Crash of 1929. The main reason 
for the creation of the SEC was to regulate the stock market and prevent corporate abuses relating to 
the offering and sale of securities and corporate reporting. The SEC was given the power to license 
and regulate stock exchanges,  the companies whose securities traded on them, and the brokers and 
dealers who conducted the trading. 
Holding companies were required to register with the SEC, which would then conduct administrative 
proceedings to limit each holding company to ownership of a single integrated electric system (with 
certain exceptions) through the divestiture of the securities of other public utility and unrelated 
companies.  The PUHCA also authorized the SEC to flatten the corporate structure of utilities to 
remove unnecessary corporate layers. Individual operating utility companies could centralize certain 
business operations into central Service Companies, but All Service Companies would be subject to 
the SEC and to the Federal Power Commission Regulation. When a State Utility Commission 
regulated a utility located in a particular state, the rate payers of that state would pay only the share 
of any common service expenses associated with that state's electric company allocated to it under 
SEC-approved formulas. This would prevent a holding company from double-recovery of its expenses 
when it operates in more than one state. Because the SEC strictly enforced the divestiture provision 
of PUHCA in its proceedings and ordered divestiture of all corporate holdings except for a single 
integrated electric system, the affected holding companies filed voluntary divesture plans. As a result, 
by 1948 holding companies had voluntarily divested themselves of assets worth approximately $12 
billion and the number of subsidiaries controlled by affected holding companies was reduced from 
1,983 to 303.(*) 
An important PUHCA provision prohibited sales of goods or services between holding company 
affiliates at a profit. These rules prevented the utilities from increasing their cost-based regulated rates 
by artificially marking-up the prices paid by the utility operating companies above what the central 
purchasing affiliate paid.(*)  
 Regulating Hydroelectric Projects : The Federal Power Commission 
 
The Federal Power Commission (FPC) was an independent Commission created in 1930, composed 
of  five members nominated by the President of the US and confirmed by the Senate.  The Federal 
Power Commission was originally instituted in 1920 by the Federal ( Water )  Power Act whose 
original purpose was to coordinate more effectively the development of hydroelectric projects in 
the United States. The Power Act was fostered by John J Esch, a republican congressman. Until that 
time the regulation of hydroelectric power was in the hand of individual states(*), despite federal 
control of navigable waters and the necessary congressional approval to construct such facilities. The 
first federal legislation broadly dealing with hydroelectric development regarded its competition with 
navigation usage. (*) Until 1903, these congressional permits were given away on a 'first come first 
served' perpetual basis and controlled by the individual states. This would lead to a long debate 
between competing private and public development interests, and culminate in the act's passage in 
1920. The Federal Power Commission became the federal licensing authority for these plants. The 
Federal Power Commission was created to regulate the interstate activities of the electric power and 
natural gas industries, and coordinated national hydroelectric power activities.  
The Commission's mandate was : 
‘ To maintain reasonable, non-discriminatory  
and just rates to the consumer’  
 It was ensured that the state in which the dam was built would have been granted the 37.5% of the 
income derived from hydroelectric power leases. The Federal Power Act provided for the licensing 
by the Federal Power Commission of  hydroelectric projects on the land or on navigable water owned 
by the federal government. The Federal Power Commission also regulated interstate electric utilities 
and the natural gas industry. 
 The Federal Regulatory Energy Commission 
 
 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 1977 
based in Washington 
(*) with the passage of the  Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 Congress made it illegal to dam navigable 
streams without a license (or permit) from them. 
In 1977, the Federal Power Commission was replaced by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC).  The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has jurisdiction over 
interstate electricity sales, resale electric rates, hydroelectric licensing, natural gas pricing, and 
oil pipeline rates. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission  also reviews and authorizes 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, interstate natural gas pipelines and non-federal hydropower 
projects.   In 1978, FERC was given additional responsibilities for harmonizing the regulation of 
wellhead gas sales in both the intrastate and interstate markets. The Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission also administered a program to foster new cogeneration and small power production 
under the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978. On August 8, 2005, the Energy Policy Act 
of 2005 issued by President Bush and passed by both houses of Congress,  repealed  PUHCA, 
despite consumer, environmental, union and credit rating agencies objections . It was 
replaced by a much weaker set of laws called the ‘ Public Utility Holding Company Act of 2005’ 
which gave the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission a limited role in allocating the 
costs of multi-state electric utility holding companies to individual operating subsidiaries.  The 2005 
Act had many provisions which applied to just electric subsidiary to the exclusion of natural gas 
subsidiaries of Holding Companies.  On December 8, 2005, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission recommended that Congress amend the 2005 Act to give FERC cost allocation 
authority over gas subsidiaries, and greater enforcement authority over gas subsidiaries (*) but 
Congress did not act on FERC's request.  
 
Hydropower Policy –  The Promotion of Small-Hydropower projects 
  
The Commission's main responsibilities on hydropower include: issuance of licenses for the 
construction of a new project; issuance of licenses for the continuance of an existing project (re-
licensing); and oversight of all ongoing project operations, including dam safety inspections and 
environmental monitoring. The Commission regulates over 1600 non-federal hydropower projects at 
over 2500 dams, representing all together more than half of all the hydropower capacity (54 
gigawatts)  in the U.S. The Federal Power Act  authorized the Commission, to issue licenses and 
exemptions for projects . Of such projects 71 % of the hydropower projects have an installed capacity 
of  5 megawatts or less.   
In the recent years the Commission’s declared policy is – in line with the policy of President Obama, 
to promote small hydropower generation . in a report of  Jeff Wright, director of Energy Project in 
FERC , the Agency says that : 
 ‘ having seen an increased interest in small hydropower projects, 
responded by  facilitating  efficient review of project proposals,  
adding new web-based resources, and took a  number of measures 
to help applicants to understand and complete the licensing 
process for small hydropower hotline and email address to answer 
applicant questions, and to educate  potential small hydropower 
developers through an outreach program. ‘ 
                                                     
                                                         [Jeff Wright, sub-Director in FERC ]  
 
 
 Aside of these commitments by the Agency, in 2012 a strong push towards empowerment of 
hydropower industry, through simplification of green energy bureaucracy has come by the 
US Government through the proposal of a new legislation, the Hydropower Regulatory 
Efficiency Act, thought to enable increased electricity production from domestic sources by 
removing roadblocks to new hydropower projects. This legislation has been conceived to easy the 
bureaucratic path for hydropower projects enabling more efficient permitting processes across the 
Nation by easing the licensing requirements for small hydroelectric projects.  
The bill was introduced into the House of Congress on January 15, 2013, and it passed on February 
13, 2013. The bill would change some of the regulations in the United States surrounding hydropower 
by making it easier for smaller hydropower stations to be created. According to the bill's 
proponents, current regulations are unwieldy and represent a significant hurdle to creating more 
hydropower plants. The new law would alter those regulations to make it easier for smaller plants to 
get approval quickly. Section 3 of the law amends the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 
( PURPA ) to increase from 5,000 to 10,000 kilowatts the size of small hydropower projects which 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission may exempt from its license requirements.(*)  The 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act  Act was  written by Diana De Gette and and  Mrs. Mc Morris 
Rodgers.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Shift to Private Provision for Water and other Regulated 
Utilities in late XXth century. 
 
Contract  versus  Discretionary Regulation 
 
US Waste disposal : The Shift to Concession Contracts in US and Canada 
(XIX  to  XX )  
 
In the  XIX  and early XX  century many municipalities had contracted with private firms for solid 
waste collection and disposal services, but many converted from private to municipal provision, under 
the influence of the Progressive reformers seeking to reduce corruption(*). 
In the 1970s, the use of private contractors for the disposal of solid waste rose rapidly, due to a new 
set of environmental regulations set by the US Government at federal level. At the time the 
municipally owned landfills and incinerators did not comply with the recent standards newly set by 
the Federal government. Modern landfills and incinerators would be larger in scale and much more  
technically sophisticated, and many cities could not afford the expenditure to build or manage them 
to fit the new standards. For this reasons many cities turned to private companies with high experience 
in building and operate these infrastructures for the industry.   
Some of the new  private facilities were built under long-term contract with a city , or a group of 
cities , others were ‘ merchant plants ‘, built for the spot market, and many used a combination of the 
spot and merchant approaches. Around six large firms emerged operating landfills and incinerators 
around the country , presumably because of their skill to spread specialized technical and managerial 
staff over a large number of facilities.  
 
By late 1990s , approximately 58 % of the tons of solid waste collected from US cities was disposed 
of in private facilities. Similarly and in Canada the 59% of expenditures on solid waste from Canadian 
cities was spent on private contractors. (*). In solid waste the emergence of concession contracts is 
much more widespread as competition is higher . Most cities no longer dispose of their solid waste 
within the city limits , because of the constraints of siting new landfills and incinerators and, due to 
how the sector is structured, they can now choose among several regional facilities for disposal. Most 
city managers and facility operator sign long term, contract, to protect from short term-fluctuations 
of dumping fees.  but there is also a fairly competitive spot market they can use if  
they need to. 
 
 US Water and Sewerage in Late 1980s 
 
Concession contracts are far less common in water and sewage than in solid waste, because 
competition is weaker and is much more important a careful contract design. 
In the late 80s a similar shift to private provision of Water and sewerage began , although 
it progressed much slower than in waste disposal. (*) Similarly to what happened for the 
solid waster, the push was due to stricter environmental standards for drinking water and 
for waste waster discharges . Cities found themselves in the double need to maintain existing 
systems and to build, and operate new plants for the drinking water and for the sewage 
treatment and many  of them began to contract out this function to private contractors. The 
provenience of the contractors was various: some of them still belonged to the few large 
private utilities that survived the wave of municipal takeovers that took place in America 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, other contractors were originally 
suppliers of chemicals, of equipment, or of other services, to the municipal water utilities.  
 
 
US Water and Sewerage in the 1990s 
 
 
During the nineties large private water firms from France and Britain also entered the US 
and Canadian market to compete for contracts. Nevertheless, in 1995, only 12% of the US 
citizens were served by privately owned water systems: Furthermore, many of these were 
operated by Homeowners Associations , rather than by investor-owned utilities. In 1995 
a survey of the US Environmental Protection Agency showed that 93 % of the population 
was served by community water systems and the rest by systems like wells serving single 
household. Of the population served by community water systems, 13% were served by 
privately owned systems and only a half of these were investor owned.  This suggests that, 
in 1995, roughly a 6% of the population was served by investor-owned companies. (*)  A 
1997 survey led by the city manager‘ s association revealed that only 5.7% were employing 
private contractors to operate their municipal water distribution systems, 3.7% to operate 
water treatment plants and 6.2 % to operate wastewater collection and treatment. (*) In the 
same year, another survey found that 1200 communities contracted with private firms to 
operate and maintain their water systems but many of theme were apparently small.(*) 
 
The Growth of  Water privatisation in US during  the 90s 
 
In late 1990s, the prospects for water privatisation opened up again, when the federal 
government reduced two barriers it had created. One was a federal program to fund cities‘s 
improvements of their water and sewerage plants, rooted back in the previous decade. 
During the previous decade a city was required by the Federal government to pay back its 
public grant, used to fund the construction of a plant, if the plant was after it sold or leased 
to a private operator. In 1992, this rule slightly was changed and the cities were required, 
in case of sell, to repay only the under-preciated portion of the grant. The second barrier is 
rooted in the structure of municipal bonds income. In US the interest paid on municipal bond 
is tax free, and this makes it cheaper to finance municipal facilities with municipal bonds 
rather than with private debt. 
Until 1997 a company operating a municipal facility,  despite the contract lasted longer than 
5 years,  was considered as operating a private facility, and therefore could not be financed 
with tax-free municipal bonds. In 1997 the US Conference of Mayors obtained to 
municipalities the possibility to extend to 20 years the length of contracts with private 
operators, for operating municipal facilities without loosing the possibility to use municipal 
tax free bonds. This made the difference and had the clause  that the facilities needed to be 
municipally owned to be eligible for  tax-exemption , but they could be built, maintained 
and operated by private concessionaires under long – term contracts. By 2001 many cities 
had entered a new contract to built and maintain new water and sewerage plants or to 
operate and maintain existing systems. These changes contributed to a gradual increase in 
long-term contract with private firms. The average contract for operating a water treatment 
plant was for ten years, as to design, build and operate  a new system it was for twenty 
years.(*) In the passage from public to private provision there seemed to be evident savings 
in either construction costs and operation and maintenance. A Seidentat, Nadol and Hakim 
report in 2000 registered saving in many cities from 15 to 25 percent in construction costs 
and 20 to 40 percent in operating and maintenance costs.  The reports showed that the 
competition for the initial contract showed to be fierce, but, at the end , when the contract 
expired, it seemed that both parties were reasonably satisfied, as many contracts resulted to 
be extended through negotiation, rather than re-bidding. 
 
The Need for Proper Contract Design for Water and Sewerage  
 
The cities that have turned to private solid waste disposal, water, or sewerage providers, in US and 
Canada, seemed to be satisfied, although their water contracts were not studied, at the times, nearly 
as intensively as other sectors contracts. Water and sewage, by contrast, are classic natural 
monopolies in that economics of scale are such that it is uneconomical to build more than one water 
distribution or sewage collection system in a community, and systems sited in other communities are 
not good substitutes. As a result cities and facility operators must protect themselves with a proper 
design of the concession contracts, because there is no competitive spot market to limit 
opportunistic behaviour. In practise the greater importance of drafting a workable contract 
has made in time US cities more cautious about water and sewerage privatisation. 
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Regulatory Design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
The Need and Design of a proper Regulation for Utility Performance 
 
 
 
Historically, the main questions  arisen around  Regulatory agencies have been  to which 
extent the same agencies do have the discretion to set tariffs and service standards, and how, 
once established will they use their discretion.  
 
 In this  chapter we want to analyse the path followed by different concepts of Regulation. In 
the first part of the chapter describes some main cultural patterns of approach to regulation 
such as the Rate-of-Return Regulation , firstly devised in the US – and then recently 
extensively spread in Asia and Latin America. Against it , the development, during the 1980s, 
of the Price-cap regulation in Britain. While looking at these different ‘ regulatory cultures 
‘ the exercise has been addressed at the regulatory agencies and the other actors which 
established ways through which societies developed substantial room and adequate 
interactive channels of communication with their operators of water and other regulated 
utilities. Drawing examples from US, India and Latin America the latest part of the chapter 
uses different examples to explicitate these institutional , formal and more informal settings, 
how they could be, how they actually have been devised, drawing examples from different 
institutional and regulatory patterns, with the aim to establish  which proper democratic 
conditions for an interested dialogue among governments, utilities and citizens, can be 
proposed for establishment in the management of the water services.   
 
Discretionary Regulation for Rate-Regulated Utilities 
 
 
Cost of Service  Regulation 
 
Cost- of- Service regulation, is also known as Rate-of -Return regulation and  is conceived through the 
way that the price is set by the regulator in order for the regulated firm to cover its costs of 
management, up to a reasonable level, and to include within the price a  fair rate-of-return  on its 
investments. With cost-of-service regulation, there is a direct link between the costs that an entity is 
expected to incur and its expected revenue as the rates are set to allow the company to recover its 
expected costs. 
The Cost- of- Service regulatory mechanisms has been reputed, by the British, to show few incentives 
to the efficiency.  In practise, a company that decided to cut its costs risked to see its tariffs to be cut 
accordingly.  Therefore these inadequacies have been addressed  through the development , in British 
regulators , of the Price – cap mechanism. 
 
* All the big utilities, constituting de facto’  a natural monopoly must utilize ratemaking to set their 
rates, include railroads, natural gas distribution, telecommunications,  and electricity generation and 
distribution. they have been legally mandated to go through the ratemaking process in order to 
determine the allowable service charges for their industry. 
 
 
 Utility Ratemaking 
The formal regulatory process by which regulated industries set the prices - commonly known as 
"rates" - they will charge to consumers is known as utility ratemaking*. In US ratemaking, typically 
is carried out through "rate cases" before a  Public Utility Commission , which serves as one of 
the primary instruments of the  government regulation of public utilities 
 
The Business Vision on the Issue of  Water Regulation 
The Need and Design of a Public Accountability for utility performance 
Rate-regulation (*) of utilities creates new patterns of operational and accounting situations. Although 
the rates are set to allow the ‘ regulated entity ’ to recover its expected costs, there could be a 
significant time-lag between incurrence of costs by the entity and their recovery through tariffs. 
Recovery of certain costs may be provided for by regulation either before or after the costs are 
incurred. Rate regulations are therefore enforceable and  generate legal rights and obligations for the 
companies 
 
 
‘ Rate – regulated entities Will Rise : we need special accounting for them’.   Jitendra  Agarwal, 
Deloitte, Haskins and Sells.  The raise of a new Water-accountancy. The Hindu  Business Line. 
  
 The COST–RECOVERY   Principle  
 
In a Cost-of-Service ( or Rate-of-Return ) Regulation, the resource is the right conferred by the 
regulator whereby the costs incurred by the entity result in future cash flows. 
 
In such kind of regulation, incurrance of costs generates an enforceable right to set rates at a level 
that permits the regulated entity to recover those costs, plus a specified return, from an aggregate 
customer base.  
 
For example, if the regulator has approved certain additions to be made by the entity in its assets base 
during the tariff period, which would be added to the asset base for tariff setting, the entity upon 
making such additions obtains the right to recover the costs and return as provided in the regulatory 
framework though the actual recovery through rates may take place in the future.  
While adjustment of future rates is the mechanism the regulator uses to implement its regulation, the 
right in itself is a resource arising as a result of past events and from which future cash inflows are 
expected cash flows. In such cases, incurrance of costs creates an enforceable right to set rates at a 
level that permits the entity to recover those costs, plus a specified return, from an aggregate customer 
base. For example, if the regulator has approved certain additions to be made by the entity in its assets 
base during the tariff period, which would be added to the asset base for tariff setting, the entity upon 
making such additions obtains the right to recover the costs and return as provided in the regulatory 
framework though the actual recovery through rates may take place in the future. While adjustment 
of future rates is the mechanism the regulator uses to implement its regulation, the right in itself is a 
resource arising as a result of past events and from which 
future cash inflows are expected. 
 International Accounting Methods for Rate-Regulated Utilities. 
The Deloitte’s methodology  for Rate-Regulated Utilities in India. 
 
         
 
 
 
Among the methods which are being internationally developed for the accounting of Rate- Regulated 
Utilities, one is the methodology developed by Deloitte in India , which is an interesting model for  
both developed and developing countries.  
 
Regulatory Asset / Liability 
 
 The methodology is commonly referred to as the  Regulatory Asset/Liability assessment.  This 
method takes into consideration the basic fact that, in each country the Government or  State’s 
Regulatory Agency  has the responsibility to ensure uniform supply and fair pricing as major 
objectives, determining the price ( tariff ) that the utility will impose to consumers. The regulator 
determines the tariff on the basis of data obtained from the service providers and by applying its 
judgement on the appropriateness, reasonableness and accuracy of the data.  The tariff can be 
challenged by the service provider, and by  consumers through a redressal mechanism.   The revenue 
based on such tariffs may vary from the amount recovered from consumers due to cost variations and 
other factors.  The differential is recoverable/payable from/to consumers  through adjustments in 
future tariff, and is referred to as ‘ the regulatory asset/ liability ‘.   As this could materially impact 
results for the period, accounting for regulatory assets/ liabilities has been the subject of debate at 
various international forums.  
 
Application  
 
Although the existing Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAPs) in India do not have any 
specific pronouncements on ‘regulatory asset/ liability’, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
India recently issued a guidance note on ‘Accounting for Rate Regulated Activities’ (*). The guidance 
note dwells on the principles of recognition and measurement of regulatory assets / liabilities.  
 
Recognition  
 
The salient features for recognition of a regulatory asset is the reliability of its measurement and the 
probability of future economic benefits flowing to the entity as a result of the actual or expected 
actions of the regulator under the applicable framework.  
 
Reliability of measurement is linked to the specific costs incurred, which can be recovered under the 
regulatory framework; hence, there should be no difficulty in reliably measuring the asset. As for 
probability of future economic benefits, a regulatory asset can be recognised only when the regulatory 
framework provides for recovery of the incurred costs and the entity has actually incurred them. The 
regulator can specify conditions for treatment of expenditures, which will determine the manner of 
ascertaining the regulatory asset.  
For example, some expenses that are considered revenue expenditures may need to be considered as 
capital when determining tariff. The service provider should determine tariff based on the regulator’s 
requirements. The guidance note provides that the entity should recognise a regulatory asset with 
respect to such costs, as they can be recovered from consumers in future.  
A regulatory liability should be recognised when an entity has a current obligation as a result of a past 
event; an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits may be needed to settle the obligation, 
for which a reliable estimate can be made. Broadly, if the costs incurred by the entity are lower than 
those initially considered for rate determination, the entity has to set up a liability for making a refund 
to consumers through lower tariffs.  
 
Measurement 
 
The amount recognised as  asset/ liability should be measured at the end of the subsequent reporting 
period to ascertain the best estimate of the amount expected to be recovered/ refunded/ adjusted as 
future cash flows under the regulatory framework. The estimates, which cannot be discounted, are 
determined by the management on the basis of statutes or regulations providing for recovery of cost 
in rates, written formal approvals from the regulator, uniform regulatory guidance for treatment of 
various costs that is used in setting rates, opinion of independent experts on the recoverability of cost 
based on regulations and past practice, and any additional evidence provided by events after the 
balance-sheet date.  
Rate regulation is not a recent phenomenon, but accounting for it has been governed by the general 
accounting principles and practices adopted for other commercial organisations. Rate-regulated 
entities will increase in future and there will be greater need for special considerations in accounting 
for them. The guidance note mentioned here is the first step in the formal recognition of the special 
considerations involved in accounting for such entities, and there is hope for improvisations.  
 
 Concerns  on going Changes under recent reforms on Indian Accounting   
‘ The larger concern, at present,  is that under both Ind-AS and 
IFRS, regulatory assets and liabilities cannot currently be 
recognised, which would lead to large losses – especially  for 
those groups in India carrying significant regulatory assets. ‘ 
                                                            (The Hindu, 2012)  
Currently under Indian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), companies subjected to 
rate regulation tend to already recognise an asset or liability based on recovery or refund of costs 
through future changes in customer tariffs. While infrastructure assets constructed are recognised as 
fixed assets under Indian GAAP and the revenue recognised over the course of the contract on an 
accruals basis, under Ind-AS, the fixed assets will become intangible assets or financial assets or a 
combination of both.  Furthermore, the timing of revenue of profit may be accelerated, compared with 
the related cash flows. The de-recognition of fixed assets and apparent mismatch between revenue and 
cash will mean that institutions providing the project finance will need to revisit how they assess such 
projects. The financing KPIs will need to move away from fixed assets and revenue, with a greater 
focus on cash generation. Therefore, Infrastructure groups should engage early with their financial 
bankers to ensure that they clearly under stand the impacts of these accounting changes.  
Designing an Independent Authority 
 
In the pursuit of the Public Interest:  Independent Regulatory Agencies  
 
Regulatory agencies are almost always created in the name of reaching the ‘ public interest’ . A 
number of economic theories are often used to explain why government regulation is established and 
how regulatory agencies behave, once they are created. One of the most common looks at the agency 
as a  ‘tool’  to establish the broad public interest  while regulating the performance of the industry.  
The concept of  the ‘public interest’ assumes that members of society share common objectives that 
need to be protected by the public regulator. In matter of water infrastructure such primary objectives 
of the aforementioned regulation ought to be clearly politically identified and pursued through a 
decision making process based on democratic engagement of all the involved parties at stake, which 
are citizens, companies and institutions.  Averagely, the most commonly pursued goals show to be the 
promotion of universal access to water (or general) utility service and the promotion of economic 
efficiency of the regulated industry. Nevertheless, the pursued objectives do not always register to be 
pursued necessarily, if pursued, in the above mentioned order. 
 
 The Public Utility Commissions 
 
During the first half of the twentieths century  U.S. reformers devoted a great deal of effort in 
designing their regulatory institutions that would resist corruption and other practises which would  
divert the agency  from its primary goal of protecting the public interest.  In the United States, as well 
as in Canada ( with the Public Utility Boards )  public regulatory bodies were constituted at the 
beginning of the XXth century to pursuit the public interest  towards the single firm interest. 
 
 
  At the time, regulation which was based on municipal concession contracts chose to be replaced by 
Public Utility Commissions, at state level. The Public Utility Commissions were established after a 
debate that took place in the United States and Canada around public ownership , municipal or state 
regulation would best protect the public interest from private monopoly.   
 
 
 An Independent Regulatory Agency 
 The 
Public Utility 
Commission of 
California 
 
 
 
 
The Public Utility Commissions embodied the ‘ public interest ’ perspective. Shifting regulation from 
the municipal to the state level , the idea was  create regulatory agencies sufficiently detached from 
the municipal more easily corruptible base, with enough resources to afford expert staff. 
 
 
 
Structure of the PUC 
 
The PU Commissioners are appointed to a fixed term, and are removable only for specific causes, so 
that they can make decisions that might be unpopular in the short term, without fearing political 
interference. This aimed to  establish an independent agency.  
 
 
  
Example of organizational chart of a Public Utility Commission ( for the State of California). 
 
 
 
 
Supporters of  the ‘ public interest ’  theory 
 
The belief in public interest was particularly strong in the 1950s , and became popular again 
toward the end of the twentieth century.  Public Interest proponents put their faith in the 
democratic process, but they also seek to design regulatory institutions that will encourage 
the development of public interest.   The state PUCs established in the first third of the XXth 
century are clear examples of regulatory institutions crafted to encourage the rational 
discovery of the public interest.  
 .. and Critics 
Critics to the perspective of the role of regulatory agency as mean to pursue the public interest 
often argue that this is a mere illusion, as often , when reality comes to term, although there 
was commonality of goals when problems have been stated, the broad consensus generally 
dissolves, when it comes the time for the established goals, to be translated into public 
policies. To put it simply, for example, although we all may agree around  the principle that 
‘some’ basic level of public service should be guaranteed to everyone, we the disagree when 
defining ‘what exactly ‘ or ‘ which amount ‘ does constitutes such basic level.*  These 
critiques assert that, given the impossibility to make a completely informed rational 
decisions, even a large and expert staff cannot  
 
 
* An example of this is the Phiri Water  Case, in South Africa where recently emerged the 
issue around the definition of the Right of access to water , on what can be considered ‘ a 
minimum amount of water’  to be guaranteed to everyone. The case went up to the Supreme 
Court. 
 
comprehend and analyze all the information needed in time. But to the proponents of the public 
interest this criticism seems exaggerated. Simply because there is uncertainty about the nature of 
public interest it doesn’t mean that it doesn’t exist. All citizens rely on infrastructure services, and 
this means that they have a common interest in seeing that infrastructure is provided efficiently and 
at a reasonable cost. While regarding the promotion of universal access to the service, although 
controversial, enjoys widespread support. In particular regarding water services, the public has a 
general interest that everybody is reached by efficient public pipes and sewerage systems to protect 
the public health from the spread of diseases 
  
The British Water Regulation and the Design of Price-Cap 
 
 
      THE BRITISH CASE 
 
 
In England and Wales, Public Water Supply and Sanitation has been characterized by universal 
access and generally good service quality. The salient feature of the sector in the United Kingdom, 
when compared to other developed countries, is the full privatisation of the service provision and the 
pioneering of an Independent Economic Regulation for the water sector, in Europe. Nevertheless data 
showed that there has been a substantial increase in real tariffs between 1989 and 2005, whilst 
independent assessments assert that the cost of water provision in the UK is higher than most other 
major countries in the EU*. 
 
 
    
England Before Privatisation : Local Government  Water Provision 
 
Before 1973 the sector was highly fragmented. Water and sanitation services were provided by 
different authorities. Until the 1950s there existed over a thousand water undertakings, with 
administrative boundaries similar to those of local government boundaries. By early 1970s the 
number of these operators had been reduced to 198 through a gradual consolidation process aimed at 
achieving economies of scale. Out of the 198 water undertakings 64 were run by individual local 
government authorities, 101 by joint boards comprising several local government authorities, and 33 
were statutory privately owned water companies, some of which dated back to the Victorian era. At 
the same time there were over 1,300 sewerage and sewage disposal authorities, most of them run by 
individual local government authorities.  Water resources management was entrusted to 29 River 
authorities created in 1965. Their responsibilities included water conservation, land drainage, 
fisheries, control of river pollution and, in some cases, navigation. 
 The Regional Water Authorities  (RWAs) 
Through the Water Act, in 1973 the government established 10 Regional Water Authorities in order 
to achieve even greater economies of scale, especially in sanitation. The reform was aimed to put in 
practice the principle of Integrated River Basin Management (IWRM) especially concerning the 
planning of investments in wastewater treatment. In practice the area covered by each of the Regional 
Water Authority typically contained more than one river basin, given the small size of many river 
basins in England and Wales. 
Interestingly, the Regional Water Authorities were not only in charge of water supply and sanitation, 
but also of water resources management, thus opening the possibility of conflicts of interests since 
the same institution was in charge of abstracting water and discharging wastewater on the one hand, 
and controlling these same abstractions and discharges on the other hand. The Water Act left open 
the possibility to contract out water supply and sanitation services to local authorities. However, in 
practice this did not happen, and substantial assets were transferred from local governments to the 
new Regional Water Authorities. Since the transfer was internal to the public sector, no compensation 
was paid to local authorities. Local authorities also initially held a majority of the Board seats of the 
new organizations. The private statutory water companies, which provided water to 25% of the 
population, escaped reorganization and were left to operate as before. 
Centralisation and First Attempts to Commercialize Water Service Providers 
With the election of Margareth Thatcher, in 1979 the water and sanitation sector initially remained 
public, but the government attempted to make the enterprises operate more along commercial lines. 
As a result the number of employees in the sector declined from 61,000 in 1976 to 52,000 in 1985, 
real operating costs declined, tariffs were increased above the inflation rate and the share of self-
financing of investments increased. However, government regulators also cut back on investments. 
While the industry became profitable, the rate of return on assets based on replacement cost values 
remained low at less than 2%. As part of the attempt to commercialize the service providers, the 
Water Act 1983 reduced the number of Board members of the water authorities. However, it also 
eliminated the local government representation on the Boards and made all Board members appointed 
by Ministers, thus further centralizing the sector.  
 
 
 
 
 
The Privatisation of the Industry :  from Authorities  to Companies. 
 
 
Plans for the privatisation of the water industry in England and Wales were first advanced by the 
Thatcher Government in 1984, but were abandoned after a public outcry against it. However, they 
were resurrected soon , and, in 1989, the ten unitary Regional Water Authorities (RWAs) in England 
and Wales were privatised.  The Water Act  in 1988 transformed the RWAs into private companies 
and sold them off. In 1989 the government privatized the ten public Regional Water Authorities 
through divestiture (sale of assets). The newly formed Companies became owners of the entire water 
system and properties of the former RWAs. Against the conflict of interest the Authorities' functions 
related to water resources management were separated and retained by the public sector. At the same 
time was created a new Economic Regulatory Agency OFWAT, on the model of Regulatory Agency 
set up in other sectors (such as telecommunications and energy). The Act gave the Companies 
exclusive 25-year concessions for sanitation and water supply, creating therefore private 
monopolies.  The Government took a number of steps to boost the profitability of these companies, 
writing off the all the debts of the water companies before privatisation, worth over £5 billion. In 
addition, they were given a ‘green dowry’ of £1.6 billion. The government also offered the companies 
for sale at a substantial discount, 22 per cent less than their market value(1). A very generous pricing 
regime was established, and the companies were given special exemption from paying taxes on profits 
(2) . 
 
According to some commentators, even from the Tory news, the privatisation consequences 
had been depicted as 
 
“ The greatest act of licensed robbery in the UK  history.” 
      ( The Daily Mail July 11th 1994 ) 
Consequences in the years following privatisation:  
 
    
Price increases   
 
The most noticeable impact of privatisation for the public has been the dramatic increase in 
prices.  On average, prices rose by over 50 per cent in the first 4 years.  The first 9 years produced 
an increase of 46 per cent in real terms, adjusted for inflation. (3)   Over the next five years, up to 
2009, average water bills will rise by 18 per cent.(4 )     Such sharp rises hit households hard with 
one in five being in debt to their water company. (5)   
 
Very High Profit Margins 
 Pre-tax profits doubled in the first year of privatisation, and rose by  142 % in real terms over eight 
years (6). There has been a direct relationship between higher profits and increasing water 
bills.  When the water bill is broken down into its components, operating profits, which have more 
than doubled since privatisation, account for almost the entire increase(7). Between 1990/91 and 
1997/98 the pre-tax profits of the ten sewerage and water companies rose by 147 per cent with 
sewerage and water prices rising respectively by 42 and 36 per cent.(8)  
 
 
The Average Profits margins for UK companies compared to those of other Countries 
Profit margins in the UK, in  are typically three or even four times as great as the margins of water 
companies, private and public, in France, Spain, Sweden, or Hungary (1999). [Data source:  PSIRU 
– University of Greenwich ] 
 
According to Waterwatch,  in 1996 customers of the ten regional water and sewerage companies paid 
up to £ 93 each towards shareholder dividends.  Of North West Water's average bill of £222, £93, or 
42 %, went towards shareholders dividends.  In the South West region, customers paid an average of 
£77, the 29% , towards dividends, and Severn Trent and Wessex Water customers paid £60, the 25%  
in their bills towards dividends. (9)   Although a Conservative Government put this regime in place, 
the profiteering by the water companies has continued under New Labour.  In October 2003, the 
Commons Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs heard that 
"Whilst operating profits and dividends (in the water industry) are 
down from the 1990s, dividends are still showing growth and the 
sector outperformed the Financial Times All Share Index by 58 
per cent in the last two years."    
   [The Belfast Telegraph, August 2004 ] 
 
  In Britain profit margins are typically three or even four times as great as the margins of water 
companies in France, Spain, Sweden, or Hungary.  
 [ Source: PSIRU – University of Greenwich ] 
 
Tricks on Planned Investments  
 
One of the methods the water companies have used to increase prices and boost profits, in the British 
Regulatory system of  Price – Cap has been to exaggerate the level of investment required to maintain 
their network.  Forecasts for capital expenditure are consistently higher than actual expenditure, 
leaving a capital surplus that can be added to profits.  Prior to privatisation the level of capital 
investment in the water industry had been accelerating, and rose to a peak in 1991-92.  The forecasts 
for future investment by the water companies, which supposedly determined prices, were based on it 
continuing at the same rate. What actually happened was that the level of capital investment levelled 
off and even fell.(11)   A number of companies deliberately cut their investment programmes and used 
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the savings to maintain or increase their profits.  One example of this was Southern Water submitting 
plans for a series of sewage treatment plants that were not installed.(12)  Another example was 
Yorkshire Water expecting to avoid £50m expenditure on sewage treatment because the Conservative 
Government promised to redefine coastal waters near the city of Hull as sea, where untreated sewage 
could be dumped, instead of estuary, where sewage would have to have been treated. (13 )    
International Expansion  
 
One of the motives for water companies in accumulating capital was to enable them to expand 
internationally and into other sectors.  They used the capital from the water industry to secure the 
loans that would finance expansion.  However, most of these ventures have been unsuccessful, and 
left the water companies heavily indebted.    
 
 
Multi-utilities and Concentration of Ownership   
 
One of the ideological claims of privatisation is that it produces competition.  However the water 
companies created in 1989 were private monopolies.  Since then the water industry has become even 
more monopolised with an increasing concentration of ownership.  Initially the ten water and sewage 
companies were protected from takeover for five years by the government’s ‘golden share’.  
However, the fourteen smaller ‘water only’companies were the subject of takeovers straight 
away.  All of them are now owned by multinationals, mainly the three French groups Vivendi, SAUR, 
and Suez-Lyonnaise.  Half of the water and sewerage companies have also been purchased by 
multinational companies. Two are now owned by US companies, one by a French company, and one 
by a Scottish company.  The largest, Thames Water, has been purchased by a German company 
RWE.  All but one of these takeovers has been by energy companies’ whishing to expand into water 
sectors. (14)    
 
Executive Pay  
 
Privatisation has also witnessed a massive increase in the fees, salaries and bonuses the 
directors of the water companies have awarded themselves.  In a 7-year period the real value of 
the highest paid director’s pay increased by between 50 %  and 200 % in most of them.(15)     
 
The Impact of privatisation   
 
Therefore, if water privatisation has been a bonanza for business, in the view of some commentators 
(PSIRU, 1999) the corollary is that it has been a disaster for users, the environment, and those 
employed in the industry.   
 On employment 
Job cuts and Erosion of Employer Rights  
Since the privatisation of the water industry in England and Wales, The UK’s regulatory regime has 
so far allowed the water and sewerage companies to treat their employees entirely according to 
commercial objectives of profit. Basically the people who felt the most immediate impact of the 
privatisation of water industry seem to have been the workers.  They have seen their conditions 
steadily eroded through redundancies and job cuts.  Since 1900, the workforce has fallen by 8,599 
to 21.5 per cent20 (PSIRU , 1999). 
 Table 1: Overall fall in employment, water and sewerage, 1990-1999 
 
1990 1996 1999 
Change in 
percentage 
of 
employees 
1990-1999 
Percentage 
change, 
1990-1999 
Employees in water 
supply and sewerage, 
10 regional companies 
39,962 34,578 31,363 
- 8,599 -21.5% 
Source: PSIRU database, Company annual reports and accounts. University of Greenwich. 
 
As well as losing jobs, water workers have also suffered by some companies eroding employee rights. 
 Source: 
PSIRU database, Company annual reports and accounts. University of Greenwich 
 
Even the informations on employees seem to have been lost.  One consequence of the various 
takeovers has been the loss of stock exchange annual reports , which has been offset by the regulator 
requiring accounts still to be published of the water section of the companies – but these accounts do 
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not include any information about employees, unlike the accounting requirements of the stock 
exchange annual report. 
 
Sub – Contracting 
Work which was previously carried out by specialist water workers within a water company has been 
sub-contracted to employees of other companies, on different employment conditions, even where 
these subcontractors are subsidiaries of the same group. In a case reported by PSIRU, in 1999, that 
Thames Water, Southern Water and Yorkshire Water showed sub-contracting behaviours , due 
mainly to commercial reasons of cost – cutting, giving up the guarantee to have properly trained 
own technical staff in the maintenance of the infrastructure.  
 
Mergers and Takeovers 
Always on the theme of the employment, other substantial job cuts resulted from the commercial 
logic of mergers and takeovers. For instance, the  Scottish Power's annual report, in 1997, showed 
that restructuring and disposals following the takeover of Southern water cut 624 jobs in the water 
operation, that means a reduction of 14% of employee.  Such  commercial logic was reinforced by 
the administrative demands of the regulator, who insisted on a significant level of reductions in 
operating costs as a condition for approving the mergers. 
 
Disconnections and Public Health  
 
According to other commentators privatisation also saw a sharp rise in the number of households 
being disconnected. The rate tripled in the first 5 years, with 18,636 households disconnected in 
1994.(21)   A consequence of this was a marked deterioration in the health of the poorest households 
and public health in general.   In 1992 there was a rise in the number of cases of dysentery reported, 
in all major conurbations other than London.(22)   A 1996 study by Save the Children found that on 
average low-income families were spending 4 per cent of their weekly budget on water.   This study 
also detailed the health compromising measures families took to conserve water, and the correlation 
between water disconnections and rising dysentery rates.(23)     
 
Deteriorating service ? 
 
One of the claims of privatisation was that it would lead to more investment and improving 
services.  Nevertheless, according to some commentators (25)  inadequate investments has led to 
worsening conditions in water mains. Between 1993 and 1998 water mains categorised as being in 
“poor condition” increased from 9 per cent to 11 per cent. Apparently , as the same authors comment, 
the water companies, in order to boost profitability, kept investment at a minimum level. This, with 
the reduction in staff numbers led to the deterioration of services in many areas of the water industry 
Consequences on Water quality   
An indicator that seems to confirm the failure of the companies’ in properly maintaining the network 
is that there seem to have been no improvement in water quality.   A report of the Drinking water 
Inspectorate (DWI) in 1998 concluded that there were  ‘weaknesses in companies’ performance and 
in the ability of the DWI to enforce standards by taking action.  On five key parameters: nitrate, iron, 
lead, PAH and other pesticides, less than 80 per cent of zones complied.  The number of ‘serious 
incidents’ did not decline in the first six years of privatisation.(26)   In March 1997 there was a serious 
outbreak of cryptosporidiosis in North London, during which people were poisoned.(27)     
 
Environment and Pollution   
The privatisation of the water industry had also a negative affect on the environment.  In a list 
published by the Environment Agency in 1998, Water companies seemed to be responsible for 1 in 
5 pollution incidents(30). In 1998 the subsidiaries of Vivendi, Suez-Lyonnaise and Enron were 
ranked as the second, third and fourth worst polluters in Britain.   Offenders are classified 
according to the fines levied by the courts.  However, these fines had been lenient, given the wealth 
of these companies.    Wessex Water, Enron's UK water subsidiary, had to face an overall £36,500 
fine in 1998 ( it was fined only £5,000 with £500 costs for discharging 1m gallons of raw sewage 
into a Dorset marina on August bank holiday..).  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
The Price – cap 
 
 
 
The Price Cap, designed by regulatory agencies in Britain during the 1980s was conceived always 
with a strong faith in the pursuit of the public interest and became a widespread regulatory mechanism 
in many other countries  as well, during the 1990s. Price – cap  was designed as an alternative to the 
cost-of-service approach practised at the time by most of the regulatory agencies in the US.  Also 
renown as  incentive regulation, Price – cap had become the dominant form of discretionary 
regulation, by the end of the XXth century. It  has been developed by the British when they started to 
privatise their utilities, in the 1980s, and it is rooted in similar incentive schemes dated back to the 
nineteenth century.  Price – cap  is also known to be the most common alternative to  concession 
contracts, widely used also in developing countries, and it’s especially used to regulate industries 
where it turned to be difficult to draft a complete contract. As Crew and Kliendorfer (*) report, the 
United States have been slow in adopting  price- cap regulation, and in their report they quote some 
poor variants of it.   
 
 
 
ECONOMIC TECHNICALITIES 
 
Price - cap Mechanism 
 
Price-cap addresses the shortcomings of the rate-of-return regulation by conducting Price Reviews at 
fixed intervals (usually every 5 years) and by setting a formula to cap the annual price increases  
which the regulator allows between each reviews. 
 
The typical set formula is : 
 
RPI  -  X 
 
where  RPI is the change in retail price index 
 
    and    X   is the expected rate of productivity improvement,  
in the industry  
 
 
For an industry, having a price-cap which is fixed for 5 years, allows cutting costs, and therefore  
increase its revenue between reviews.  
 
 
Price-cap as a Discretionary form of Regulation  
 
 
Price cap is traditionally thought as a form of discretionary regulation, since the regulator has 
substantial freedom to reset  the initial price at each periodic review. But can also be considered as a 
hybrid of the discretionary  and of the contractual approaches  to regulation. In this the contractual 
elements are central to develop efficiency incentives, in Price – cap structure.  
Price – cap Regulators enjoy the ‘ protections ‘ and relative freedom from political pressure which 
typical of discretionary regulation – such as the fact of being appointed to their commitment for a 
fixed term.  
 
Price-cap as Incentive for Efficiency 
 
Price-cap is reputed to be a typical form of regulation aimed to leave space for  efficiency incentives  
for regulated firms.  The regulatory statute usually prohibits the regulator to change  X  between 
reviews; this is typical incentive for the firm. Furthermore, in the setting of the forthcoming price it is 
implicitly assumed that the regulator does not  take into consideration the possibility to recover ( or 
recover ) past excess profits ( or losses) , looking at the past profitability only as a metric to estimate 
the next tariff level. In this mechanism, changing  X between reviews would undermine the incentive 
purpose. 
 
 
Strengths, Weakness and Claims over Price-Cap Regulation 
 
 
 
 Strength of Price-Cap 
 
According to substantial number of scholars, in England the price cap mechanism has been judged a 
great success, primarily because of its stronger incentives to improve efficiency. These scholars 
converge in saying that it is difficult to determine how much of the productivity gains that has been 
achieved by British utilities in the last twenty years were due to price-cap regulation and how much 
were due to the British privatisation process. In any case, British utilities posted efficiency gains from 
3 to 9 % per year through all the 1990s, and this is an impressive record by any standard.(a) Water 
prices rose but , according to these scholars, because of environmental improvements – on the other 
hand the price increases would have been much larger without the offsetting gains in efficiency (*).   
According to the majority of economists, it is also unlikely that the cost savings would have been as 
great if these industries had been privatized with conventional cost-of-service regulation. 
The incentives to improve efficiency seem to have survived in time, despite the govemment's 
occasional renegotiating on the explicit and implicit commitments that are central to them. 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 Claims  
  
A case for a claim, from the industry, surged when, in March 1995, Stephen C. Littlechild, the head 
of  the Regulatory Authority, announced that  the electricity price-caps for the period 1995-2000 would 
have been lowered. This was not illegal, since the price-caps were not scheduled to enter into effect 
until April 1.  But Littlechild  had already previously  spoken about , in the previous August, of the  
"final" price caps that should be issued so the industry had room to argue that the authority had ‘ 
broken faith ‘.   
 
 
 The New Labour’s  Regulatory policy 
 
 
In May 1997 Tony Blair led the Labour Party to victory in a general election, after 18 years of 
Conservative Party rule. High utility earnings had been an important theme in the Labour campaign. 
In July 1997 the new government imposed ‘ a onetime ‘  tax of £ 5 billion on utility profits – in a 
setting where the industry share is of  £1.8 billion. The ‘windfall’  profits tax, imposed by the incoming 
Labour government in 1997, was justified as ‘a one time’ event, provoked by the extraordinary 
circumstances surrounding privatization.  But, according to the classical economists, this is the kind 
of regulatory claw back expected to under mine incentives to reduce costs.  
The new government commissioned a review of the system for regulating private utilities, that ended 
up in proposals to stress the emphasis on consultation, transparency and protecting low-income 
consumers.  A striking change was the proposal to gradually move from individual regulators to Small 
Commissions for each sector.  
 
 
 
Quoting the study of the Department of Trade and Industry ( DTI )  
 
“ There are risks in concentrating too much discretion on an individual ( agency ) 
… especially those of unpredictable and unaccountable decision making “(*) “   
           [Department of Trade and Industry - 1998 ] 
 
In  addition , regulators were to establish and to publicise their consultation procedures and to explain 
their decisions in writing, as it was already happening. 
 
 
The Competition Act 1998 
 
In the water regulation sector, however, few changes happened.  The Competition Act of 1998, 
obligated the regulator not only to ‘ facilitate ‘, but also to ‘ promote ‘ competition  . This fact 
stimulated Ofwat, the Water Regulator, to research further ways to encourage competition for 
customers of bulk water.     
 
The Water Industry Act  1999 
 
In the Water Industry Act of 1999, the government increased  the protection for residential customers, 
requiring that the water-meter should have been  optional and the meter installation be free.  
Meanwhile Ofwat developed tariffs to protect  ‘ vulnerable groups ’  of customers that might face 
hardships from being charged  by meter, and that companies do not shut off  households who had not 
paid their water bill.  
 
 
On going adjustments and trust  
 
 
In addition, some water company officials argued privately that Ian Byatt,  the first water industry 
regulator,  had been tough in his 1999 review because he wanted to "get even"  for 1994, so that the 
1999 review amounted to something of a claw back too. 
Nevertheless, most utility executives probably believe that events like Littlechild's 1995 reversal or 
the 1997 windfall profits tax prove to be relatively rare. And even if they now expect an occasional 
element of claw back in the periodic reviews, they probably don't expect  all the excess profits to be 
taken so that the efficiency incentives are weakened but not eliminated. 
 
 
Limitations of Cost-of-Service Regulation 
 
 
Price cap has proved less successful in providing incentives for capital investment, although in this 
respect cost-of-service regulation has its drawbacks too. With cost-of-service regulation, the 
traditional concern is that the regulated firm might over-invest. A regulator is likely to make a mistake 
on the side of overestimating the return the firm needs to earn on its invested capital, since a mistake 
in the other direction would leave the firm unable to raise money for new investments. But an overly 
generous return will give the firm incentives to ‘gold plate’ its investments, so as to expand the asset 
base on which the return applies. As a result, cost-of-service regulators often must review the 
investments the firm proposes to make sure that they are really needed.(1,2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Limitations of  Price - Cap 
 
   
With price-cap regulation, by contrast, the incentives are usually to under-invest. One reason is that 
price cap does not encourage efficiency improvements that have payback periods longer than the 
interval between price reviews. Indeed, firms are unlikely even to make improvements with short 
paybacks as the review date approaches, since by delaying until after the review they will capture the 
savings as profit longer. Firms will make improvements with long payback periods only if they are 
convinced that the regulators will recognize them as worthwhile investments and enter them into the 
regulated asset base to be recovered in future review prices. 
    A second reason for under-investment is that price-cap gives the firms incentives to cut back on 
investment programs agreed to with the regulators. The price-cap formula for the coming review 
period covers the regulator's assessment of investment needs as well as operating costs. But many 
types of infrastructure are so durable and resilient that under-investment does not result in a clear or 
immediate decline in the service quality or performance. In such cases, the firm will be tempted to cut 
back on the investment program and pocket the savings as profit.  
Price-cap regulators are usually forced to monitor the firm's current investments to make sure that any 
under-spend is due to efficiencies in investment rather than to a dodging on commitments. 
Controversies over under-spend have been particularly intense in Britain's railways sector. 
 
     
 
 The Investment Issue: increasing efficiency and avoiding Capture 
in Price-Cap  
 
 
In the water sector,  it is hard to say whether the risk of over-investing is worse than the risk of under-
investing. One might argue that price-cap is less attractive for developing countries, for example, since 
they often need substantial investments. But the importance of investment must be balanced against 
that of increased operating efficiency and of avoiding capture, which makes such generalizations 
difficult. 
  
The  Periodic Review procedure  : Pros and Cons. 
 
   The Price-cap model also seems to have failed to reduce significantly, as hoped,  the burden of 
regulatory proceedings. Although is true that prices are reviewed only once every five years under 
price cap, whereas reviews are generally more frequent in cost-of-service regulation. Because the 
reviews are less frequent, however, the stakes for each review are higher. As a result, most British 
regulatory agencies follow procedures roughly similar to those used by Byatt  in the 1994 and 1999 
reviews. The reviews begin three years before the end of the current review period, finding often an 
industry in the mid of a review.  The regulatory staff develops a series of consultation documents 
about the ‘ overall framework ‘and ‘ key issues ‘ in the review on which the companies and consumer 
groups usually feel compelled to comment, often with the aid of consultants. The companies submit 
business plans that explain their investment programs and their special circumstances, which the 
regulatory staff scrutinize and discuss with them. The result is reviews that are process-intensive, and 
perceived as ‘ intrusive’ from the industry – far from the simplified approach envisioned by  Littlechild 
in 1983. 
These procedures have evolved because setting price-caps has proved to be both harder and more 
important than originally perceived. 
Much of the attention has focused on the problems of forecasting the factor X  in reasonably accurate 
manner. Even in the British water industry, with its simplified  number of companies, it is hard to 
standardize for differences across companies to make accurate estimates of efficiency. And these 
difficulties are not likely to decline with more sophisticated statistical techniques. Many scholars 
confirm that there will always be’ room for argument’ , as  a variety of  cost models  - very different 
among them, but plausible - can be estimated from the available data.  Estimating the frontier of  
efficiency gains is even harder, given the uncertainties about extrapolating from past trends and 
selecting comparator industries.  
The Factor  X  is not the only ingredient needed to set price-caps, moreover, and there are 
comparable difficulties with the cost of capital and other elements.     
 
 
 
 
Limitations of  the Technical Analysis &   the Five Year Period of Review 
 
 
In short, the technical analysis is seldom sufficiently precise or certain to provide the agency with 
adequate political protection.  The hope that efficiency incentives would make it less important to set 
X reasonably accurately has been disappointed, at least in part. The ‘ central insight ‘  of price cap was 
that excess profits or losses were tolerable, and even desirable  in the short run because they 
encouraged innovation and price reductions in the long run.  But five years has proved to be a long 
rime for the  public to endure profits that they regard as excessive. And, according to many scholars, 
it could also prove to be a long time for the companies or their consumers to endure low returns to the 
point that the industry cannot attract capital. According to the same authors shortening the period 
between reviews 
would reduce the political and economic damage from setting price caps that were wrong, but a shorter 
period would also reduce the strength and scope of the efficiency and investment incentives as well. 
In sum, the  process-intensive regulatory procedure is a compromise that seems to be essential to 
preserving the popular commitment to a price cap. 
 
 
  
 Asymmetry of Information , Consultation and Risk of Capture :   
The Economists View. 
 
 
            
      a)                  b) 
 
(a) Sir Ian Byatt, the UK Water Regulator between 1989 -2000  
and  (b) Steven Littlechild , designer of the Price-Cap Regulation  
and UK  Water Regulator after the year 2000. 
 
 
  One question raised by this compromise,  is whether the evolving procedures will also subject price-
cap regulation to greater risks of capture.  Littlechild feared that the regulator might be captured by 
the companies, because the companies had more information than the regulator.  An equally troubling 
possibility is that the consultation - intensive process adopted may ultimately make it harder for the 
regulator to adapt quickly to new challenges or changing circumstances. 
 
   Such a preference for the status quo, even at the expense of the long-term health of the industry, 
has characterized the telephone, railroad, airline, and other regulatory agencies in the United States 
at various points in their lives, particularly when beset by strong and conflicting pressures.  
 
According to America scholars, Britain's water industry seems subject to similar risks, for example, 
given that the companies, residential consumers, industrial consumers, and environmentalists all have 
distinct concerns. 
 
 ‘ Factual investigations’ , in the view of the most of the economists,  narrow the scope for debate, 
but still leave plenty of room for disagreement.    
 Consultation 
 
Consultation makes it easier for the varied interests to be heard and, it is hoped, strengthens their 
understanding and support for the regulatory system. But whether the processes will make it easier or 
harder for the regulator to make difficult choices – in the Economists’ view – has to be seen. 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The need of factual Investigations and Consultation 
 
 
 
In the end, the ‘ burden ‘ of an intrusive regulatory procedure and the risk of capture seem 
unavoidable with discretionary regulation. Discretionary regulators can find some refuge in purely 
technical analysis but, as the Competition Commission pointed out, the technical analysis is seldom 
conclusive. In Democracies, discretionary regulation seems to require the extensive factual 
investigations and consultation as found in Britain and the United States. And – in the view of 
many economists - it is ostensibly better to take the risk of capture with price-cap than with cost-of-
service regulation, especially where efficiency incentives are important. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Alternatives 
and Solutions    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Water narratives …A tale for Two Views ? 
 
Major Elements to be drawn for a lesson . . .  
 
“ Private wins Public on Efficiency 1  to 0 
If we assume  Efficiency as predominant element 
for a decision… “ 
     
 
 
 On the basis of case studies on water companies in far east regions, Estache and Rossi developed a 
benchmark methodology applicable to Latin America  for Regulators when comparing the 
performance of regulated industries. On the basis of a report by the Asian Development Bank 
published in 1997 , they found private water operators , in a sample of asian and Pacific Water 
companies to be more efficient than public operators. From an accounting perspective, this is due to 
the fact that costs, in concessionary companies, tend to be significantly lower than those in public 
companies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
…Should be the ‘efficiency predicament’  the only element to be taken into 
consideration..? 
 
 
Mechanisms for Citiziens Involvment in the Regulatory Process 
 
Evidences from Developing Countries 
 
 
Effectiveness of  Redressal Processes  in India  
 
 
Faced with inadequate or poor quality infrastructure services, citizens of many developing cities often 
turn to different channels to make their grievances heard. These range from complaints hotline or an 
ombudsman, more formal routes provided by the local government or utility, to more informal 
avenues including elected representatives, neighbourhood associations, media, and, in some cases, 
public protests. Recently, development agencies and domestic governments have been focusing 
attention on institutionalising tools, legal channels, and public spaces for grievance redressal, 
often as part of larger programs for governance reform of their utilities.  
 
ACCOUNTABILITY  
 
The case of  the administrative and judiciary channels in  Asia. 
 
 
Through the years the Asian Development Bank through  its “Access to Justice” program helped  
strengthening the  administrative and judiciary channels  for the poor to improve governance and 
reduce poverty. An increasing number of municipal governments and utilities, in developing cities 
throughout east Asia, are actually putting in place formal grievance redressal mechanisms that 
aim to hold government officials and public and private service providers to account. However, 
an analysis of these systems’ effectiveness - that is, whether service providers are responsive or not 
– reveals that it is still insufficient.  Whether such mechanisms are accessible to the urban poor, and 
how effective they may be versus more informal and political channels - particularly for the poor and 
marginalized – to obtain greater accountability from public service utilities, especially in developing 
countries, is still under assessment. 
 
Complaint Management Tools 
 
The published experiences of the Asian Development Bank  up to date with institutionalised or formal 
complaint management tools related to municipal services such as drinking water, street lights, 
garbage removal, and sanitation.  ‘ Complaint management ‘  involves the direct relaying of citizens’ 
grievances about an urban service to a utility or municipal agency and the follow-up response by the 
individuals responsible.  The ADB report shows the risks involved in formal complaint management 
systems such as exclusion of certain groups, or prioritisation of the complaints of certain groups over 
others.  
 
 
    Residents waiting for their turn at a community “mini” water tank in Bangalore, India. 
 
 
Grievance Redressal Mechanisms 
 
The Asian Development Bank  reviewed the rationale underlying grievance redressal and the 
reasons for its recent emphasis in reform agendas across developing cities, providing a range of 
examples of various formal and informal complaint avenues and their relative efficacy, 
using also the example of case studies, providing the design for a grievance redressal 
mechanisms to obtain  improved and more equitable urban service delivery. 
 
 
Institutionalising  Grievance Redressal  Mechanisms 
 
 
‘ It is widely recognized that efforts to reduce poverty should not simply involve improving material 
conditions, but also involve enhancing access to the judiciary, police, public administration systems, 
and institutions charged with ensuring justice.  While service delivery is being decentralized globally 
by devolving responsibilities to local governments, little attention has been given to decentralizing 
access to and delivery of justice, and establishing effective grievance redressal procedures ‘ (ADB 
2006). 
 
Right to Information, Committees, Consumer Courts and Citizen Report Cards 
 
In the case of urban services, there is growing consensus that citizen engagement can play a role in 
demanding greater responsiveness, accountability, and transparency from service providers through 
watchdog Committees, Consumer Courts, Citizen Report Cards, right to information 
or freedom of information acts, public interest litigations, and other mechanisms (WSP 2007). 
Several arguments support formal mechanisms to redress complaints over urban resources:  
 
1. First, monitoring by consumers or beneficiaries of an urban infrastructure project helps ensure that 
infrastructure projects stay on track, and provide a check on environmental damage, project 
expenditures, and timelines; 
 
2. Second, important economic arguments -  frequently invoked in the context of reforms -underlie 
the need to ensure feedback to service providers of infrastructure sectors exhibiting natural monopoly 
characteristics.  
 
 ‘ Where multiple suppliers exist, the volume of demand is a clear metric of satisfaction, and customers 
can be relatively easily switch to another commodity or service provider if they are unsatisfied and if 
other options exist. But often water, sanitation, electricity, and other network infrastructure services 
that exhibit natural monopolies (that means, a single supplier is more viable than several smaller 
suppliers)  have very few substitutes. As such, it is important that monopoly suppliers are effectively 
regulated to ensure universal coverage. There is also an expectation at the point of use, the citizen 
knows best and can therefore provide the best “quality control” monitoring’ (Asian Development 
Bank,2002). 
  Cooperation as Co-Production 
Thus, it is sometimes claimed that by’ tapping the synergies ‘ that exist between providers and 
citizens, the latter can “co-produce” the services that are of consequence to them (Ostrom, 1996). 
Use of Technology  
 
The direct interaction with service providers through the use of technology is one approach 
to enhance customer leverage.  
 
De Jure  and de Facto : Relationships of Power . 
Goetz and Jenkins, on the other hand, identify accountability fundamentally as relationships of power, 
and further suggest that there are often differences between de facto and de jure lines of 
accountability. That is :  
 
“in the real world, there is very often a difference between whom one is accountable to according to 
law or accepted procedure, and whom one is accountable to because of their practical power to 
impose a sanction “ 
 
 (Goetz and Jenkins, 2002). 
 
 
 Barriers to Efficacy of Grievance Redressal . Poor politics 
 
Using this definition, the Asian Development Bank report shows that  there are barriers to the 
accessibility and efficacy of formal systems of grievance redressal and the types of direct routes 
to accountability advocated by international development agencies, especially for the poor. For 
instance, the poor may lack property rights or the capabilities and connections to access 
formal systems. They may also be too geographically isolated or too time-constrained to be 
able to formally register and follow-up on their complaints.  
Conversely, service providers may face institutional, financial, and human resource barriers 
that sabotage their responsiveness. In majority of cities in Asia, the poor depend on more 
informal grievance redressal procedures, involving local politicians, street leaders, lower 
level bureaucrats, and neighbourhood associations. To Benjamin (2004), these “politics by 
stealth ”, that is the types of everyday negotiations that the poor engage in to improve access to urban 
services, is  significant. According to Benjamin it is such processes that, ultimately, provide voice to 
the poor. These processes should therefore not be so easily dismissed as “patronage” or ‘vote bank’ 
politics as they so often are in development circles. 
 
Efficacy and Channels of  Grievance Redressal, in Asia 
 
 
 The Asian development Bank recently  reviewed several current approaches to and channels for 
grievance redressal in urban Asian infrastructure services. 
    
Common ways for Citizens to Complain About Urban Services,  in Asia  
 
The efficacy of e-grievance redressal depends on several factors, including :  
 
 
1.  Pre-existing accountability relationships, incentive structures, and regulatory 
oversight 
 
Several utilities in Asian cities now dedicate a telephone “hotline” or 
call center for complaints regarding service disruptions. Sometimes 
hotlines are used in conjunction with helpdesks where citizens can file 
complaints in person. More recently, utilities have launched websites 
through which users can report problems online. Known as ‘online 
complaint management’ or ‘e-grievance redressal’ the use of the 
Internet to connect citizens and the government, or citizens and service 
providers is becoming increasingly popular. It aligns with the larger 
trend, in development institutions, of promoting the use of  information 
and communication technologies for development. As discussed below, 
the efficacy of e-grievance redressal depends on several factors, 
including pre-existing accountability relationships, incentive structures, 
and regulatory oversight. Although these telephone hotlines exist in 
theory, in practice, it is common to find them out of order or too 
backlogged with complaints to be effective. Similarly, those who do 
have access to the Internet rarely have confidence that their complaint 
will be registered and attended to when filed through websites-  as is 
frequently the case in India. The regulatory framework that generally 
specifies the quality and type of grievance redressal procedure is known 
as a “citizen’s charter.”  Citizen’s charters developed globally in the 
1990s as a ‘ contract ‘  that intended ‘ to reengineer the relationship 
between the state and citizen into one that best resembled the 
relationship between a business and its customer ‘ .  
As Haque (2005) describes, the main components of such a charter 
(known variously as “service standards initiative,” “quality charter,” or 
“service charter”) include a description of the standards that should be 
expected from government, the performance indicators that can be used 
to assess service delivery, the individuals responsible for providing 
services, and the mechanisms or procedures available to express 
customers’ grievances or complaints.  
While such compacts provide citizens with clearer expectations of the 
state, critics of citizen’s charters caution that - particularly in highly 
exclusionary societies such as India - citizen charters do not cater to the 
needs of the poorest.  Moreover, it is telling that while the Government 
of India adopted ‘citizen charters’ in 1997 to increase transparency and 
accountability - in line with standard prescriptions of “good 
governance”- it has also gradually reduced expenditure on public 
health and education as a percent of gross domestic product, which was 
already very low (Haque 2005). 
 
 
2. Use of Legal routes by Citizens,  for more serious grievances. 
 
 Several governments have appointed an ombudsman to prosecute 
public officials and public corporations on behalf of citizens on a broad 
range of issues, including grievances related to the environment and 
public utilities. More frequently, ombudsmen pursue complaints about 
corruption and malpractice in government. In India, public interest 
litigations allow citizens to file cases on issues that affect the wider 
public. For instance in Delhi, this process led to new regulations on 
pollution and solid waste management (World Bank 2007).  While the 
courts may be the most enforceable option to demand action from 
service providers, citizens rarely resort to them for day-to-day civic 
issues, given the resources and time required to file cases.  
 
 
Listed below,  Some typical avenues of formal grievance redressal procedures. 
 
 
Grievance Procedure                 How it works 
 
 
Public hearing  -  Issued by Utility Agencies  :  Usually held once a month in neighborhoods 
                              (e.g., monthly water “courts” held by the water board in Bangalore, India) in 
which the public is invited to voice grievances against the utility. 
 Regulators, engineers, and divisional management staff generally attend.  
A drawback is that these may not be so widely attended, or may over-represent the  
interests of particular groups of residents. 
 
 
Ombudsman -  An ombudsman (often a government official) is appointed to receive and 
investigate complaints  about public officials or services provided by public 
agencies.  
 Electricity and water agencies frequently have ombudsmen. 
 
 
Telephone  hotlines 
E- grievance  systems - Complaints received by a telephone hotline  
                       or through the Internet are relayed directly to the field engineers responsible.  
Drawbacks are that the hotlines or web pages may not be accessible to everyone, or  
that information about a complaint does not get transferred appropriately. 
 
 
Public Interest Litigation  -   Public interest litigations involve cases introduced by the court itself, not  
necessarily the aggrieved, related to issues of public interest.  One advantage is that since 
victims may not have the necessary resources to file a case  
                          themselves, the court takes on this burden on their behalf.   
                          Evidence on the effectiveness of public interest litigations in dealing with urban  
                          service issues is limited. 
 
 
3. Informal and Non-institutional mechanisms 
 
Aside from institutionalized mechanisms, citizens use a variety of 
informal or non-institutionalized mechanisms to complain, stake claims, 
and negotiate access to urban resources and services as mentioned above. 
Media plays an important role in raising public awareness about progress 
on and neglect of urban infrastructure. For example, newspapers 
frequently publish and highlight local and neighborhood civic issues in 
Bangalore, Mumbai, and Delhi. Print media often serves as an interlocutor 
between citizens and public officials, although it is not officially 
designated to do so by the government. 
  
 
 
Neighborhood associations 
 
Aside from media, several citizen-led and more localized approaches 
to grievance redressal exist in cities around the world, including 
neighborhood groups, such as barangay (neighborhood) associations in 
the Philippines and resident welfare associations (RWAs) in India. In 
some cases, formal processes allow citizens to interact with the 
government as with the Bhagidhari (“participation”) program in New 
Delhi, or with the Philippines Local Government Code of 1991 which 
mandates a role for the barangay government. Institutionalizing roles 
for neighborhood associations, however, runs the risk that only certain 
wealthier and better-connected associations will benefit, as is the case 
in Delhi because of the terms of participation (for instance unauthorized 
colonies cannot participate in Delhi’s Bhagidhari program). 
In general, the main roles of neighborhood associations are to report 
public works problems that directly inconvenience residents, and, on 
occasion, to raise funds to finance these works. Because of the type of 
residential areas in which RWAs in India are usually established, this 
type of activism is generally associated with the middle and upper 
classes. In Bangalore, for instance, the citizens’ and volunteer group 
Janaagraha liaises with several RWAs to build awareness regarding 
ward-level grievances and encourage involvement in resolving them. 
Another organization in Bangalore, the Citizens’ Voluntary Initiative 
for the City (CIVIC) organizes monthly public grievance redressal 
forums in which representatives of major agencies such as the 
Bangalore water board, electricity utility, and the municipal 
corporation, are present to listen to the grievances of residents. Both 
Janaagraha and CIVIC liaise with many RWAs and are well known for 
their initiatives among their members. Over the past decade, Bangalore 
has witnessed several such examples of proactive citizen engagement in 
civic affairs (Heitzman 2004; Kamath 2006; Nair 2005; Paul 2002). But 
the extent to which such efforts have benefited the lower classes, 
especially those located on the periphery of the city, is negligible. In 
these areas, where civic amenities are often wholly inadequate or absent, 
some grievances, including those concerning land and tenure, ration 
cards, and voter identity cards, are often channelled through political 
entities such as elected representatives or organizations with political 
agendas. It is therefore important to note that multiple informal or 
citizen-initiated channels of negotiation and complaints exist in 
Bangalore and other cities, and that these are often dependent on social 
class, income, and geography. 
 
 
 
Case of  Municipal Grievance Redressal in Karnataka State 
 
As part of a state wide municipal reform program covering 57 cities, in 
2005 the Department of Municipal Administration of the Government 
of Karnataka launched a web-based application for citizens to file 
grievances relating to a variety of municipal services known as the 
“Public Grievance and Redressal (PGR )” Module. For each of these 
cities, the PGR system is linked to a municipal website that provides 
services such as information on city finances, contact information for 
city officials and politicians, Geographic Information Systems (GIS) 
based property information, and applications for birth and death 
certificates. Notably, the web version of the PGR module is in both 
Kannada and English. The Urban Development Department, the Survey 
of India, and the E-Governments Foundation (a public interest 
organization) jointly implement these reforms and technology 
applications. The PGR system is intended to work in the following way: 
in every municipality, the urban local government has set up a helpdesk 
and telephone helpline to collect and respond to complaints in a 
centralized manner, and appointed a non- government organization 
(NGO) to staff the helpdesk. When residents have a problem such as 
disruption in water supply or blocked underground drainage, they have 
four options for reporting this grievance: by personally visiting the 
helpdesk, by phoning the helpdesk, by submitting a letter to the 
helpdesk, or by lodging a complaint through the city’s new website. 
Thus, while the system has a web interface, it is accessible to users 
through avenues other than the Internet.(*)  The helpdesk then logs 
these complaints into a logbook, and relays them to frontline engineers 
who are supposed to resolve the problem within a stipulated time frame 
and report back the status of the problem. At the end of the day, the 
helpdesk staff is supposed to log all complaints in the PGR database 
(see figure). The system is thought to build accountability because it 
provides real-time information about the problems experienced by 
residents and also sets a time limit within which grievances must be 
resolved. PGR also provides reports and maps summarizing the number 
of complaints made in a particular category or in a particular ward for 
anyone who has access to the Internet to review. 
 
Citizens can register complaints in several categories: those related to 
engineering (e.g., broken streetlights),  those related to health (e.g., 
absence of garbage collection), and those related to various 
administrative affairs. The majority of complaints are filed in the first 
two categories, and within these, broken streetlights, leaking water 
pipes, blocked sanitary systems and storm water drains, and lack of 
garbage collection are the most frequent sources of complaints across 
the municipalities.  
 
 
Findings of the Case : problems of Enforcement of contract 
 
In reality, although the Public Grievance Redressal module was 
successful at raising awareness among citizens about the existence of 
the helpdesk, several challenges hinder its efficacy. These can be 
understood in terms of the institutional set up of municipalities. All 
infrastructure works, from the digging of borewells, to the maintenance 
of streetlights, are tendered out to local private contractors. Because 
tenders are often poorly drafted and enforcement of contracts is weak, 
contractors often do not honor their responsibilities, leaving several 
burned-out borewell motor pumps or silted-up drains, among other 
problems.  That is,  - regardless of how sophisticated the grievance 
redress system is, citizens continue to suffer from inadequate quality of 
services because of weak contractual enforcement. Moreover, as 
discussed above, the very poor often use more informal mechanisms to 
voice demands, such as through their ward councilor, by making group 
visits to the assistant  
 
 
 
(*) Because of the low penetration rate of computers and the Internet in India, it is not surprising 
that more residents file complaints in person, by telephone, or in writing than through the 
Internet 
 
 
executive engineer’s office, through a local civic welfare association, 
or through field engineers on their inspection visits. 
 
These informal reports do not usually get recorded in the Public 
Grievance Redressal system - raising questions about who the system 
caters to and how representative the data is.  Another shortcoming of 
the PGR system is that NGOs and RWAs did not have access to nor 
demand the data to track the major problems in the area. In general, 
community-based organizations had very little involvement or 
awareness in reviewing the grievance redressal mechanism and 
providing feedback on its usefulness. Finally, elected officials also had 
little involvement in implementing the grievance redressal module and 
in monitoring the data. The lack of involvement of councilors has been 
recognized as a serious problem in Mumbai: “Given that elected 
representatives serve as important conduits for citizen grievances in 
their constituencies, particularly the urban poor who face barriers in 
accessing other formal channels, their nonsupport is likely to lead to 
less than optimal public acceptance and utilization levels [of online 
complaint management systems] (World Bank 2007).” 
 
 
 Conclusions 
 
In Karnataka’s, as seen, Grievance Redressal system is ‘ a promising first step’  to 
institutionalizing grievance redressal in municipalities. The benefits could be significant, particularly 
in that it could provide vital data for infrastructure problem identification, and a streamlined way to 
handle complaints across neighborhoods. Currently however, some important limitations* need to be 
addressed if the system is to be scaled up across the state and country. 
 
 
 
 
(*) Inconsistent municipal water supply is a serious grievance in several Karnataka municipalities, especially 
for the poor who do not have their own borewells, but such grievances are not reflected as priorities in the 
summary reports generated by the module, by person, by telephone, or in writing than through the Internet. 
 
 
The Customer Management System in Manila 
 
 
This second example, describes a different kind of system - an outsourced call center set up by the 
private water utility Manila Water to receive and process customer complaints related to water  
supply. Manila Water is one of two private concessionaires responsible for delivering water to 
Manila, and its primary jurisdiction is eastern Manila. The utility has two primary modes of delivering 
water to residential customers: through individual connections, and through third party bulk water 
sellers who buy water from Manila Water at industrial rates and then on-sell the water to households 
in communities.  About 50% of customers are served through the mode, known as the ‘ Tubig Para 
Sa Barangay ‘or ‘water for the community’ program. This program was developed by the utility 
shortly after privatisation, in 1998, to reduce non-revenue water, while also meeting the coverage 
targets stipulated in the contract. The  ‘water for the community’ program is targeted at poor 
customers and  neighborhoods , as there are  higher risks associated with 
serving the urban poor, for a company. In it the bulk seller, known as the barangay association 
or  peoples’ organization (often a long-term and deeply embedded member of the community)  
is financially responsible for laying small-scale distribution infrastructure within a community and 
must then set tariffs to recover they set, however, are not regulated by the regulatory authority. 
 
 Complaint Procedure  
For ordinary customers of Manila Water’s , in case of complaint, such as a billing discrepancy or 
leaky pipes, they can call the call center’s number ( the 1627) which then transfers the complaint to 
field officers and designated territory business managers who must inform the complainant how long 
it will take to redress the problem. Once a complaint has been registered, the call center is supposed 
to provide feedback on the status of the complaint in 24 hours and indicate a time frame within which 
the complaint will be redressed. Standards for resolving complaints are set by the utility: priority 
complaints such as no water, dirty water, and leaks must be resolved within 48 hours, while 
all other complaints must be resolved within 5 days.  
 
 Vertical Accountability 
 
The system also has built-in automatic escalation, a strategy used to build vertical accountability. If, 
after the stipulated time frame (48 hours or 5 days depending on the complaint), the complaint has 
not been resolved, it is transferred to a higher level of management. The complaint keeps escalating 
every hour until it is resolved. According to Manila Water, this has been one of the key factors in 
ensuring the timely redressal of complaints. 
 
Access to the System  
 
 
Although this system is available to individual customers, about 50% of Manila Water’s customers— 
mostly the poor who receive water through TPSB—do not have access to this complaint management 
system because they are not technically considered Manila Water’s customers, even though TPSB 
customers may face problems such as substandard pipes, leaks, and billing discrepancies.   As in the 
Karnataka case the reason for this, , has to do with the particular institutional structure of water 
delivery in Manila. The flaw in this case is that unlike the utility’s primary customers, who have 
recourse to the complaints system and the regulator, the customers who receive water through the  
peoples’ organization are not considered Manila Water’s customers and therefore lack the same 
privileges. The reason for this flaw is that Manila Water is not obligated under its contract to attend 
to the complaints of customers that buy water services from the barangay association. Therefore, 
these customers must turn to their peoples’ organization  for redressal of their complaints. By 
some accounts,  the barangay associations have found to be extremely savvy and responsive to 
customers (Chng 2007), while by others, POs are characterized as irresponsible and rent seeking 
(Tinga 2006). As Ferrer (2006) notes, because peoples’ organization are not subject to regulation, 
there is always a risk that individual interests of  peoples’ organization’ managers may prevail 
over the interests of the community. The underlying issue is that these customers do not enjoy the 
same recourse to formal grievance redress mechanisms as Manila Water’s customers, even though 
they are counted in the utility’s overall coverage target. This case study shows how vital it is to ensure 
that grievance redressal systems are accessible to both the poor and the well off, and that it is 
necessary to address the weaknesses of the institutional structure and the pre-existing accountability 
relationships to do this. 
 
 
Structuring Complaint Management Systems. 
Efficacy of the  Informal Routes. 
 
 
While institutionalized grievance redressal mechanisms have potential and are attractive to 
advocates of reforms because they create an image of ‘private sector-like’  professionalism, 
critical aspects related to institutional design, relationships of accountability, and 
regulatory oversight may hinder the efficacy of these systems- both in the ability of 
providers to be responsive and in accessibility for the poor.  In municipal agencies that 
contract out particular services to private contractors and where contractual relationships 
are weak (as the case in Greater Bangalore), the formal complaint mechanism is not 
effective. What is effective are the informal routes and networks, including local leaders 
and elected representatives, who can better monitor contractors and ensure proper delivery 
of services. In private utilities (such as Manila Water) it is important that the grievance 
redressal mechanisms are available to all types of customers, including the poor.  
 
Recommendations  
 
Therefore, here there are some important considerations to make, when structuring such 
mechanisms: 
 
 
1. Make sure that Multiple routes for grievance redress exist. 
 
 
In practise, formal, institutionalised grievance redress mechanisms are not likely to replace 
existing modes to deliver complaints such as civic organizations, elected representatives, or 
even the media. Data from computerized systems should therefore not be seen as conclusive. 
Moreover, civic agencies should not address complaints delivered through formal routes to 
the exclusion of other routes. Each channel - especially more informal ones - is likely to be 
effective for certain groups of people. It is therefore imperative to acknowledge these 
alternative routes and strengthen them. 
 
   2.  Strengthening Accountability in the  Contract 
 
As the Karnataka case shows, the accountability of private contractors responsible for infrastructure 
upkeep is fairly low, suggesting that, for grievance redress to work, it 
is important that such accountability relationships are strengthened through enforceable 
contracts or other means. Another way that vertical accountability can be strengthened is through 
automatic escalation of complaints to the next level in the administrative hierarchy. It is imperative 
also for banks, funders  and practitioners to be aware of these institutional and stakeholder 
relationships and understand them before a project is implemented.  
 
2. Regulatory and Contractual Design determines Accessibility.  
 
 
As emerged in the Manila Water case, it is relatively easy for utilities to neglect certain  categories 
of consumers and their grievances because of the regulatory and institutional set up of the 
concessionaire and the design of the contract between contractor and municipality, of company.  
The customers of the ‘water for the community’ program  didn’t have access to Manila Water’s 
customer complaint management system because the Peoples’ Organizations are not regulated in 
this arrangement. To make  accessible grievance redress systems to a broad cross section of 
citizens, such institutional factors should be improved. 
 
3. Involvement of  local representatives. 
 
 
Without support from locally elected representatives, to whom a significant proportion of 
grievances are directed, the sustainability and efficacy of these complaint management 
systems may not sort its results. Complaints routed informally through the channels of local 
representatives are an important means through on which the poor rely on making claims 
and negotiating their  services needs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Sharing Data with NGOs and with Community Groups  
    ( to enable follow-up). 
 
 
To make service providers more responsive, it is necessary to put the grievance data in the public 
domain, and to mandate that the data is made available to elected representatives, civic 
organizations, the media, and other watchdog entities.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In conclusion, in different cities and contexts different grievance redressal systems apply, therefore a 
grounded, preliminary analysis will reveal which mechanism is the best to structure grievance 
mechanisms in the various places, depending on the prevailing regulatory and institutional set up and 
on the relationships of accountability established.  
 
In many cases, elected representatives and neighborhood associations are more effective at exerting 
pressure on municipal agencies and local contractors than institutionalised  
‘ e-governance ‘ tools or telephone ‘ hotlines ‘ .  
 
In any case, where institutionalised mechanisms exist, there is always a risk that they may exclude or 
may not be available to particular groups.  
 
Therefore, in any water regulatory reforming agenda precise accountability specifications,  taking 
into consideration the multiple ways in which citizens interact with the government and service 
providers, should hopefully be pursued, in the attempt to set the foundations of a proper democratic 
setting in water systems. 
 
 
GLOSSARY  
 
Regulated entity    :  a utility that is subject to regulated rate for its revenues, being  
                                   under monopolistic conditions for its services. 
 
Asset  :  is a resource controlled by the enterprise as a result of past events from which future 
economic benefits are expected to flow to the enterprise. 
 
Regulatory Asset  : is an entity’s right to recover fixed or determinable amounts of  
                                money towards incurred costs as a result of the actual or expected  actions  
                                of its regulator under the applicable regulatory framework. 
 
Regulatory Liability is an entity’s obligation to refund or adjust fixed or determinable amounts of 
money as a result of actual or expected action of its regulator under the applicable 
regulatory framework. 
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Terzo Capitolo - Chapter 3 
 
Political Ecology of Water: A Theoretical Pattern for a 
Modern Approach. 
 
 
Environmental and Cultural Roots of  Water Privatization  
 
 
 
To be put in condition to engage with sound knowledge with the environmental 
aspects of water management, particularly those aspects regarding water 
privatisation, the approach purposed in this thesis is to step back and consider the 
wider cultural environment where privatisation mechanisms have been nurtured 
and cultivated throughout the last part of the century. Many authors, as Bakker 
depict water privatisation 1  as ‘the  product of an era where a strong push towards 
market liberalism has taken place, an era in which our responses to the 
environmental crisis demonstrate to be increasingly mediated by the doctrine of 
market liberalism and neoliberalist theories’ 1 . Neoliberalist theories - especially in 
their respect to the environment has been extensively studied and at the center of 
the attention of many scholars as for example Harvey, by whom it has been defined 
as  : 
 “a doctrine  where market exchange becomes an ethic 
in itself , capable of acting as a guide for all human 
action “.   
 
                        [ David Harvey,  Distinguished Professor of 
Anthropology and  Geography at the 
Graduate Center of the City University of 
New York  - CUNY  ]  
 
Liberal Environmentalism : a new Cross – Cultural trend. 
 
 
 
The reason why and the mechanism through which the cultural push towards market 
liberalism has been observed happening throughout the century have been at the 
centre of the studies of many authors. Among others,  Harvey and Bernstein.3  The 
latter, devised the term ‘ liberal environmentalism’ to describe the compromise that 
has been observed taking place, in the recent decades, among views that advocate  
‘environmental protection ‘ with views that assume, as ground for their reflection, 
the maintenance, and the promotion of a ‘liberal economic order’. Bernstein defines 
this trend as a : 
 
“A new ‘compatibility’ of environmental concern with economic growth and  the 
basic tenets of a market economy,  within liberal international order ’.  
[ Steven Bernstein, University of  Toronto ] 
 
Bakker , uses the term market environmentalism adding that it ‘ emerged in response 
to serious environmental threats to profitability under capitalism ‘ and adding that 
‘our responses to environmental crisis have been increasingly mediated by the 
doctrine of neoliberalism‘.  On this regard she points out that ‘the rise of market-
based regulatory mechanisms and the private sector participation – as indicating 
elements  of neoliberal process going on – are not unique to the water sector, but are 
a broad–based trend across resources and environmental services’. Therefore they 
are a clear a cross- cultural trend that encompass all the fringes of the economy and 
the present history. 
 
 ‘Markets during the recent years, have increasingly 
encroached in an unprecedented manner many aspects 
of the natural world, from genetic resources to 
atmospheric carbon, which were previously 
uncommodified.’ 
   
[K. Bakker - Director of Program of Water 
Governance,  University of British 
Columbia] 
 
 
According to Bakker, market environmentalism ‘offers hopes of a virtuous fusion 
of economic growth, efficiency, and environmental conservation. Through 
establishing private property rights, employing markets as allocation mechanisms, 
and incorporating environmental externalities through pricing, proponents of the 
market environmentalism assert that environmental goods will be more efficiently 
allocated , if treated as economic goods, and , by that means, at the same time 
addressing concerns over environmental degradation and inefficient use of 
resources’.4 
 
 
In this respect, the tradable artificial wetland, as demonstrated by Robertson4,  is 
the archetype of market environmentalism, where restoration ecology and 
economics displace hydraulic engineering as dominant paradigms for intervention 
in hydrological landscapes5.  The growth in consumption of  bottled water,  which 
is now a growing emerging market, or the emergence of always newly rising water 
treatment technologies, as a response to a widespread concerns regarding  ‘water 
security ‘ or the ‘degradation of water quality environment ‘ well exemplify, 
according to Bakker, the liberal environmentalism compromise.  It is like the system  
shows inability to respond to the environmental crises, which are observable in 
terms of resource depletion and of decrease in sink capacity for our discharges,  out 
of the frame of a capitalistic view. 
According to Bakker and Barnstein – two scholars chosen among the many who 
dedicated reflections to these dynamics -  our attempts to respond to the 
environmental crisis are deeply rooted into a wider ‘ capitalist paradigm ’ that 
claims ‘to turn threats into new opportunities’ for business and capital 
accumulation, enhancing substitution ( f.i. bottled water),  and the development of 
new technologies and private appropriation as solutions for the raising emergencies.  
Nevertheless, as other authors ( O’Connor and Katz)  already pointed out in the 
past, there is an ‘inherent contradiction’ in such capitalistic approach4, which 
exhausts the environmental resources that are fundamental  for the fulfilment of the 
systems’ own functions  –  both when they are used as  source of inputs (as a 
commodity)  or when they are used as a ultimate sink for the systems’ output of 
waste and pollution disposal 5 . This determines an unavoidable involution6  of the 
same capitalistic system. According to Bakker, this trend is not new, as , since the 
nineteenth-century, as some political economists show7 the environment has always 
been captured by capitalism, since the early time of the ‘ enclosure of the commons 
‘ , which created both a proletarian workforce and a new ‘commodity’, the 
environment, from which profit could be extracted. The insights given from 
nineteenth-century political economists, like Marx – always according to Bakker – 
is that  capitalism  is ‘ predicated on our metabolism of nature, which we ingest 
and transform ( continuously), altering ourself in the process‘.  This extremely 
powerful image that Marx and Bakker recall, describe the capitalistic cultural 
approach as a way ‘ to feed ‘ our brains and imagery well suiting to the way in 
which the modern society reorganizes itself in each aspect of its economy - from 
science to technology - in line with the ‘principles’ of  commodification  and 
transformation of the natural world revealing capitalism, as the root reappearing in 
the new form of liberal environmentalism, which is now pervasive of all aspects of 
the natural environment, from resources to finance. 8    
 
THE  CASE   
Latest forms of Liberal Environmentalism in US - The  Good 
Derivatives’ of Richard Sandor. 
     
 
Good Derivatives can be reputed as the most recent product of the liberal 
environmentalist thought, when applied to the finance and derivatives sector. It 
originated from the conceptions and the activism of Richard Sandor, a US 
contemporary businessman.  Sandor,  better known as  the father of  Cap and 
Trade, elaborated  a  market-oriented mechanism for trading rights of pollution in 
the financial market, an experiment which was heavily supported by President 
Obama, in his recent mandate.  In this mechanism the market is used as a substitute 
for regulation in achieving environmental goals. Sandor, former chief economists 
of the Chicago Board of Trade, devised this mechanism promoting and brokering 
it at political level – managing to successfully convince congressmen and 
politicians as well as regulators, academics and students that "derivatives" may be 
a quicker and more effective tool , than 
 ‘the pachydermic bureaucratic machine ‘ , to solve issues of environmental 
pollution without altering the on going mechanism of finance and exhange market, 
rather, using it, and allowing investors to bet on fluctuating prices or interest rates 
and, eventually, reducing their risk if the price of a commodity skyrockets. Sandor 
applied the financial trading mechanisms first to the issue of air pollution (to  
sulfur dioxide, the pollutant precursor of acid rain) creating markets to buy and 
sell the right for emission, and obtaining a strong reductions in SO2 emissions 
overall US. His attempt is now to combat global warming applying  financial 
trading to the emission of greenhouse gases.  In his book  Sandor9 argumentate that 
market forces will eventually prove that ‘ the market is the most effective and 
efficient way to cut the emission of greenhouse gases’ . 
 
 
  
‘ The proper market can more efficiently and cheaply clean 
up the environment than regulations can. ‘  
      [ Richard Sandor ] 
 
and therefore proving therefore to be an emerging and sophisticated figure within 
recent scenario of the liberal environmentalism ideas . 
 
The Necessity of a ‘ leap’ of knowledge: Swingedouw, 
Bakker, Smith, and the Political Ecology thinkers. 
 
Swingedouw’s Socio-Nature  and  Water as a Hybrid. 
  
Always following the file rouge marked by K. Bakker’s thougths  modern products 
of biotechnologies and techno-science, as genetic engineering, can be considered 
as  ‘transgressive incarnations’ of the principles of  liberal environmentalism and 
tackle the distinction between  ‘ natural’ and ‘social’, one the fundamentals of 
modernity.  In this sense, as many times recalled in various parts of this thesis,  to 
encomapass the complexity of the natural and human dynamics in shaping the 
water environment, a new leap of knowledge is needed and invoked.  Many 
scholars of political ecology , such as  Bakker, Swingedouw, Latour, Jasanoff, Neil 
Smith and others afforded this issue of the contemporary production ( or co-
production) of nature and society, recognizing to  water the characteristics of 
having a ‘hybrid nature’ with the capacity to embody a multiplicity of socio-
natural significances.  Water, according to Swingedouw, is a powerful metaphor 
for the socio-ecological processes constituting human life, embodying a 
multiplicity of  tales that represent the indivisibility of nature from society  - so the 
definition of water  as a 'hybrid'.  Swingedouw borrows his 'hybrid' definition from 
Bruno Latour 
According to Swingedouw, , through the water-history of a country many 
‘interrelated tales’ are being narrated : stories of social groups and classes, of 
powerful socio-ecological processes that produce social spaces of privileges and 
exclusion, of participation and marginality, of chemical, physical and biological 
reactions and transformations of the global hydrological cycle and global 
warming, of the capital, machinations and strategies of dam builders, of urban land 
developers, of the knowledges of the engineers, of the passage from river to urban 
reservoir, of the geo-political struggle between regions and nations. 
Swingedouw quotes Smith defining as ' production of nature ' 9 the context in which 
the present political-ecological processes around water do take place. 
According to Swingedouw ' Natural’  or ‘ecological' conditions and processes do 
not operate separately from social processes, and the existing socio-natural 
conditions are always the result of intricate transformations of pre-existing 
conditions which are themselves inherently ‘ natural and social.’  Swingedouw 
often recalls Bruno Latour when referring to  the modern environment of water 
landscape as  
 
‘.. a ' hybrid  ' thing , part natural part social that  embodies a 
multiplicity of historical-geographical relations and processes 
that are simultaneously and inseparably natural and social.’ 10 
 
and quotes David Harvey (1996) , when affirming that: 
 
‘There is nothing particularly unnatural about New York’ 
[ Harvey, 1996] 
 
noting  in particular that    
‘Cities, regions or any other socio-spatial processes or 
condition are a network of interwoven processes that are 
simultaneously human, natural, material, cultural, 
mechanical and organic.’ 
                [ Eric Swingedouw, 1996] 
 
All of these multiple characteristics  recalls the clear need to dispose of  a new leap 
of knowledge that may frame and encompass the wide variety of issues and visions 
related to water, , being water simultaneously, in Bakker’s words  
 
 ‘ an  economic input, an aestethic reference, a religious 
symbol, a public service, a private good, a cornerstone of 
public health, a biophysical necessity for humans and 
ecosystems, and, at least in part, a commodity’.    
 
 
 
and the political ecology scholars show to have some of the best view to approach 
the entirety of the issues and therefore this thesis proposes – to adopt their scope as  
a main conceptual framework for the analysis.  
 
 
Ecological Impacts of Water Privatization: The debate around 
the Role of Private sector involvement. Good Use of Water sector 
Reforms and Economic Critics to Water Neoliberalism. 
 
Bakker embraces liberal environmentalism as a vision to enclose the complex dynamics 
taking place in nowadays environmental and water management. She notices that 
privatisation ( and neoliberalisation)  not necessarily has a negative impact on the 
environment, when it is addressed to find solutions to the deterioration of the 
environmental quality.  Therefore water sector reforms, taking place under liberal 
environmentalism, according to Bakker may have the potential to improve 
environmental quality.  
In particular, when water and  the environment  are given voice into the discursive 
framework of policy making, and when water is conceived as part of the environment -  
and not only as a mere resource to exploit –   the environment may reasonably come ‘to 
be represented’ in the political discourse with its own legitimacy as well as that of the 
economic and society interests. This means, in practise , that such concept needs to be 
formally incorporated into enforceable regulatory frameworks, by law.  
In this respects, Bakker stresses that  
 
‘ we must recognize the potential of water sector reforms, allied 
with liberal environmentalism, to improve environmental quality’.  
 
At the same time as the author further develops, the condition for this role of the reforms 
to be properly exerted is satisfied when ‘water and  the environment  are given voice 
into the frame of a discursive11 policy making’ - and also ‘when water is conceived as 
part of the environment, and not only as a mere resource to exploit’ . In that case  the 
environment, may come to be represented in the political discourse with its own 
legitimacy as well as the legitimate rights of the economic processes and of the society 
interests. This means, in practise, in Bakker’s words ‘to formally incorporate such 
definition of environment into enforceable regulatory frameworks’, that represent it 
legitimately as a formal ‘water  user’ , ‘ whose interests are to be balanced – or even 
prioritized above – those of other users ‘. 
This concept has also been developed by Tony Allan , in his theory of  sustainability. 
The case of England and Wales – to which Bakker  devoted a greater part of her early 
studies – is then used to exemplify how the process of re-regulation involved in any 
privatization reforms policy, can be used to address the needs of the environment. In the 
case of England, the bulk of policy of reforms -  that started to be undertaken with 
Margaret Thatcher decision of restructuring the water management industry  towards a 
privatised management system in 1989 -  brought about, according to Bakker 
‘impressive improvements’ in water quality as well as greater regulatory legitimacy for 
the environment, although this also happened in response to emerging new EU 
legislative requirements.   
As liberal environmentalists use to comment, when they argue in favour of the private 
sector involvement in addressing management and operational problems in water 
management,  public operators often work out inefficiently. According to proponents of 
liberal environmentalism, the goal to be reached, is the efficiency, or in any case a more 
efficient allocation of the resources.  On the other side, the opponents of the neoliberalist 
thought, that critic the applied consequences of market liberalism, argue that exactely 
the market - with the commodification process on resources that lays as a consequence 
of it -  is the cause of the problem, and that many water sector reforms, in practise, 
conceal beneath them the attempt for an ‘intensification of capitalist robbery of the 
environment’, that they claim having reached ‘unprecedented levels’. Such a critique 
occurred in most of the cases of water sector reforms recently occurred worldwide 
involving private sector, expecially in developing countries water reforms experiments 
in Latin America12,13 , Pacific Asia14,  and in South Africa15,16,17.  For the opponents of 
neoliberal policies, conservation and protection of the environment should be the 
primary goal to be pursued. In opposition to the liber environmentalistic though, and in 
sustain of an alternative vision of development, a number of economic theoretical 
observations have been raised to counterbalance, from the economic perspective the 
mainstreams of neoliberal theories. The major points are that : 
 
A.  Many evidences of market failures are often generated in neoliberistic policies, 
especially because – as regards the environment  
 
B .     market activities deal with resources that are usually not properly accounted for , 
generating externalities whose cost is entirely born by the environment; 
C .     the impossibility to find substitutes,  especially when dealing with the limits of the 
exploitation of  nature 
 
D.  lastly, the high cost of some new technologies which naturally recalls the intervention 
of the State and is not likely to be left to the private initiative alone. 
 
 
 
Pricing : Multiple Views on an Unavoidable burden.  
 
Whether we decide to follow the fully neoliberalistic vision, or we want to include in 
our reasoning the social and ecological concerns deriving from the recently arising of 
socio-environmental discourses, in any of these cases we have to come to term with the 
thorny issue of pricing.  
According to the market liberalist thought, which is predominant nowadays, the costs of 
running water systems should be entirely recovered. This is asserted either with 
reference to the costs of operation and maintenance of the water-built system., already 
in place, that a company – private of public it may be - has been entrusted to manage, 
but also with reference to the cost of new investments which are needed to finance the 
extensions of the water infrastructures. This implies the acceptance of the full cost 
recovery principle, that is invoked by most of recent water sector reforms around the 
world, as well as by the Water framework Directive in Europe by the major international 
water institutions, like OECD18.  Pricing , therefore, in the modern times, seems, un 
unavoidable mechanism and probably will be necessary to acknowledge it somehow to 
arrive to share a common vision upon the true value of that precious environmental 
resource which is water.  Nevertheless a constructive  discussion can be opened upon 
what we might think reasonable to be charged, on how this price should be distributed 
among the various typologies of users, and whether including in our considerations those 
costs that  have been entirely borne so far by the environment, if someone will ever 
manage to explicit them ( an exercise that could be a very useful practise for those 
economists who would like to engage in the never concluded issue of valuing 
environmental goods ).  
 
On this regard, the Water Framework Directive , recommends , in its Article 9: 
 
 
 “ Member States shall take account of the principle of 
recovery of the costs of water services, including 
environmental and resource costs….  in accordance with the 
polluter pays principle …  having regard to the social, 
environmental and economic effects of the recovery as well 
as the geographic and climatic conditions of the region or 
regions affected “. 
 [ EU Directive 2000 / 60 , Article 9 ] 
 
Clearly, the Directive has been nurtured in liberal environmentalist principles and seems 
not to leave much room for different interpretation, although, its statement of 
acknowledgement of the ‘ social ’ and the ‘ environmental ‘ costs gives us the permission 
to infer that, in the making of its fundamentals, a certain influence of theories and actors 
from the sociological and ecological arena has definitely reached the policy maker in 
Brussels.   
Then, as depicted in other dynamics related to water, we can find at least three diverging 
visions around pricing referring to the way that cost- recovery should be put in place. 
The plain neo-liberal view recalls the necessity to fully recover - through pricing - the 
entire cost of the ‘water business’, including the investments for further developing the 
infrastructural water network. This is currently the dominant vision among the coalitions 
between states and corporate powers which normally share a top-down vision and 
practice in their policy approaches. In opposition to this view, we find a  ‘ redistributive  
model’ , normally  supported by those who propose of the principle of equitable 
redistribution among the different socio-economic categories of water users within 
society. According to them, water tariff  (a  term which they prefer to the market-sound 
word of ‘ water price’ ) should be calculated keeping in account of the different income 
of consumers, and leveraging the actual cost on the capacity of big consumers to pay 
more, and therefore balancing the cost to repay in order to cross-subsidize small-income 
consumers. Such mechanism, when applied, should be able to grant a ‘minimum 
amount’19 of affordable water to everyone.   
 
 
 
Unfortunately, in the case of poor countries, where the largest amount of users lay in 
poverty, it is difficult to hypotize that even a social-redistributive mechanism can totally 
recover the entire costs of infrastructure, and therefore, the role of the state, and 
moreover, of foreign aid agencies turns to be essential, for the development of water 
infrastructures in developing and under-developed countries. 
Thirdly, to acknowledge the raising importance of ‘ ecologic thinking’ , for the 
environmentalist thought, the price should reflect the cost to the environment of all the 
phases of the water management process : from abstraction of groundwater, to the 
disposal of wastewater, all these environmental costs, as well as other - unaccounted so 
far - should be , according to the environmentalist vision, reasonably included into the 
tariff.    
To be objective, the Water Framework Directive, in stressing the need for the States to 
openly address  ‘ the environmental and resource costs’  clearly  aligns its principles  
along the latter vision. 
This may lead, inevitably, to the countabilization of  higher costs for everyone. The 
obvious question is now to which extent the economy and society are likely to 
acknowledge and to willingly - and responsibly - decide to acknowledge and uptake the 
costs of it’s own  impact on the environment ?  
  
 
Basic Principles for the Characterization of Water Reforms under Market 
Environmentalism. 
 
Water reforms, under market environmentalism , as Bakker remember, show a pretty various 
typology of forms, which depend on and are readapted to the different cultural, socio-economic, and 
juridical conditions of different societies. 
Nevertheless, we can recognize a number of common characteristics, or principles, to which they 
conform to and principles that , when present,  allow to recognize liberal environmentalism in action 
. These principles or factual tendencies which are observed guiding the policy process are :  
 
1. A certain prioritisation of water conservation, in response to the increased stress in 
water use, as a consequence of increased water demand from the economic activities;  
 
2. A growing emphasis on valuing the environment, though mostly through pricing 
instruments, and a strong push towards incorporating metering  techniques  into 
policies of efficiency; 
 
3. Environmental protection, restoration, remediation – collocated within a market of 
new ‘ecosystem services’ - assume increasing importance and become goals of the 
new water management policies;  
 
 
4. In adopting pricing instruments, the priority shifts from access to water  and from 
equity principles towards principles of economic efficiency. 
 
5. In some cases, private property rights and tradable water markets are established; 
alternatively, new government regulation apply market-based policies and 
mechanisms;  
 
6. In any case, the private sector tends to play a more significant role, both in the 
management (operation) or in the ownership of the water infrastructure; 
 
7. Las, but not least, a new set of changes in governance take place, where a stronger 
part is left to play to the market. The various combinations of it, are listed in the 
following part of the chapter. 
 
 
 
Main Types  of  Reforms under Market Environmentalism  
 
 
 
Through the analysis of  several patterns of management, Bakker distinguishes into three 
categories of means and processes by which resource management  is commonly 
reformed under neoliberal market environmentalism: reform of . Institutions ( laws, 
policies, rules, norms and customs) through which resources are governed;  reform of 
organisations ( that are the collective social entities that the government of resource use) 
and reforms of governance ( the process, the practises  by which organisations construct 
and administer the exploitation of the resources). If we fail to understand to which level 
a specific reform targets its aims , we risk to miss the point of our argument. These 
cathegories can also be useful in understanding at which level the failure of the water 
management happened , in various cases , and to avoid a certain ‘ analytical sloppiness 
‘ - as Bakker defines the source of misunderstanding - that ‘ diminishes our ability to 
correctly characterize and understand the trajectories of neoliberal projects of resource 
management reforms’ . 
In practise, for Bakker,  reforms can be undertaken in a plethora of ways, and these ways  
are not necessarily concomitant  :  
‘ one may privatise without deregulating, deregulate 
without marketizing, or commercialise  without 
privatising …’  
[Bakker, 2004]  
 
Having studied extensively the British case, Bakker uses it as an example in attesting 
that the privatisation of water supply industry in England and Wales in 1989 did not 
imply marketization, in the sense that it did not entail the introduction of a market  in the 
water abstraction licences, at the time.  Bakker continues arguing that it is essential to 
recognize to which  aspects of resource management we refer, when we use terms as  ‘ 
privatization’ and ‘ marketization’.  
 The utility of such a categorization lays in the helpfulness when approaching the 
analysis in the comparison of cases. It makes more sense and usefulness comparing 
reform cases that may be referred to similar categories , such as for example,  comparing 
the introduction of water markets in Chile 11 and  Colorado14 or in Australia13 and  
California 12  , rather than  the introduction of water rights for ‘ raw’ water in 
environment in California and the private sector participation in water supply 
management in an urban environment. In the last case different process are involved, on 
different bases -  marketization and private sector participation -  which show little room 
for comparison, in a proper analytical frame. 
 
 
   Marketization 
 
 
When water withdrawal permits are legally allowed to be traded between users,  this produces a ‘ 
water market ‘ .  
 
 
    WATER MARKETS IN THE US   
 
 
 
Water markets, in this way of describing them, are more common in the western United 
States where water is generally allocated through the principle of  ‘ prior appropriation’ 
(*) . However, other authors  point out that - whether or not there is legal recognition of 
the right to trade something - anything with value ( such as a permit to withdraw water) 
may be traded on the ground of  ‘informal’ markets. For example, the State of Florida has 
no formally recognized a trading scheme for  
development rights that require approved water supplies, but it shows to have   
‘ concurrency requirements’ that can hinder development in areas with water  
 
(*)  The prior appropriation doctrine, in dealing with water rights, states that water rights are determined 
by priority of beneficial (productive) use. This means that the first person to use water or divert water for 
a beneficial (productive)  use or purpose can acquire individual rights to the water that is  the first person 
to use a quantity of water from a water source for a beneficial use has the right to continue to use that 
quantity of water for that purpose. Subsequent users from the same source can use the remaining water 
for their own beneficial purposes provided that they do not impinge on the rights of previous users.  As 
the first individual user to withdraw water from a source for a beneficial use has the right to the same 
amount of water for perpetuity, as long as he/she continues to use the water for the same purpose. Seniority 
is protected under this method, as new users are only allowed to use the remaining water as long as it does 
not affect the previous users. After determining the capacity of the shared water source for a given year, 
the appropriators receive their full appropriation of water, in order of seniority based on the priority date, 
until the capacity of the source is exhausted. When water becomes scarce, junior appropriators may find 
themselves without any allotment of water. Water rights from prior appropriation are not connected to 
land ownership, and therefore are transferable between users. The transferability of the water rights has 
opened doors to water markets in some of the western States. Beneficial use is commonly defined as 
agricoltural, industrial or domestic use. Ecological purposes, such as maintaining a natural body of water 
and the wildlife that depends on it was not historically held to be beneficial uses but has recently been 
accepted in some jurisdictions.  
 
 
supply problems. Cynthia Barnett21 claims that developers in Southwest Florida have 
developed ‘informal’ trading mechanisms to get around these restrictions. Similarly, 
farmers in Piedmont North Carolina have been known to ‘informally’ trade water from 
streams that are running to other farmers whose sources are dried up, charging whatever 
price the two parties agree on. 
 
 
 
Water Markets Do Work ?   
The of Vision of  Prof. Joseph Dellapenna 
 
Yet others, as most notably Prof. Joseph Dellapenna22, disagree that true " water 
markets"  exist, outside rare circumstances.  In his articles, Dellapenna remarks  
that  markets are  introduced nowadays  as ‘ ideal institutions’  for water  
managers, at every level, both national and international being presented as functioning ‘ 
automatically ‘ and nearly  ‘ painlessly ‘. 
 As a result, Prof. Dellapenna  asserts that they are much in vogue, for this characteristics  
among the policy makers. Nevertheless true markets, however, have seldom existed for 
water rights and there are good reasons for believing, according to Dellapenna, that they 
seldom will. This is due to the fact that water is an ambient resource where the actions of 
any one user necessarily affect many other users.  Therefore, if true markets are to be 
relied on to allocate for particular uses and distribute water among users, the transaction 
costs of organizing contracts with all holders of water rights (let alone those holding less 
formal claims affected by a sale or lease) generally have been and will be predictably quite 
prohibitive.  
 
 
Prof. Joseph Dellapenna - Villanova University School of Law, Pennsylvania 
 Water, in short, is the quintessential public good for which markets simply do not work. 
Prof. Dellapenna explores the nature of markets and the forms of property developed for 
the rights to use water, explaining why water has customarily been treated as a public 
good. In Dellapenna’ s position  water , when treated as a ‘ common property may lead 
tragically to its over exploitation  as soon as water becomes a scarce commodity, 
describing also the market failures that emerge from of treating the right to water as being 
private property. Prof. Dellapenna uses the California Water Bank case as an example  - 
a case usually made in support to the thesis that  ‘ markets for water do work ‘ , but he 
finds the regulatory pattern  beneath it, explaining how it is ‘ masqueraded as a market ‘.  
Dellapenna’s position, in dealing with water trade in US, likes to stress the importance of 
recognising a correct naming of the mechanisms in action 
 
“ If we do not get the names right, we cannot expect affairs to be in order ” 
[ Joseph Dellapenna – former Director of the Model Water 
Code Project , American Society of Civil Engineers - 
International expert on Water Law]  
  
 
 
 
Dellapenna presents a "regulated riparian mode “ for water management that operates in 
US on the basis that water is a form of inherently public property about which basic 
allocation distribution decisions must be made by public agencies. In his view, he leaves 
room for  various economic incentives, including fees, taxes, and water banks as a possible 
way to finance and managing water as a public property, and that true markets must remain 
a marginal phenomenon to the enterprise of managing large quantities of water for the 
benefit of numerous users. 
Commenters are now proposing the idea of ‘ quasi market ‘to describe institutions that 
promote trades but that, for one reason or another, do not present all the attributes 
classically attributed to markets.  In US. The N.C. Water Allocation Study has begun a 
discussion of the costs, benefits and implementation issues of developing water markets 
or quasi-markets in North Carolina. 
 
 
Water , as an Economic Good  
 
THE CASE of WATER RIGHT MARKETS  in  CHILE   
 
    The General Context 
 
The theme of  water  as an  ‘economic good‘  that  is overlooked through reforms that 
are undertaken on the basis of an economic approach, therefore making use of market 
incentives and of other economic instruments to increase the efficiency of water use and 
allocation, is well represented by the history of the Water reforms that took place in 
Chile in the last decades of the XXth century. Carl Bauer23, Jessica Budds24 and other 
scholars documented, from the field, the strict relationship between water and power 
and the role played by water reforms undertaken throughout the country in the context 
of the consolidation of a bunch of neo-liberal reforms that brought to the establishment, 
in 1981, of the Chilean Water Code. 
 
  
 The Chilean example exhibits a water reform that took its shape rooted on the first wave 
of reforms of neo-liberal  brand,  heavily sustained by the US, reforms in which  all Latin 
American governments were pushed towards the reformation of their internal economic 
programs to adopt  free market policies.  These policies, generally renown as ‘ the 
Washington Consensus‘, were strongly advocated by the major multilateral financial 
institutions of the time such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
The results of such reform policies had been strongly contended across the last decades 
among various commentators36, and, unequivocally, their impacts showed to be dramatic 
especially because such neo-liberalistic policies -  mainly based on the establishment of 
private property rights, and on their tradability - demonstrated to be entrenched in 
a too narrow interpretation of neo-liberal principles, with a predominant emphasis on 
privatisation and on free markets operations, to the detriment of social equity and 
institutional correctness.  
 
 The Chilean Example  
“… Chilean Water Markets have enjoyed good press 
recently, shining in the reflected glow of the 
country’s dynamic economic growth…Nonetheless, 
the empirical result suggest that the Chilean model 
is something for other countries to learn from rather 
than to copy….”  
 
[ Carl Bauer, 1998..] 
 
Since the 1981 Water Code*  was promulgated, Chile remained one of the main examples 
at international level of water policies that well incarnate free market principles.  
 
(*)  In 1951, Chile adopted a precedent Water Code that provided a system of water rights administration, 
and  granted licenses to private parties for the exclusive use of water, very similar to the system practiced 
in the Western US. In that the government granted provisional water rights that became protected property 
rights after being used.  In 1967, a new Water Code was enacted to replace that of 1951 and was part of the 
Chilean agrarian law reform. The 1967 Water Code was intended to empower landowners to receive water, 
and attempted to redistribute water as a component of the governments strategy to reform agrarian policy. 
The 1967 Water Code strengthened Government control of water and enabled redistribution of large estates 
and the expropriation of land and water rights to be reallocated and without any compensation to the 
previous holders. Land expropriated prior to 1974 was divided into small farms and the rights to land and 
water were granted to the current occupants, including approximately 48,000 small farmers. Partly due to 
these reforms, and partly the deteriorating economic situation, prepared the terrain for the military 
overthrow of Pres. Allende, in 1973. The new military government of General Pinochet began adopting 
free-market economic policies and then signed a new constitution in 1980. The 1981 Water Code was 
enacted in those circumstances. 
 
 In the two decades after the Code saw a raise in the interest among other countries’ 
researchers25 and international development organisations in studying Chile, as it offered 
a unique opportunity to study the results and the effects, the strengths and the weaknesses 
in the experiment of  market – oriented water policies. ‘ No country has taken the 
experiment as far as Chile ‘ says Bauer, who dedicated a major effort in digging deep 
into this experiment through his research. The Chilean case demonstrates : 
 “ How water markets work, how they fail to work and the 
importance of institutional and legal framework, when 
regulating the issue. “ 
 
Water Property  and Water Ownership:  Rights and Exclusion 
 to the Right 
 
The Chilean example – as many cases in Latin America -  turns to be at the center of the 
debate between proponents36 and opponents of ‘market–friendly’ environmental policies 
especially  for what regards the definition of the concept of  ‘property rights‘,  in its 
application to water. In her reflection on privatisation also Bakker asserts, that a ‘ water 
property right ‘, in its general term, refers to a wide variety of privileged uses across the 
world and historic times, and can be very different in the various parts of the world. 
Bakker ‘s  concept o ‘property’ is subject to evolution, being tightly bound to the social 
relations.   
“ Property is not a fixed object framed by economic 
rationality;  it is a  social relation that can evolve over time. 
“  
       [ K. Bakker ]  
 
Nevertheless - at least in the case she mentions of Bolivian water rights - the creation of 
‘ water rights ‘ even when expressed in the case of  ‘ rights of communities of indigenous 
people ‘ - and therefore solicited in a collective form – may be always an element of the 
mainstream (neoliberistic) development model as long as it defines privileged uses for 
water for some and the exclusions for others that are not part of the Community owning 
the right35.  Therefore Bakker ascribes that even the collective water rights ( studied in 
the case of Bolivian indigenous communities) may reflect a nuance of extreme 
‘privatisation feature‘ in the appropriation  of water.  
In any case, always following Bakker :  
 
“ Water rights create the possibility of the creation of   
Water markets, in which water right ‘owners’ are to be 
reimbursed for allowing “ their “ water  to be diverted to others. 
In other words, a system of water rights  akin to private 
property rights is being created . 
… An ethic of exclusive ownership  of water resources  
by some communities implies difficulties to re-allocate 
resources for the state… “ 
 
In practise,  
 “ ..Although these rights may provide some communities with 
an opportunity to engage in market exchange, via the sale of 
water rights,  they may not necessarily enable the poor 
within or beyond these communities to reap the benefits that 
markets can putatively provide“  
 
As always, it is most often an issue of redistribution either of the resource or the 
benefit that comes from the use of the resource. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
The Market Approach to Water Rights 
 
 The Free-market Efficiency in allocating water resources  
 
Since the neo-liberal market approach was applied in Chile, other countries in the region 
initially took this model as a guiding standard and tried to copy it24 . Some economists 
have hailed Chile’s water rights trading system, which was established in 1981, as a model 
of free-market efficiency that allocates water to its highest economic use.  
 
 
 Private Property Rights  
 
 For the right point of views, in Chile water is formally  ‘ a national good of public 
use ‘ , where, nevertheless individual property rights  over water enjoy a very strong 
protection  
Private Water Rights are recognized in its Constitution, in Article 24:  
 
 
“ Private Water Rights, recognized or constituted in 
conformity with  the law, shall grant their holders 
ownership over them . “  
   [ Constitution of Chile, Article 24 ] 
 
 
 
This means, in practise, that water rights in Chile override other regulatory norms.  
To enforce this approach, practically, Water Rights must be defined as a Property that 
is  :  
1. Private 
2. Exclusive 
3. Transferable 
 
 Freedom to Use ( and Abuse ) for the Owner 
 
When in 1981 the Water Code was issued, during the military dictatorship, it granted ‘ 
total, permanent  freedom to the owner of the way in which using water’ , in 
such a way that the owner may use or may not use his rights to water , or can transfer them 
separately from the land, to use them anywhere else or  sell them on the market.  
 
 “ The idea is that free market will be able, through the 
competition among users and among different water uses, to choose 
and redistribute water rights to the user, or sector, with the most 
profitable use for the water resource…  “  
“ By granting water rights to the economically most 
beneficial, valuable use, the regulatory function of the free 
market would increase  the value and the efficiency of the water 
use28 “ 
   [ C. Bauers  and  A. Dourojeanni, Sustainable 
Development Water Experts ]   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Expected Optimisation of Multiple Uses 
 
 
“ By setting the real price of water on the market and, in 
general, commoditizing the resource multiple uses of water 
could be compared, determining the ‘optimal’ uses and users “  
[ C . Bauer ]   
 
Restrained Government Intervention   
 
According to this view, Government intervention must be limited ‘ to facilitating 
transactions among water users ‘ , reinforcing contracts among players, and 
protecting private property  ( Bauer 1998 ). 
 
Condition for Success in Water Trading  
 
In some regions of Chile, water markets have been successful at achieving the original 
objectives of reallocating water to higher-value uses and capturing economic efficiencies 
through trading. 
Economic instruments in Chile showed to be beneficial under certain situations, for 
example, when applying the ‘ polluter pays principle ’ , or in the support of the 
reorganisation of water management within a territory where the productive system and 
the social relations were already highly market oriented  - providing the  condition of a 
legal and administrative framework that effectively regulate and protects the 
environmental and collective interests.  
 
 
Failures of Water Trading  
 
However, in the case of the Andean communities, the commoditization of water rights 
entailed enormous environmental and social justice problems, and often has the opposite 
effect from what was intended.  
“The Chilean model has gone too far in the direction of 
unfettered regulation. It hasn’t thought through the public 
interest.”  
  
“ Australia and the Western United States have somewhat 
comparable systems, but they contain stronger 
environmental regulation and conflict resolution than 
Chile’s “ 
 [C Bauer, 2009 ] 
 
Especially when social usage priorities are not established, and beneficial use in not 
prescribed, the most powerful actors, like, for instance, large mining companies are 
free to accumulate and speculate with water rights29. 
 [ Solanes and Gonzalez – Villareal, 1999] 
 
Therefore water rights are often transferred or purchased  by the economically most powerful 
entities at the expense of subsistence communities 30.  
                                  [ Castro, 2002 ] 
In the Andean countries reality fails to resolve multisectoral water rights conflicts, where 
there is no  strong and effective legal and institutional framework to support it. In this 
situation such a water policy not only encourages accumulation, monopolization and 
speculation with water rights by the dominant sectors,  
But it also tends to foster disorganisation, by individualizing water management and 
externalising conflict resolution. 
 
 
 
The Gap between the Theory and the Practise 
 
The predominant view among economists and thinkers inside and outside of Chile is that 
Chilean water markets and the’ Chilean model’ of water management and broader economic 
development and have been a success - and this perception has strengthened  other 
countries’ decision to follow Chile’s example in applying  free market-oriented water law 
reforms. Nevertheless, much of the debate about Chilean 
water markets, has been based more on theoretical or political beliefs than 
on empirical study. Therefore the applied studies from the field collected by researchers like 
Carl Bauer of Budds that observed the evolution of these markets in the last decades assume 
particular significance, within a context of the mainstream culture, because of their 
considerations on long-term practises. 
in theory, the Water code strengthens user organisation and grants them greater autonomy 
over using their rights, it does not help with conflict resolution and with collaboration 
among users 
 
Concentration of Powers  
 
 
As Hendriks 31 notes, studying the effects of Chilean water policies on the practises of 
peasant irrigation systems : 
 
     
  “ The more individual owners of water, the fewer owners “. 
 
 “ Because private rights are So strong relatively to the State’s regulatory 
authority, the bigger and more powerful water users have little 
incentives to negotiate. Irrigators, on the other hand, have less bargaining 
power, less political influence and face higher transaction costs in organising 
themselves . Moreover, the electric companies are national political players, 
while the irrigators influence is more local and regional “ [Bauer 1998 ] 
 
 
 
 
Failure of  Water market  transactions.  
 
Exclusion of Social Groups from markets 
 
In 1999, two water experts at ECLAC, Dourojeanni and Jouravlev,   published a 
comprehensive analysis of the Chilean Water Code, curiously entitled ‘‘Between ideology 
and reality’’ in which they tried to explain why water markets turned  to be in practise 
inactive in Chile and why the water rights transactions have been so uncommon, trying to 
give an explanation  of  the various factors behind such  failure. Many marginal social 
groups, particularly the poor and  politically disenfranchised, lost access to water which had 
been protected under a range of historical and  traditional rights. Limited access to 
information and  prohibitive transaction costs largely excluded some groups from 
registering water use or engaging in trade. 
 
 
Speculation, Accumulation, Excessive Monopoly Power.  Resistance to further 
Reforms.  
 
In their report Dourojeanni and Jouravlev , describe the problems with the original allocation 
of water rights: speculation, accumulation and hoarding, by  excessive monopoly 
power28.  They argue that these problems have been  serious in the case of non-
consumptive rights and the electric sector,  and less serious  unimportant in the case of 
consumptive rights and agriculture. They analysed the various factors that explain why 
water markets have been so inactive in Chile and why water rights transactions have been 
so uncommon.  
  
In the following years, although the Government attempted to review the legislation proposing 
combined public and private multisectoral agencies for watershed management , the ‘ 
resistance ‘ by powerful stakeholders has been still  hegemonic and still resists 
strongly against state interference in any private or corporate business. 32 (ECLAC 
1998).  
 
 
 
Failures at Basin Level 
 
Lack of Coordination among Different Uses and lack of Conflict Resolution 
 
The task of coordinating different water uses at the level of river basin is left mainly to 
voluntary bargaining among private right holders and their organisations. Because 
state intervention is so limited, when bargaining fails the conflicts are supposed to be settled 
by the ordinary civil courts. Conflicts37 among multiple users (f. i. agriculture and 
mining) are also arising. 
 
 
 
Extinct River flows and Multiplied Environmental Pollution  
 
Economic development based on market rights has multiplied water pollution 
problems, underground water management issues, problems in preserving 
ecological flows, and in governing transfers of water between basins . All these 
problems have been left to be settled through ordinary civil law courts, between private 
and privatised players of unequal power.” 33 [Bauer 1998, Boelens and Davila 1998 ]. 
The system failed to protect the environment,  as market-based allocation encouraged over-
registration, speculation and the transfer of water rights across  hydrological 
boundaries, whilst administrative control of the resource had been significantly 
undermined. [ WWF – 2007]. 
 QUILLAGUA – THE DRIEST PLACE ON EARTH 
WITHERING OF A TOWN IN ATACAMA DESERT 34  
 
A Picture journey through water markets’ shrinking dowry. 
 
Quillagua, as is was  
 
Rio Loa, Quillagua, Chile. 
 
Quillagua is a town is recorded , in the book  as the driest place on earth during the past four 
decades.  The town had a  river, feeding an oasis, in the Atacama desert.  
Quillagua is also close to mining companies.  
In the years, mining companies have polluted and bought up so much of the water according 
to the residents - that for months each year the river is little more than a trickle ( un goccio 
it.) and its unusable quality  for feeding their livestock. 
Quillagua, as it is now. 
 
 
Quillagua, listed as earth's driest place by the Guinness World Records, reached a 
population of 800 in the 1940s. Now 120 people live there. Most of the people left their 
houses and land in the 1960s after the lagoon that had sustained them dried up. 
 
 “ Concerns about water shortages plague Chile’s economic 
expansion through the exploitation of its natural resources like copper, 
fruits and fish — all of which require loads of water in  a country 
with limited supplies of it… “  
             [ Alexei Barrionuevo –  Correspondant  
      to The New York Times ] 
  
 
Alejandro Sanchez, 77 visiting  fields that once grew corn and alfalfa. [Photo :  NYTimes] 
  
 
Chile is the Largest producer of Copper in the world, and one of the largest of Lithium. 
The water discharges from mining activities are heavy and strongly impacting on the 
environment.  
 In Chile, where water rights are private property and not a public resource, 
agricultural producers and mining companies ‘siphon off’ rivers and tap scarce 
water supplies.  
 
 
Now, the few remaining citizens Quillagua that didn’t leave the town, attract their tourists 
with the 108 meteor crater sites present around town. 
“ In the north, agricultural producers are competing with mining companies 
to siphon off rivers and tap scarce water supplies, leaving towns like this one bone 
dry and withering. “  
      [ Alexei Barrionuevo –  Correspondant  
      to The New York Times] 
 
 
 
    Mr Alejandro Sanchez , aged 77, showing the fields of corn that he used to grow. 
 
“Everything, it seems, is against us,” says Bartolomé Vicentelo, aged 79, who 
once grew crops and fished for shrimp into the Loa River, and is resisting in living 
in Quillagua. 
 
 
  “ Nowhere is the system for buying and selling water more  
  permissive than here in Chile  “  
 [ C Bauer ] 
 
In Chile, where water rights are private property and not a public resource, 
agricultural producers and mining companies siphon off rivers and tap scarce water 
supplies. Drinking water is trucked into Quillagua because the river that fed this 
oasis town is contaminated and almost dried up by mining discharges. 
 
 “ Private ownership is so concentrated in some areas that a single electricity 
company from Spain, Endesa , has bought up 80 percent of the water rights in a 
huge region in the south, causing an uproar.  
 
 
Mining Legacy  
 
 
Polluted water, blue with chlorine at the Lithium mine in Atacama 
Valley. 
  
 
  
The Atacama desert grows more that a meter per day. Two thirds of 
Chile’s territory is facing desertification.  
Social Protests 
 
“  Water rights are private property, not a public 
resource, and can be traded like commodities with little 
government oversight or safeguards for the 
environment. “ 
                [ C Bauer, 2009 ] 
 
 
In recent years, Chile and many other Governments of Latin America  had to back track 
on their hard neo-liberistic programs after extensive public protests, that obliged them 
to make amendments in their laws for the protection of the environment and. the 
safeguard of the indigenous rights. [ A Dourojeanni ] 
  
 
 
 
A Sustainability Dilemma  
 
 “ The dilemma we are facing now is whether we can permit ourselves to 
continue to develop with the same amount of water we have now” 
        [Rodrigo Weisner, Chile’s Water Director  
         Public Works Ministry ] 
 Chapter 3. Glossary 
Market-based Instruments (MBI): instruments of environmental policy that use markets, 
price, and other economic tools to create economic incentives to reduce  or 
eliminate pollution, and to incorporating the external cost of production or 
consumption of resource in various ways, as taxes, transferable permits. 
 
 
Market-based Tax approach : the polluter chooses its own   tax-rate under which he can 
lead its productive activity . The maximum cost of the measures to reduce pollution 
if fixed; the quantity of pollution reduced depends on the chosen tax rate. 
 
 
Market-based Transferable Permit : sets a ‘ cap ‘ , or  a maximum level of pollution, which 
can be transferred , or traded through the market. 
 Nevertheless, as all market–based tools , critics reports that the maker of the permits 
can be heavily influenced by market strengths, like liquidity (the power to be sold 
without loss of value), being auctioned or allocated through grandfathering20 ( 
namely exemptions to the new rules, for priviledged cathegories) and/or other market 
(or political) powers. 
 
 
Water Licences   
( Water Rights )  : refer to the Right of a user to use water from a water source (a river, a stream, 
a pond or a groundwater source ). They may be land-based (like riparian rights in 
eastern US) or use-based rights (western US). The firsts are based on land ownership 
or possession,  the seconds rely only on the legal access of water user to the source 
and are disconnected to the ownership of the land; they can be traded and 
transferable. In case of riparian rights, water right cannot be sold or transferred 
without its adjoining land, while water cannot be transferred out of the watershed. 
Riparian rights include: the right to access for swimming, boating and fishing, and 
the right to wharf out to a point of navigability, the right to erect structures such as 
docks, piers, and boat lifts; the right to use the water for domestic purposes; the 
right to accretions caused by water level fluctuations. Riparian rights also apply the 
"reasonable use" principle, to ensure that the rights of one riparian owner are 
weighed fairly and equitably with the rights of adjacent riparian owners. Among the 
use-based rights,  appropriation rights are the most common. The appropriation 
doctrine confers upon the owner who actually diverts and uses water the right to do 
so, provided that the water is used for “reasonable and beneficial” uses, regardless 
of whether that person owns land contiguous to the watercourse. Between 
appropriators, the rule of priority of use is 'first in time, first in right’ (prior 
appropriation principle). 
 
 
 
 
Privatisation  : We’ll use here the term water privatisation in its wider use, in the way it is  
commonly used by the public, and therefore omitting the technical specifications , as 
may be found in the economics approaches 
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Chapter 4.  
 
A Tribute to Allan. The Politics of Water in 
Allan’s Vision.  
 
  In the panorama of most acknowledged experts of the water politics contemporary scene, 
John Anthony Allan represents one of the most ample and versatile figures, with an in-depth vision 
and densely formulated political economical reflections, which he draws from his life-long 
acquaintance with dynamics on Middle East and North African countries, as well as a worldwide 
advisory activity. Allan’s voce is unique because of its multidisciplinary view upon water - deeply 
rooted into the field  of the human geography tradition - always open to the refreshing breath of 
new scientific intuitions – always inclusive, never closed , to the contribution of any other science, 
being it human or technical, that aims to put itself into a discursive frame with other disciplinary 
thoughts, in the attempt, never ended, to shed a glimpse of truth on the multifaceted reality that 
water issues propose. Allan discovers each time new perspective angles, contemporary new and 
timeless, grounded in (the honesty of)  pure scientific approach, which assigns to the scientist the 
worthy role of appraising the truth and making use of always new views and panoramic for the 
investigation while  remaining faithful to the original object of disentangling water issues/politics 
dynamics, always focused on the human. 
Allan’s reflections cover decades of water politics achievements, from risk perceptions, to the global 
water scarcity , to the Integrated Water Resource Management, to the effects of Trade of goods and 
services on water resources, this one, a last intuitively genuine conception, ,the one of Virtual Water, 
which is product of Allan’s  intuitive mind, which represents one of the modern highest scientific 
achievements and with the amplest ripercussion on modern research 
 On Reviewing the  Water Management Predicament  
 
 “ The last year of the twentieth century witnessed an unprecedented 
level of international discourse involving the world's water users, 
managers and policy makers. They engaged in intense consultative 
activities. They reviewed the global water predicament  
and identified ways to secure regional water environments and the 
societies and economies which depend on them. The preparatory 
process produced numerous reports for the Second World Water 
Forum in The Hague in March 2000 (World Water Council 2000, 
GWP 2000, World Water Commission 2000). During the consultations 
for the report writing attention was drawn to the fundamental political 
nature of the pre-Hague process (Allan 1999). But the authors of the 
numerous reports were unable to escape their assumptions that water 
was a narrow hydrological phenomenon rather than a multi-
dimensional resource enmeshed in nested political economies. 
Nor could they think or write outside the technical and economic ideologies  
There was talk of civil society, governance and stakeholders, even of political 
commitment. But the discourse failed the challenge of recognising that innovative 
outsider scientific information as well as outsiders principles of economy, equity 
and the environment are subordinate to local political milieux into which they 
would have to be introduced.  “ 
 
   [ Tony Allan – Millennial Water Management Paradigms ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 On Water as an Economic Resource  
 
 
 “ At The Hague (2000) the political reaction 
 to advocating that water is an economic resource  
rather than a social resource  
was strongly contended. “ 
 
[ T. Allan – Millennial Water Management Paradigms ] 
 
 
 
“ Water pricing instruments and privatisation  
were also very loudly contested  
from the first moments  
of the Forum.” 
 
[ T. Allan , speaking of the Second World Water Forum, in Le Hague] 
 
  
 
 On Water as a Political Resource  
     
 
 
 
 “ The purpose  
is to draw attention 
 to the necessity of starting  
with the political contexts  
in which water resources  
are allocated and managed. “ 
 “ The 5 Paradigms “ 
 
“ The purpose of this study 
is to draw attention 
to  the paradigms 
that have determined the way 
that water resources 
have been perceived 
and managed 
during the twentieth century.  
( including those that influenced the authors 
of The Hague Forum reports  
and those that contested them  ). “ 
 
 
1, 2. The hydraulic mission 
 (Swingedouw ). 
   The paradigm that Nature  
   could be controlled  
   was one of the ideas that  
  dominated both capitalist  
  and socialist versions 
        of industrial modernity  
   - during the first 75 years 
   of the century. 
 
 
 3.  A paradigm based on the notion that 
environmental resources such as water 
were being damaged rather than controlled 
by the impact of the alliance of science, 
engineering and national investment gained 
currency in the North and Northern donors 
by the mid-1970s. 
This paradigm reflecting environmental 
concern has only achieved very limited  
purchase on water policy making in the 
South of the world. 
 
 
 
4. In the 1990s a further 
set of principles gained  
currency. That water is  
an economic resource.  
       This idea seized the  
      Northern professional 
      Community.  
      The same idea has been  
      resoundingly rejected  
  in the South.   
        
 
 
5. The Fifth Paradigm. 
        
Emerged in the last years of the 1990s,  that of Integrated Water Resource 
Management (IWRM).  
 
It requires a new holistic approach and an unprecedented level of political 
cooperation. 
 
 
 
 
The Next Water Paradigm : Influencing Politics 
 
 
 
 “ The Next essential water resource management 
paradigm is that water users can assimilate 
IWRM if  the innovation of integration is 
appreciated as a political process and not just  
as a ‘technical’, ‘investment’ or 
 ‘information sharing’ process. “ 
    
“ Water policy will be transformed if it is      
politically feasible. 
Influencing political feasibility 
is the next essential 
water resource paradigm.” 
 
Innovation in Water reforms 
 
‘Such innovation will be achieved by taking an inclusive approach and 
emphasising the institutional dimension of the inescapably political integrated 
water resource management.’  
 
 
 
Different Community Reactions 
  
‘Water allocating and managing communities world-wide are diverse. Variously 
endowed and differentially developed socially, politically and economically.’ 
The economies of the plural North are relatively rich and deeply integrated into 
global information and trading systems. 
 
  
 
 
 
Proper Communication of Scientific Knowledge 
 
‘ Those concerned to communicate new knowledge and to promote innovatory 
water policy reform must be clear about the phase of innovation with which they 
are concerned ‘ 
 
 
 
Awareness 
 
“ Achieving widespread awareness, at all levels of 
the water using and water policy-making 
communities, that water’s role in livelihood futures 
is as important as its current role in securing 
existing livelihoods, is essential. “ 
 
Innovation and Interests 
 
“ Those who have a stake in the status quo will  
effectively resist the economically and environmentally inspired 
innovations of water use efficiency and the newest  
concepts of environmental sustainability.” 
 
 
Sustainability : Economic  
and Social Dimensions 
 
 
 Fortunately Sustainability is no longer just  
an  ecological concept.  Economic and social  
dimensions are recognised to be as integral to  
the definition of sustainability as are the  
environmental priorities that were   
constructed by the green movement  
from the 1950s and 1960s. 
 Global Water Deficit  
‘In the Vision of Le Hague, 
FFA process water specialists 
Are trying to export their  
perceptions of the risk  
of a global water deficit  
to peoples who have 
overwhelming local anxieties 
resulting from  extreme poverty, 
and to politicians fearful of  
social instability 
Water poverty is just one of their deficits.’ 
 
 
Mary Douglas’ Ways of Life’ 
‘A number of social theorists have pointed out 
that individuals and communities take different 
approaches to the way they perceive and utilise 
resources. Douglas developed her group/grid 
theory to provide insights into the attitudes and 
the expectations that determine the approach of 
major group of players.’ 
[ from Who’s playing the Game: competing inspirations. 
in Hydropolitics and the Global Economy ] 
 
 
       
 
 
  Fatalists/     Hierarchists 
/ The mass of governed    / Government 
 
 
 
 
 
 Individualists/      Ethicists / 
 / Enterpreneurs    / NGO  
 Private Sector          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Hierarchists  
 
‘ First there are the individuals and political and bureaucratic elites which can exert 
influence on affairs through holding high positions in political hierarchies. These are 
the hierarchists, with power, democratically or  otherwise founded, in positions in 
government departments, in religious bodies and in the institutions that regulate and 
provide public services. ‘ 
 
The Fatalists 
‘ Second, Douglas termed  the mass of people , that is civil society, the fatalists. 
Their role was to be responsive to the influences of individuals and institutions in other 
cathegories.’ 
 
The Individualists 
‘ Thirdly , she identified individualists or entrepreneurs, who sought opportunities to 
use and combine resources to provide goods and services. ‘ 
 
 
The Ethicicsts 
‘ Finally , there were the ethicists, or egalitarians, who are inspired by principles of 
equity and, in the case of water, also by principles of environmentalism and economics. 
They want to improve the way that water is allocated and managed ‘. 
 
 
This theory is very helpful in highlighting the political relationships between those 
inspired by the different approaches to allocating and managing water.  It is also helpful 
in identifying those contributing to the water policy discourses and especially in 
identifying the sources of new ideas that might influence regional hydropolitical 
processes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Hydropolitical Discourse 
 
‘ The role of politics is integrating the contention over the use and allocation of water, 
as illustrated (in the figure). Water is conceptualised as playing a role in the 
environment, in providing society’s needs and in providing an input to the economy. 
Each of these uses is at a point of a triangle. The relative and changing demands for 
water by society, the economy and the environment are represented by the arrows: as 
the volumes of water required by the respective users increase, the pull from each area 
increases. The resultant impact of the three water demand depends on the effectiveness 
with each contending demand can communicat, through the hydropolitical discourse, 
and legitimise its ideological and political arguments. ‘ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Allan ( 2002 ) 
 
Environment 
      Sustainability  
          through the 
      Hydropolitical    
         Discourse  
Society 
Economy & 
Tech 
Foucault and Discourse Analysis 
 
‘ The explanations of Foucault (1969, 1971, and 1980), concerning the lack of free will 
for individuals and the communities ‘ discoursing ‘ in political entities also brings 
useful theory to a discussion of the water politics. Foucaluts argues that normal politics 
involves the interaction of interests. The resulting tension creates outcomes, which he 
termed ‘ networks of consensus ’ for which he used the word discourse.  ‘ Discourse ‘ 
, in this usage, is a  form of power, the discursive power. 
Foucalts used this term to conceptualise the discursive power within a political entity, 
to distinguish it from coercive power. The discourse, is the outcome of the contention 
in formal, and informal (water) political processes. Such discursive power is not just 
concentrated in the hands of a few: it is dispersed in the networks through which the 
contending parts comunicate and share knowledge.  Those in formal power, experience 
‘limits’ to their free will, as well as those they ‘govern’, and receive from the process 
of contention signals of what is politically feasible. Foucaultina insight explain why 
politician speak with many voices and fail to implement sound economic and political 
policies, of which they are aware. Such politicians are not ‘ free’ to initiate water 
reforms because they are part of a system in which their inputs are just some of many.  
Their role is often to legitimise what is determined by the ‘ discourse’. Often, in (a 
country) water politics, many of the statements of water resource use are determined 
by the national ‘ discourse ’ and not by the recommendations of government servants, 
or from outside. 
 
 
 
 
 
Interdisciplinary Analysis : an Applied discipline. 
 
‘ …Reference has been made to hydrological systems, to the environment, to 
environmental management implying engineering and institutional instruments,  to 
water, to economics, to social theories (belief systems), to law, to politics and to 
international relations. The framework has developed over a decade of 
interdisciplinary endeavour. One of the outcomes of that research is a conviction that 
explanation cannot be found in a single discipline , and an (even more strongly held ) 
conviction that analysis based on a single disciplinary approach is unsafe. ‘  
 
 
 
‘ Interdisciplinarity is demanding (..) , and risky of attracting sharp and destructive 
analysis by scientists with more specific disciplinary expertise .. Yet, firms, 
governments, and other entities which get things done have to address problems which 
are inherently interdisciplinary. ‘ 
 
Virtual water: The Mighty Invisible  
 
‘ In complex industrialised economies the role of water is very important, but the role 
may be not as visible as it is in a subsistence system, where all inputs are locally 
accessed: the soil, the water, the livestock, the cultivating systems and the labour. 
 In industrialised economies only a small part  of water used is evident ( the drinking 
and the domestic water). Some other water used, is also evident, for example any water 
laboriously delivered to fields for crop production. But some even more important 
water, namely soil water, is less evident, unless there is a draught.   In these 
circumstances the absence of soil water has an economic impact.  Such soil water is 
not even accounted in the national water budgets. 
 Water use by industry and services is misunderstood (..).  How much people know 
how much, or how little, water their firm, their office, their school uses per year1 ?  At 
the extreme of invisibility, the water embedded in imported commodities, such as food 
has no profile at all (2000) . This last water, in practise, gives life to the individual and 
balances and stabilises water deficit economie2. The political economy of virtual water 
in incalculable…’ 
 
 
1  A university, in a central city in an industrialised economy can be concentrated on a hectare. In mid 
90s it used 10,000 m3/year of water, costing $15,000 (for water and sewage services) and employed 
1000-full time and part time staff, that is 1000 jobs, educated 3500 students per year, provided 
international library, consulting and other specialist services and tuned over $ 45 million per year, in 
1996. If it had been a wheat field, the activity would also have used 10,000 m3/ year of rainfall falling 
on the site and would only have turned over about $1,200 per year, and have provided 1 / 20th of one 
livelihood. ( data for SOAS, located in Central London,1995). 
 
 
. 
 
  In 2008,Tony Allan was awarded  the Stockholm World Water Prize,  
  for his Virtual Water concept ( here,with Princess Victoria of Sweden) 
 
 
A vast new field of research developed, starting from the concept of Virtual Water,  
 
conceived by Prof. Tony Allan. 
 
 
 
His legacy of Present researches move forward in such direction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How Much Water do We need for … ? 
 
        
 
 
 
           
 
 
The Amounts of Water  
Virtually embedded  
in producing  
a commodity 
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